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In the last three decades governmental policy in prioritization of medicines is 
increasingly legitimized through the scientization of the decision-making process on 
the one hand and a separation in policy production and policy execution on the 
other. The discourse on health care reimbursement decisions has likewise been 
dominated by increased rationalization and formalization of the decision-making 
process. Since the early 1990s the Dutch government and arm’s length agencies 
have undertaken much effort to regulate pharmaceutical care, mainly by 
emphasizing the role evidence should have in decision-making on the appropriate 
use of medicines at all levels, from decisions on insurance schemes coverage to 
prescriptions at the point of care (Commissie Dunning 1991; Gezondheidsraad 
1991; College voor zorgverzekeringen 2007). The Dutch government has 
developed a series of tools to promote rational prescribing – such as professional 
guidelines authorized by state agencies, real-time monitoring systems and the 
conditional reimbursement of medicines – aimed at improving the quality and 
efficiency of care, and enabling the control of pharmaceutical health care 
expenditure (College voor zorgverzekeringen 2005; Niezen et al. 2007).  
 
Despite the rationalisation of decision-making, governmental policymakers still 
experience difficulties in explaining the foundations for their decisions. Moreover, 
the execution of the health regulations in daily practice appears to deviate 
substantially from the intended policy and its underlying principles (Niezen et al. 
2007). The Dutch drug reimbursement system is based on a bureaucratic system 
logic; if rational decision criteria are used, consistent and legitimate decision-
making has taken place. The definition of formulary lists (medicines eligible for 
funding) presumes that appropriate medicine use and reimbursement not only can 
be defined, but subsequently can be implemented in health care provision. Thus, 
when health care providers prescribe medicines according to the national 
formulary, appropriate drug use is warranted. However, there is a discrepancy 
between the decision-making process outcomes and actual practice of medicine 
prescription and reimbursement. This discrepancy points at potential legitimacy 
problems which require further research. What work practices can be observed that 
are supposed to lead to (more) legitimate decision-making? And, if legitimate 
decision-making can be observed, how does that wear off in clinical practice? 
Increasing the legitimacy of prioritization decisions might decrease the difference 
between policy and practice. Making use of a social scientific perspective this 
thesis analyses the (development of the) infrastructure of the Dutch drug 
reimbursement decision-making process and health care allocation instruments in 
order to gain insight in the practice of health care prioritization decision-making and 
the way this is legitimized.  
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Accounting for priority setting in health care 
Since the late 1970s the governance of scarce resources in health care and in 
particular the regulation of medicine use and reimbursement has dominated many 
policy agenda’s. Health care policymakers have been searching for ways to remain 
in control over health care expenditures to assure health systems’ sustainability. 
Simultaneously policymakers have been searching for ways to guarantee the 
access to and quality of health systems (Gezondheidsraad 1991; Raad voor de 
Volksgezondheid en Zorg 2007a; Raad voor de Volksgezondheid en Zorg 2007b). 
Most western governments are responsible for assuring the provision of 
accountable and accurate health care (services) to their citizens; the ‘right to 
health’. At the same time governmental decision-makers in the health care sector 
are confronted with the explosive growth of health care interventions, an ageing 
population combined with the increased public interest in health and well-being that 
comes with a strong economy. This creates a desire for more health care 
interventions than society may be prepared to pay for or is able to afford (Raad 
voor de Volksgezondheid en Zorg 2006). Subsequently, the policy agenda of 
health care is dominated by the question how one can meet this growing demand 
for health care with restricted means (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid Welzijn en 
Sport 1983). 
 
The primary response of governmental regulators to deal with scarcity of health 
resources is resource allocation and prioritization. With resource allocation, 
governments try to ensure that resources available to health care are put to optimal 
use. The priorities for the allocation of scarce resources are set via principles, 
values and/or defining practices (Sabik & Lie 2008). However, while the need for 
rationing in health care systems is widely acknowledged, the way the priority 
setting process is managed is still much debated. The principles used in deciding 
on the prioritization and/or rationing of health care services may vary: “treating 
people equally, favouring the worst-off, maximising total benefits, and promoting 
and rewarding social usefulness” (Persad, Wertheimer & Emanuel 2009, p.423). 
Moreover, the (combination of) mechanisms and principles used also depend on 
the health systems in place (social health insurance, tax based health systems, 
voluntary or private health insurance) in the different countries. Despite the 
existence of these decision criteria and/or frameworks, shaping an accountable 
decision-making process remains problematic. The reimbursement choices made 
based on the current decision framework including prioritization criteria such as 
effectiveness, efficiency and necessity regularly cause controversies and 
sometimes even are judged as unfair by different stakeholders (Kirejczyk et al. 
2003). Some examples are the (non) reimbursement of Viagra, IVF treatments or 
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the post-code prescribing of Herceptin (Stolk, Brouwer & Busschbach 2002; 
Borstkankervereniging Nederland 2005). 
 
In Dutch benefit package management the use of scientific knowledge in the 
decision-making process and a rational decision framework have been considered 
important to account for appropriate reimbursement regulations. Especially in the 
field of pharmaceutical care rationalizing and formalizing decision-making has 
increased, likely because the pharmaceutical care sector is clearly delineated so 
that implementation of new steering mechanisms is relatively easy (Ngo et al. 
2007). Decisions on pharmaceuticals should be rational, and based on scientific 
findings generated by ‘neutral’ specialists and research. Policymakers feel that 
adhering to the rules of science is a token of trustworthiness whereas basing 
decisions on consensus or individual judgment increases their arbitrariness (Dehue 
2000; Dehue 2005). Increasingly, the process of decision-making is made 
transparent in order to make legitimate decisions. The quest for rationalized 
rationing thus has led to objectivity and transparency in decision-making 
procedures as its central values. The explication of the decision framework and the 
information used in the decision-making process is expected to provide legitimacy 
for the drug reimbursement decisions and related regulations. Subsequently, the 
regulations and policy tools are expected to be followed in clinical practice. 
Regulatory instruments such as guidelines and medical databases are supposed to 
stimulate and control established appropriate medicine use in medical practice. 
Governmental regulation of medicines in this way includes the task of overseeing 
medical practice. 
Health technology assessment in current decision-making 
infrastructure 
The current infrastructure of Dutch benefit package management bases its 
legitimacy on both scientific evidence (evidence based medicine) and transparency 
of the decision-making process (laid down in procedures and laws). Especially 
health technology assessment (HTA) has gained importance in the decision-
making process for benefit package management. HTA can be defined as “a 
multidisciplinary field of policy analysis. It studies the medical, social, ethical, and 
economic implications of development, diffusion, and use of health technology” 
(International Network of Agencies for Health Technology Assessment (INAHTA) 
http://www.inahta.org/HTA./). Its use is widely accepted and stimulated within 
health care allocation decision-making (Banta and Jonsson 2009; Banta and 
Oortwijn 2000; Banta and Perry 1997). In a full HTA, health, (health) economic, 
social, legal, and ethical concerns are taken into account. However, when applied 
for resource allocation decision-making such as listing a drug on a national 
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formulary, the smaller definition of HTA, economic evaluation or cost-effectiveness 
analysis, is often used (Giacomini 1999; Lehoux & Blume 2000; Lehoux & Tailliez 
2004; Lehoux 2006). In fact, HTA in the form of economic evaluations has become 
the golden standard within the medicine allocation decision-making, since it is seen 
as a bridge between the domains of science and (health care) policy. It provides 
scientific evidence, and therefore robust, rational and objective evidence into the 
decision-making process.  
 
The use of HTA has not prevented criticisms on the current priority-setting 
infrastructure. Some known problems are related to the limits of health economics 
in the valuation of a health intervention: the uncertainty of information underlying 
economic calculation and the incompleteness of the economic model. Other 
problems relate to health economics as main source informing benefit package 
management, such as: lack of reflexivity and integration of other social, ethical, 
political aspects informing the worth of a health technology for society. Lastly, 
known problems concern the dissemination of benefit package management 
outcomes in medical practice. 
 
The first criticism targets the assumption of unproblematic economic modelling in 
benefit package management and focuses on the uncertainty of information and 
lack of deliberate reflexivity in current evaluation of medicines. Ashmore, Mulkay 
and Pinch (1989) analysed the introduction of the Quality Adjusted Life Year 
(QALY) and argued that the economization of health care enabled health care to 
be thought of and talked about in economic terms and to become part of the 
economic debate in general as well as gain grounds for health economics as a 
separate scientific discipline. “The apparent promise of health economics, that a 
rational grasp of, and thereby “control” over, health-care decision-making is 
possible, is hard to resist” (Berg, Van der Grinten & Klazinga 2004, p.36). Yet, the 
calculations of QALYs and in specific the valuation of health conditions after 
intervention is not as simple and unproblematic as promised. Moreover, the 
economization of health care evaluation inhibits the development of sustainable 
reflexive practice in the form of e.g. dialogue (deliberate reflexivity) (Ashmore, 
Mulkay & Pinch 1989). Nevertheless, health economic modelling has become the 
universal standard of rationality in health decision-making and therefore also 
stands for accountability of priority setting decisions. 
 
A second problem relates to the lack of integration of social, political, and ethical 
aspects of health technology into HTA. Lehoux and Blume (2000) explored the 
evaluation of the Cochleair implant – an electrode implanted surgically into the 
inner ear and designed to take over the task of a non-functioning cochlea – in order 
to gain insight in technological change and health technology assessment 
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practices. When the implementation practice was deemed appropriate and 
expanded to paediatric implementation based on health economic evaluation, 
protests arose mainly from the deaf community. Blume argues these continuous 
disputes could have been prevented if a socio-political perspective would have 
been included in the assessment of the cochlear implant (Blume 1997). However, 
in practice only little assessments embodied and took the concerns by the deaf 
community serious since these do not fit current assessment processes and 
arrangements. The neglect of the (socio-political) stakes in the controversy led to a 
situation in which traditional HTA proved insufficient to warrant the legitimacy of 
decisions on the value of a medical technology (Lehoux & Blume 2000). 
 
Another acknowledged problem is the dissemination of HTA in clinical practice. 
Lehoux (2006) argues that current benefit package management infrastructure 
does not address how to promote the design of innovations that are likely to be 
more valuable than others. Whether the products of HTA, the recommendations of 
appropriate drug reimbursement and use, are disseminated depends on the 
network of providers, consumers, manufacturers and the habits, routines, 
established practices, expertise, rules and laws that regulate the relations and 
interactions (Lehoux 2006; Edquist & Johnson 1997). Yet, HTA as a means of 
implementing knowledge-based change within health care systems falls short. The 
linear, rationalistic process underlying the benefit package management fails to 
sufficiently take into account its environment; seeking dialogue with or consultation 
of the network, integrate related routines and regulation. It is exactly the 
understanding of the infrastructure of decision-making, its environment and 
regulatory mechanisms that may facilitate or impede the implementation of 
recommendations. 
 
The Dutch government has struggled to cope with these problems of the drug 
reimbursement system. In the last decades the Dutch government has introduced 
and further defined decision criteria of the decision framework and improved the 
decision-making process, for example by introducing the requirement of 
pharmacoeconomic reports on a health technology (Commissie Dunning 1991). 
One of the main problems has been that despite the increasing number of 
economic evaluations of health technologies, their impact on policy decisions has 
been limited (Battista et al. 1994; Battista et al. 1999; Cookson & Maynard 2000; 
Stolk et al. 2005). The case of the reimbursement of sildenafil (Viagra®) is 
exemplary and depicts a discrepancy between the economic evaluation (a 
favourable cost-effectiveness outcome) and the actual resource allocation decision 
(exclusion from basic benefit package) (Stolk et al. 2005). Stolk et al. (2005) 
assume the discrepancy between evaluation and decision can be ascribed to 
insufficiently taking into account fairness concerns in economic modelling. 
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Subsequently, they argue, optimalization of priority setting requires balancing 
health economics (efficiency) and ethics (equity). Currently an equity adjustment 
procedure in economic evaluations is introduced in Dutch decision-making on the 
value of health technology. This equity adjustment ensures that “in priority 
decisions neither equity nor efficiency concerns are put aside but instead are 
treated in a systematic way” (Stolk 2005, p146). Another example of a solution to 
the problems of benefit package management has been the transformation of the 
Dutch health system into a regulated market allowing for the responsibility of 
stimulating appropriate medicine use and reimbursement to be partly transferred to 
Dutch health insurers. Conditional reimbursement of medicines is also one of the 
new ways in which the Dutch government tries to cope with the growing 
challenges. The conditional reimbursement of high cost medicines requires 
hospitals to develop databases on high cost medicines as a prerequisite for 
application for additional funding. Again, responsibility is shifted from government 
to other stakeholders. Despite these efforts to introduce new criteria to close the 
decision framework or optimize priority-setting regulations, the discrepancy 
between policy and practice remains. 
 
Above mentioned problems and consequences of the benefit package 
infrastructure might even lead to doubting decisions and recommendations made, 
instead of accounting for its scientific rigor and legitimacy. The idea of listing 
medicines on a positive or negative reimbursement list depicts an ‘in-or-out’ 
bureaucratic system logic focussing on the outcomes of scientific research and the 
decision-making process. Moreover, accounting in the Netherlands is framed in 
terms of evidence based medicine and ethics (procedures and laws), and suggest 
particular activities to professionals in order to legitimize their activities (Pols 2004). 
Although such bureaucratic system logic allows for rationality in a complex situation 
and the promise of oversight, it is also based on uncertainty and ambiguity of 
underlying principles. Moreover, little attention has been paid to the management 
of diverging views about (the value of) health technology (Lehoux et al. 2005). For 
example, an institutional barrier may be that the health economists’ perspective on 
rationalizing the use of (scarce) collective resources is often in contradiction with a 
clinical perspective giving priority to a patient’s well-being. Subsequently, the 
regulation of appropriate medicine reimbursement and use based on HTA reports 
is scrutinized since the regulation does not fit (medical) practice. 
Notion of infrastructures 
Using the notion of infrastructure allows for gaining insight in the practice of health 
technology evaluation and its problems. The notion of infrastructure is commonly 
used in Science and Technology Studies (STS) exploring Large Technical Systems 
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in relation to design and use of computing and information technologies (Bowker 
2005; Hine 1995; Hine 2006; Star 1995; Star & Ruhleder 1996). It reflects the 
structure upon which something else, in this case priority setting based on 
valorisation of health technology, rides or works taking into account its users, 
environment, dependencies, required skills, regulations etc. (Star & Bowker 2006). 
Star and Ruhleder (1996) have defined salient features of infrastructure in order to 
clarify the concept, amongst which: an infrastructure both shapes and is shaped by 
the conventions of practice, it is build on an installed base, an existing structure, 
and subsequently struggles with the inherent strengths and weaknesses of this 
base. And one of the most important features of infrastructure is that it only 
becomes visible upon breakdown.  
 
The notion of infrastructure is used to understand the merits and failures of the 
benefit package management system in producing legitimacy for its decisions and 
recommendations. It is the infrastructural work in defining and maintaining units to 
measure, putting into place a set of agreements embodied in practices (e.g. coding 
the relationship between policy and professionals), which allows for priority setting 
and defining appropriate reimbursement and use of medicines. Thus, the benefit 
package management infrastructure embodies the processes of discussion, 
negotiation, and compilation that have gone into its creation; it involves technical 
decisions as well as political and ethical decisions (Bowker 1994; Hine 1995). The 
decision framework (decision criteria) as well as the consequences of these 
decisions can become irreversible, invisibly locked in the seemingly value neutral 
infrastructure. In this respect, an infrastructure can be jussive; it tells us what can 
be remembered and what not, what can be controlled and what not, what we can 
say and what not (Bowker 2005). Exploring the work practices in Dutch benefit 
package management allows for deconstructing the design of its infrastructure. The 
work practices embody the shaping character of the benefit package management 
system in for example the relation between policy and practice, the struggles with 
its own structure and potential ethical and political concerns regarding its 
legitimacy. 
 
In line with a STS perspective the exploration of three case studies, resembling 
different solutions sought by Dutch government to deal with the problem of health 
technology evaluation, is not focussed on advocating or condemning accounting 
practices. Yet, the exploration focuses on studying the accounting systems as they 
function in practice (Berg 1997). Therefore it is not legitimate decision-making I am 
interested in, yet the work needed to legitimize decisions. The legitimacy of 
decisions is on the one hand procedural (consistent use of decision criteria, 
transparency in the decision-making process, etc.) and on the other hand social 
(what values or principles underlie the decision framework, what stakeholders 
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involved, what knowledge used, etc). Subsequently, the production of legitimacy is 
a dynamic process. The work of Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) provides insight in 
this dynamic process and the different ways actors legitimate their action of 
decision-making. Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) define a framework of different 
repertoires of justification that allows one to study how people justify their actions. 
In Which road to follow? The Moral Complexity of an “Equipped” Humanity 
Thevenot (2002) shows that the attribution of a worth and order with which values 
are attributed shapes (the outcome(s) of) decision-making processes and work 
practices. Moreover, the authors claim there are different orders of worth, which 
means there are different gradients of right and wrong that establish different 
versions of how the public good (such as health care) should be evaluated 
(Thevenot 2002; Boltanski & Thevenot 2006). In other words, there are different 
repertoires which should be taken into account when trying to legitimize a 
reimbursement decision. Moreover, the activity of making legitimate decisions can 
be seen as situational in different social styles and institutions. Whether the actions 
of regulators are considered legitimate is enclosed in the interplay between health 
regulators and their environment (Thevenot 2002). In this thesis, I explore the 
dynamic development of these worths in Dutch decision-making on drug 
reimbursement. 
The Dutch benefit package management system and legitimate 
decision-making 
In order to understand current benefit package management and the way decision-
making on scarce health care resources is defined, the development of the design 
of this infrastructure is crucial. “Throughout the 1990s, a call for evidence based 
medicine and rational priority setting in health care contributed to defining the aims 
and means of HTA” (Lehoux & Blume 2000, p1085). HTA offered legitimacy for 
decisions, since it introduced systematically gathered, scientific evidence on the 
value of a health technology in the prioritization decision-making process. This 
introduction of evidence based medicine and evidence based policy in The 
Netherlands was boosted by the report of the Committee Choices in Care 
(Commissie Keuzen in de Zorg - also known as Committee Dunning) and The 
Health Council report “Medisch handelen op een tweesprong”, both published in 
1991 (Commissie Dunning 1991; Gezondheidsraad 1991). The public discussion of 
both reports facilitated the growing awareness that resources were not endlessly 
available and promoted the need for evidence based choices in health care. Both 
reports emphasize the need for evidence based medicine, for example making use 
of guideline development programs of the professional associations. The 
Committee Dunning argued in their report it was time to make choices based on a 
framework of four filters: necessity, efficacy, efficiency and ‘own responsibility’. 
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Efficacy and efficiency were to be based on HTA studies and necessity and ‘own 
responsibility’ were thought to be based on normative reasoning. Of course, these 
Dutch reports are not unique. They depict a wider international trend for the need 
of rationalized rationing in health care and are shaped by and reflect on the 
ongoing HTA developments (Ashmore, Mulkay & Pinch 1989).  
 
Whereas two decades ago legitimacy of policy (-making) was derived from the 
rationality of the priority setting system and its evidence based character, 
nowadays the process itself and its transparency have become more in focus for 
legitimate decision-making (Holm et al. 1998). In this development, the procedures 
for decision-making are made more transparent and the appraisal of collected 
evidence is increasingly explicit. This reflects a wider tendency in Dutch health care 
(and, more general, public policy) settings, in which transparency has become a 
dominant value in and of itself. The value transparency is embedded in market 
based governance (Bal 2008). Subsequently, within the timeframe of the research 
conducted for this thesis (2003-2009) the transition from state / corporate 
governance to market governance is visible in the policy measures and instruments 
used to monitor and control health care. In the transitory process from state 
controlled to a more market based mechanism governing health care, regulatory 
processes concerning health care reimbursement have been made more scientific 
and formal. Consequently, since 2000 the Dutch Health Care Insurance Board 
(CVZ) increasingly has stressed the importance of a more precise and objective 
construction of the decision-making system and its framework. Choices in health 
care should meet the requirements of being transparent, solid and judicial 
sustainable, preferably without affecting innovative developments (College voor 
zorgverzekeringen 2007).  
Research questions 
This thesis offers an analysis of several solutions searched for by Dutch health 
policymakers in order to complete and close the decision framework in the 
Netherlands as well as the new approaches taken in drug reimbursement decision-
making processes. Exploration of the priority setting infrastructure in the 
pharmaceutical care sector is particularly relevant since this sector can be 
regarded as the frontrunner for new and innovative steering mechanisms in 
governing appropriate care. In order to gain insight in the different aspects of the 
work needed to legitimize decisions I specifically explore the (knowledge) practices 
in prioritization decision-making processes. The (development of) criteria of the 
decision framework, databases and related social processes are part of the work 
practice legitimizing priority setting decisions and embedded in the infrastructure (in 
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development) of benefit package management. The following research questions 
have guided my exploration of Dutch benefit package management. 
 
 What work is conducted to legitimize decision-making regarding 
appropriate drug use and reimbursement? 
 How does the decision-making infrastructure, such as the conditional 
reimbursement regulations and databases, govern appropriate drug use 
and reimbursement in (clinical) practice? 
 What (new) forms of social relations, objectivity and knowledge does the 
benefit package management infrastructure produce, and how might this 
lead to new governing mechanisms of appropriate drug use and 
reimbursement? 
Research method 
The research in this thesis is based on the exploration of three case studies using 
mainly qualitative research methods. The three case studies allowed for the 
exploration of Dutch drug reimbursement processes and related policy tools to 
steer both policy and clinical practice. We were able to examine the process of 
governing appropriate drug reimbursement and use by introduction of ‘new’ policy 
measures and tools rather closely. This close examination was made possible by a 
research project commissioned by CVZ and two independent research projects 
funded by NWO on the introduction of budget impact as a rationing criterion and 
the use of databases as steering instruments. These research projects have 
included both quantitative and qualitative research methods as the projects were 
conducted in multi-disciplinary teams. However, I have concentrated on the 
qualitative part of the three research projects, making use of documentary and 
interview evidence as well as participative observation.  
 
The study period (2003-2009) and the use of qualitative, semi-structured interviews 
have allowed for an iterative research process, in which new theoretical insights 
developed alongside the data analysis and writing of first results of the project. In 
total 86 interviews were conducted with 80 respondents from various practices and 
expertises; health insurers, Ministry of Health, medical specialists, pharmacists, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers (representatives), patient organizations, health 
economists, general practitioners, etc. Some respondents have been interviewed 
several times during the research period and with regard to different case studies. 
The major part of the interviews I conducted alone or in cooperation with my skilled 
colleagues of the different project teams. Some of the interviews were held by 
colleagues. All interviews were transcribed and coded (see the specifics in each of 
the chapters). Alongside the interviews I participated in and observed conferences 
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and meetings in which the drug reimbursement process, decisions and policy tools 
were discussed. Moreover, I have analyzed relevant literature and documents on 
drug reimbursement processes of specific medicines or medicine groups; growth 
hormone, clopidogrel, cholesterol lowering therapy, TNF-α blockers, 
thiazolidinediones, oncolytics (in specific Ibritumomab tiuxetan and Alemtuzumab). 
Because of the use of these different types of empirical data I was able to 
triangulate my findings. 
 
The relatively long time span in which the study was performed allowed me to 
observe the various ways in which governmental decision-makers have tried to 
obtain authority as decision-makers and underwrite and improve the legitimacy of 
their decisions and decision-making processes. Although the active data-collection 
ended in 2009, activities thereafter related to drug decision-making have informed 
me when writing the papers for this thesis. 
Case studies 
The first case study explores conditional reimbursement of outpatient medicines as 
a new form of benefit package management. The conditional reimbursement 
regulation (Schedule 2 of Health Insurance Regulation
1
) makes the reimbursement 
of particular medicines conditional to specific criteria or rules. For example, the use 
of medicines is restricted to specific categories of patients (e.g. based on 
indications) and/or place in treatment lines (e.g. step-up treatment). By 
conditionally reimbursing specified drugs, CVZ expected to stimulate the 
appropriate use in practice supported by evidence based policy. In this particular 
case study we combined quantitative and qualitative research methods to analyze 
how conditional reimbursement instrument aimed for steering appropriate drug use 
and reimbursement and in what way this shaped clinical practice. The quantitative 
research focused on the volumes of drug use versus the expected volumes and the 
annual growth since admission on the conditional reimbursement regulation and 
should provide for a general idea on the functioning of the measure in daily 
practice. The qualitative research method involved 65 interviews and document 
analysis to gain insight in the stakeholders’ perspectives on appropriate drug use 
and reimbursement in relation to the functioning of the conditional reimbursement 
policy tool in five specific cases; TNF-α blockers, clopidogrel, thiazolidinediones, 
growth hormone and cholesterol lowering therapy. In the interviews as well as in 
two focus group sessions, stakeholders were asked to reflect upon the found 
quantitative data regarding appropriate medicine use. This provides insight in the 
findings as well as underlying mechanisms of the conditional reimbursement policy 
instrument. Our exploration enabled us to gain insight in the way a policy tool was 
                                                     
1
 The Health Insurance Regulation regulates the execution of the Dutch Health Insurance Act (ZVW). 
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able to steer daily (clinical) practice as well as how various stakeholders used or 
work around the conditional reimbursed tool steering the appropriate 
reimbursement and use of medicines. 
 
The second case study depicts the conventional way in dealing with the perverse 
consequences of current benefit package management infrastructure. The 
continuous discrepancies between the HTA outcomes and the actual resource 
allocation decision by the Ministry of Health requires for a refinement of the 
decision framework. Whereas the current Dutch decision framework explicitly 
entails the criteria of effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and severity of illness, the 
role of budget impact remains less obvious despite the official request for budget 
impact estimates to inform the decision-makers in the decision-making process. 
We explored the role of budget impact as a decision criterion through a literature 
review and in addition conducted eleven semi-structured interviews with 
stakeholders. All stakeholders have expertise in or were involved in the Dutch drug 
reimbursement decision-making process. In the interviews we asked if budget 
impact should be an implicit or explicit rationing criterion and whether rationales for 
budget impact as a rationing criterion were available to (not) legitimate its use in 
the decision-making process. The rationales found in our literature review were 
used as an input for the discussion on legitimating rationales in the interviews. 
Exploring the possible addition of a criterion to the decision-making process or 
framework allowed for insight in the construction of evidence used in decision-
making and gaining legitimacy of the decision-making process. 
 
The third case study explores the PHAROS registry (on expensive oncolytics such 
as Ibritumomab tiuxetan and Alemtuzumab) and the way the PHAROS registry 
infrastructure allowed for the production and construction of new forms of 
knowledge, objectivity and social relations. In 2006 the conditional reimbursement 
regulation was extended from outpatient medicines (case study 1) to inpatient 
medicines through the High-Cost Medicines Regulation. Importantly, the High-Cost 
Medicines Regulation includes the prerequisite of evidence development on the 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of listed medicines in clinical practice. The 
evidence development based on data collection in databases such as the 
PHAROS registry was intended to inform and govern decision-making on the 
reimbursement of inpatient medicines as well as to promote their rational 
prescribing. Findings of this case study have been reported in comparison with 
earlier findings from the first case study on conditional reimbursement in specific 
the growth hormone database. Subsequently, I conducted ten semi-structured 
interviews in addition to the interviews of the first case study regarding growth 
hormone and/or the use of data collection informing policy. Furthermore I 
participated in and observed conferences and informal meetings, and I analyzed 
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minutes, email exchanges and policy documents including documents from 
archives of the main policy actor, CVZ.  
Outline of the thesis 
Chapter one focuses on the debate regarding the way the Dutch priority setting 
process is managed by addressing the cost problem and inequalities in treatment 
in the inpatient pharmaceutical care sector. While the need for rationing scarce 
resources is widely acknowledged, the way Dutch health regulators manage the 
expensive inpatient medicines costs is heavily debated. Governmental steering 
aims to solve this problem by regulating the (additional) financing of expensive 
inpatient medicines and transferring responsibility of equal access to care to health 
insurers and hospitals. Yet (medical) practice depicts the policy regulation as 
inadequate and potentially leading to legitimacy problems regarding the equal 
distribution of care. This chapter shows that despite the efforts of health regulators, 
the expensive medicines regulation did not have the desired effects. Can we 
expect economic modelling and refining the benefit package management system 
to solve the problems regarding the explosive growth of medicine costs and 
subsequently the necessary priority setting decisions? Or, is a reflection on the 
value of health and health technology required as well as the use of new 
mechanisms to steer appropriate drug use and reimbursement? 
 
Chapter two examines how conditional reimbursement as a policy tool was 
developed to optimize the benefit package decision-making framework. Whereas in 
chapter one regulating additional funding for expensive inpatient medicines is 
meant to optimize priority-setting decision-making, the conditional reimbursement 
of outpatient medicines similarly intends to close the benefit package system. The 
refinement of the regulation of appropriate medicine use and reimbursement is 
based on HTA and allows for rationality in decision-making as well as the promise 
of control. In order to deal with the high cost of pharmaceuticals and 
simultaneously guarantee access to pharmaceutical care, health regulators 
focussed on using evidence based boundaries of appropriate medicine use and 
reimbursement in the form of formulating conditions regarding e.g. patient groups 
and health providers. Yet, does the conditional reimbursement tool actually govern 
appropriate drug use and reimbursement in (medical) practice? I analyze from a 
stakeholders’ perspective whether the decision-making practices are found 
legitimate and how conditional reimbursement as a policy tool is or is not 
contributing to appropriate drug reimbursement and use. 
 
In the previous chapters I examined how health regulators deal with the problem of 
defining and stimulating the appropriate use and reimbursement of medicines by 
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means of optimizing regulation and the conditional reimbursement policy tool. In 
chapter three I explore what kind of work is done to introduce a new decision 
criterion in the decision framework with the purpose of closing the (economic) 
model for priority setting in health care. A literature review focussing on the 
different possible rationales allowing for the use of budget impact as an explicit 
criterion in the decision framework was conducted. This review of possible 
rationales provided understanding in the work needed to legitimize a decision 
criterion and what the possible implications are for the decision framework and 
underlying rationales. Underlying assumption of the work to legitimize budget 
impact as a rationing criterion is that making implicit decision criteria such as 
budget impact explicit, contributes to the transparency of the decision-making 
process and therefore the accountability of the decision-makers. This literature 
review in combination with semi-structured interviews provides insight in whether 
adding a rationing criterion to the framework solves the benefit package 
management problem. Or, possibly leads to more complex decision-making and 
potentially decreases the legitimacy of priority setting decision-making. 
 
The building of a benefit package management’s infrastructure entails both 
shaping and being shaped by the conventions of practice. Chapter four explores 
and compares how two databases, the Growth Hormone Database and the 
PHAROS registry, were intended to be employed to control the use of growth 
hormone, Ibritumomab tiuxetan and Alemtuzumab. The outpatient conditional 
reimbursement regulation (chapter two) has been translated to the inpatient setting 
in specific high cost medicines such as oncolytics. The prerequisite of evidence 
building through data collection and subsequently outcomes research is assumed 
to contribute to the production of evidence informing both policy and clinical 
practice. In my exploration I examine how the work needed to collect the data in 
the databases and the interpretation of the data facilitated governing appropriate 
drug use and reimbursement. Moreover, I analyze how the databases enabled the 
production of new forms of knowledge and objectivity and subsequently 
reconfigured the relation between clinical and policy practice. 
 
In chapter five, all three case studies are combined and re-examined, this time to 
study the action of legitimizing decisions. Analyzing the activity of ‘making 
legitimate choices’ in the three case studies provides insight in how legitimacy is 
constructed by health regulators and perceived by stakeholders. In the period 
2003-2009 I observed how the various stakeholders approach the evaluation of 
medical technologies by CVZ, and subsequently the question whether the medical 
technology should be reimbursed or not. Again the question what work is 
conducted to legitimize decision-making regarding appropriate drug use and 
reimbursement is addressed. However, the solution is not sought in optimizing the 
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decision framework or health care regulation. Instead in this chapter the activity of 
making legitimate choices is analyzed from a more situational approach to 
regulatory behaviour; whether the actions of regulators are considered legitimate is 
enclosed in the interplay between the health regulators and their environment 
(Thevenot 2002). The evaluation of medicines can in its’ strive for ‘objectivity’ not 
be seen separately from politics and morality. Subsequently, it might be worthwhile 
to explore what types of repertoires are used to evaluate a medical technology and 
how these repertoires are incorporated in the current drug reimbursement decision-
making process.  
 
In the final chapter, the discussion, I present my findings of the previous chapters 
in relation to the research questions as previously formulated. Next, I display a 
general discussion of the practical and theoretical consequences of the 
conclusions drawn in this thesis for understanding the action of legitimizing 
decision-making in Dutch drug policy. Furthermore, I reflect upon the chosen 
research methodology and argue for mixed methods research, especially in 
complex research arenas such as health care, which involves both moral and 
factual ambiguity. Lastly, I reflect upon the contribution of the social scientific 
discipline in the understanding of the construction of legitimate decision-making. 
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Introduction 
The expenditures for hospital drugs increase approximately 10% per year, and 
grow much faster than the hospital budget does. Between 1996 and 2000 the 
expenditures increased approximately 8% per year in the Netherlands. An even 
steeper upward trend is predicted for the future: a 20% yearly increase in 
expenditures for hospital drugs is considered plausible (Pharmo Instituut 2002). 
The introduction of new, expensive hospital drugs is causing this; examples are the 
oncolytics trastuzumab (Herceptin ®) and oxaliplatin (Eloxatin ®). To finance 
hospital care most countries apply the traditional system of fixed global budgets, or 
the more modern variant of allotted amounts at a specific diagnosis-based level 
(e.g. in prospective payment systems based on case mix). The costly drugs also 
have to be paid for out of these budgets. Hospitals or hospital departments thus 
have to find additional resources to purchase newly introduced expensive drugs. It 
is clear that expensive and innovative drugs exert a great pressure on the hospital 
pharmacy budget, or on the allotted amounts at the level of specific diagnoses. 
Examples of regional differences between and within countries in the use of these 
expensive cancer drugs show that inequalities are increasing and that hospitals are 
no longer able to pay for these expenses from the allotted budgets 
(Borstkankervereniging Nederland 2005; Wilking and Jönsson 2005; Groot 2006). 
The question therefore is whether we can expect hospital managers to deal 
adequately with this problem, or whether the financing system forces them to make 
impossible choices. 
 
This chapter argues that today’s governmental policies do not adequately handle 
the unsustainable and exponential growth of expensive drugs such as oncolytics. 
In the majority of western countries, hospital finance has been based on global 
budgets to stimulate more effective provision of care (also called ‘technical 
efficiency’). This strategy shifted a social problem to hospitals, but with good 
reason: the perceived overcapacity in the health care system. The advantage of 
this budgeting system is that it offers hospitals an incentive for efficiency, and 
enables managers to make decisions on structural issues that have greatly 
improved technical efficiency of the health care system. For example, efficiency of 
hospitals can be improved by reducing staff size, reducing the number of hospital 
beds, or by cutbacks in the number of casualty departments. In the Netherlands, 
this financing system has been operational for more than two decades now. As a 
consequence, room for improvement of technical efficiency is decreasing. Hence 
the chance increases that health care goals will no longer be met if no other 
policies are applied. For that reason, we cannot just depend on the hospitals to 
deal with the budget pressure exerted by expensive drugs. Sooner or later it will 
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become a social problem again; a financial problem, a quality problem, or an 
ethical problem related to increasing treatment inequalities.  
 
This chapter discusses some of the current policy strategies to deal with this 
problem, as well as their limitations as they occur in the Netherlands. Importantly, 
this chapter will try to map the contours of the current problem and its possible 
solutions and will not offer solutions. 
Expenditures for hospital drugs 
Drugs dispensed in hospitals are part of the entitlement to hospital care, which is 
financed out of a global budget (see section Dutch policy). Looking at Figure 1.1, it 
becomes clear that this budgeting system is problematic for the financing of 
hospital drugs.  
Figure 1.1 Hospital drugs: development in volume and expenditures since 1991   
(1991 = 100%) 
Figure 1.1 depicts the development in volume of and expenditures for hospital 
drugs over the last 15 years in one (anonymous) Dutch, non-university teaching, 
regional hospital (about 900 beds). The figure shows a sustainable yearly growth 
rate of about 5% in the volume of hospital drug use, which is more or less in line 
with the rate of the allowed annual growth of hospital expenditures in the same 
period. However, the cost of hospital drugs grow about twice as fast, increasing 
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300% over 15 years and 150% in the last 5 years. The growth rate of drug costs is 
thus outpacing the growth of the hospital budget. 
 
The growth of expenditures for hospital drugs can be largely attributed to the 
introduction of new drugs that are very costly. Indeed, the percentage the hospital 
budget spent on new and expensive drugs increased from 6.2% in 1996 to 11.7% 
in 2000 (Pharmo Instituut 2002). Especially for this group of drugs, the financing is 
perceived as problematic as it leads to large variation in the availability of certain 
expensive drugs across hospitals and to referral of ‘expensive’ patients to 
specialised centres, which are then confronted with much higher patient costs than 
other regional hospitals (something that the central budgeting system does not 
automatically control for). Since 1996, the costs for so-called ‘expensive drugs’ 
have increased 500%. In Figure 1.2 the purchasing data of the expensive 
medicines according to the Regulation Expensive Medicines of the hospital 
pharmacy are depicted (for the same anonymous hospital as mentioned before).  
Figure 1.2 Development in total expenditures for expensive drugs* since 1999 (1999 = 
100%) 
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* Expensive drugs are those drugs that have been listed on the ‘Regulation Expensive 
Medicines’ since 2002. 
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A large share of these costs relate to few drugs. The introduction of some 
oncolytics (e.g. cytostatics and monoclonal antibodies) has especially contributed 
to the growth in expenditures (see Figures 1.3 and 1.4). The introduction of the first 
few expensive drugs mid-nineties was then heavily debated. For example, when 
paclitaxel (Taxol ®) was registered, the debate about the high costs was very 
intense. Taxoids were considered to be not cost-effective, but the general opinion 
was that hospitals could not withhold this therapy from severely ill patients only 
because of a cost-argument. The government even decided to additionally 
subsidize the costs of taxoids’ treatment. The taxoids’ case seems to have created 
a precedent. First, the introduction of even more expensive oncolytics in later years 
did not lead to public debate about their financial implications. Secondly, the 
possibilities to receive additional resources for provision of high cost treatments 
were expanded (see Section Dutch Policy). 
Figure 1.4 Relative expenditure levels for expensive drugs by year and drug group 
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Dutch policy 
Until 2005 hospitals received a lump sum budget annually. This budget was 
determined by the National Health Tariffs Authority (CTG). This hospital budget 
had to finance all provided care and cover all other expenses. A similar system 
applies in many western countries (Swartenbroekx et al. 2005). A new financing 
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system was introduced based on the modern belief that health care can be 
managed more efficiently when the system offers hospitals incentives for 
competition and patients more freedom of choice (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid 
Welzijn en Sport 2001). As of January 1, 2005, hospital care is financed using 
diagnosis and treatment combinations (diagnose behandeling combinaties – 
DBCs). A DBC defines all hospital and medical specialist activities and services 
arising from the demand for care by a patient consulting a specialist in a hospital. 
This new financing system, based on case-mix, introduces more transparently 
defined hospital products covered by prices reflecting costs. Because of this direct 
link between provided care and available resources, it may become easier to 
prevent discrepancies between budget and expenditures. However, we should not 
expect a resolution of the current budgetary problems caused by high cost hospital 
drugs on a short notice. The DBC finance system applies only to 10% of hospital 
expenditures. For other expenditures the traditional budgeting system still applies. 
The percentage of expenditures covered in the DBC system will likely be expanded 
over the following years, but at the time of writing it is not known if or how this will 
include costs of hospital drugs. The reason is that not all hospitals can deliver 
sufficiently detailed costs data to attribute the costs of hospital drugs to different 
DBCs. Moreover, the dynamics of the hospital formulary may require more 
flexibility than the DBC system can offer.  
 
Recognising the problem of financing expensive drugs like oncolytics and the 
increasing risk of practice variation in hospital care, the Dutch government 
implemented a law that forced health insurers to contribute to the costs of some 
expensive drugs in 2002 (Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit 2006). For all drugs listed on 
the ‘Regulation Expensive Medicines’ separate reimbursement should be offered. 
Until 2005 hospitals had to pay between 25% and 100% of expenditures 
(Swartenbroekx et al. 2005); the reimbursement percentage was variable and was 
determined after negotiation with insurers. In 2006 the reimbursement rate was 
fixed at 80%. Reimbursement for the expensive drugs is limited to specific (sub) 
indications and conditions. The minister of Health decides on these conditions 
based on an advisory report drafted by the Commission Pharmaceutical Care 
(CFH) of the Dutch Health Care Insurance Board (CVZ) which assesses the drugs 
for their therapeutic value. Drugs are included on the list when the prognosis is that 
they will consume at least 0,5% of the total pharmaceutical expenses of hospitals. 
By March 2006 sixteen drugs were listed (see Table 1.1, oncolytics in bold). Three 
years after listing a decision will be made about the continuation of the subsidy 
based on a cost-effectiveness analysis using daily practice data collected in these 
three years. If the cost-effectiveness ratio is favourable, the temporary measure will 
become permanent. If negative, the medicine is removed from the list and is no 
longer eligible for additional subsidy.  
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Table 1.1 Drugs included on the Regulation Expensive Medicines, March 2006 
– Docetaxel – Trastuzumab 
– Irinotecan – Botulinetoxine  
– Gemcitabine – Verteporfin 
– Oxaliplatin – Doxorubicine liposomal  
– Paclitaxel – Vinorelbine  
– Rituximab – Bevacizumab  
– Infliximab – Pemetrexed  
– Immunoglobine IV – Bortezomib  
 
In spite of the additional funds for expensive drugs, their expenditures still increase 
rapidly. Obviously, the measure has not fully resolved the problem. Unless the 
reimbursement rate is set at 100% it is unlikely that treatment inequalities can be 
prevented. 
Problems 
Because of the central budget an artificial scarcity was created which aimed to 
improve a technical efficiency. Hospitals were stimulated to cut redundant costs. 
Fact is, however, that possibilities for shifting budgets vary across hospitals, e.g. 
small hospitals typically have less room to manoeuvre than large hospitals, so they 
may seek other solutions. One of the easiest ways to resolve the problem is simply 
not to purchase expensive products and to refer patients to other hospitals. 
Therefore, the budgeting mechanism created a large variation in the availability of 
certain expensive drugs across hospitals. This, in turn, resulted in a 
disproportionate stream of ‘expensive’ patients to specialised centres. These 
specialised centres were thus confronted with a disproportionately high cost of 
specific drugs, so that their scarcity problem became more pronounced and they 
were disadvantaged vis-à-vis other hospitals. In these circumstances it is not 
surprising that some patients do not receive the care they are entitled to. A recent 
study into the use of trastuzumab (Herceptin ®) shows that this drug is not as often 
prescribed as was expected on the basis of clinical guidelines and demographic 
data (Borstkankervereniging Nederland. 2005). The differences across regions are 
pronounced, as is depicted in Figure 1.5. Policies have thus not been able to 
prevent postcode prescribing.  
 
In the Netherlands, hospital treatment qualifies for reimbursement if that particular 
treatment is considered ‘usual care’ for that specific patient group. In the 
trastuzumab case, patients thus may not get the treatment they are entitled to, 
which is undesirable and even against the law. The previously mentioned 
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‘Regulation Expensive Medicines’ aimed to ensure that patients can validate their 
entitlements. The example shows that this regulation does not have the desired 
effects. This was to be expected. The Regulation describes the conditions under 
which a hospital receives extra budget (80% of the total costs) for expensive drugs. 
Nevertheless, the hospitals still have to cover 20% of the costs. This may seem a 
relatively small amount, but declining possibilities to cut in other hospital 
expenditures makes it a large financial gap to bridge. The Dutch Federation of 
Hospitals estimates the cost increase caused by new expensive drugs to be €200 
million for 2006 (NVZ vereniging van ziekenhuizen 2006). To indicate what the 
consequences are, let’s say that an average hospital is confronted with a €2 million 
cost increase. If the hospital has to finance this from its own resources, it could 
imply that about 45 people lose their jobs. However, this is not a sustainable 
solution, since hospitals already have a shortage in personnel.  
Figure 1.5 Estimated availability of trastuzumab (Herceptin ®) in Dutch regions* 
 
* Figure reproduced from Borstkankervereniging Nederland (2005). 
Availability 25% - 50% 
 
 
Availability <25% 
25% 
 Availability 50% - 75% 
□  Availability >75% 
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Likely, the financing of hospital drugs will become even more problematic in the 
future. Clinicians expect a continued increase of average drug prices. A reason is 
that drugs become more expensive because of new production technologies, e.g. 
biotechnology. What is more, the new drugs often target relatively small patient 
subgroups, creating a downward pressure on revenues and hence an upward 
effect on prices. Trastuzumab is an example of this new group of so-called 
personalised drugs; it is only effective in women with breast cancer who have an 
amplified HER2/neu gene (Joensuu et al. 2006). More and more of such products 
are registered, so that average drug price increases. The threshold of 0,5% gets 
more difficult to reach. Since the total budget does not sufficiently increase to 
compensate for inflation and innovation, the Regulation Expensive Medicines does 
not improve financial viability of hospitals. From that point of view, the Regulation 
primarily offers a solution for practice variance in the treatment with (listed) 
expensive drugs, but this may come at the cost of increasing practice variance in 
other treatment areas. The reason is that now a part of the budget is earmarked as 
the Regulation explicitly states, what care should be delivered. Moreover, it does 
not indicate how priorities should be set in the allocation of remaining resources. 
Future directions 
To solve current problems, changes to the financing system of hospitals are 
required: we need to search for a new balance between central budgeting and fee-
for-service financing. The introduction of a case-mix financing system may help to 
resolve the problems, especially when this system is expanded to all hospital care 
and to include expenditures for hospital drugs. An implication of this policy change, 
however, is that the system loses incentives for technical efficiency, because this 
case-mix system is in theory open-ended. Typically, control over the total level of 
expenditures in open-ended financing systems is maintained through tighter control 
of the benefit package. This means that more emphasis is put on productive 
efficiency, and that more outcomes research is performed to make sure that the 
use of health care technologies at the practice level is evidence based. In many 
countries, reimbursement decisions of outpatient medication are made at the 
national level, based on evaluations of (cost)-effectiveness. In contrast, local 
hospitals are responsible for meeting the health care needs of their populations, 
but they are free to make decisions concerning the use of new technologies. It is 
not exactly known how these local managers decide on the content of the hospital 
formularies. Do they consider therapeutic value? Do they consider cost? Do the 
new drugs meet the expectations in daily practice? And when are costs considered 
to be too high? There is increasing awareness that more openness in the decision-
making process is required. If we expect all patients to receive high quality care, all 
hospitals would have to answer such questions in a similar way. Also the 
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recognition that some of the newly implemented interventions proved not effective 
in retrospect has increased awareness of the need for more scientific evidence 
before introduction of new health technologies into hospital care. In improving the 
decision-making process the government should play a role. It would be helpful if 
they promote research into efficient use of resources in hospitals by evaluating new 
and existing services from medical, economic and ethical point of view and 
establish organisational structures for dissemination of the results to local decision-
makers. In that respect it is a good development that Dutch policymakers recently 
accepted some responsibility for the promotion of evidence based decision-making 
regarding hospital treatments. This becomes apparent from the change in the 
policy rule for expensive drugs stating that three years after listing, the medicine 
should be re-assessed to see if the drug meets its expectations and to decide if the 
particular drug still deserves its place in the Regulation. 
 
The question remains whether this type of outcomes research really solves the 
problem? Perhaps we should not expect too much. If outcomes research shows 
that a medicine meets all common requirements for effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness, it does not necessarily mean that the hospitals or Dutch government 
are able to fund this medicine. Demonstrating which drugs represent added value 
for each additional euro spent, outcomes research can be used to prioritise which 
drugs are in- or excluded from the hospital formularies. But it does not solve the 
problem that it may not be affordable to fund every medicine that meets all 
requirements for effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. The introduction of new 
(cost-effective) drugs means that health outcomes can be improved at reasonable 
cost, but it also means that total resource consumption has to increase. There is no 
guarantee that the hospital is able to meet the additional resource requirements 
(Sendi et al. 2003). What is required to make the system work is certain flexibility of 
the total budget or of the applied assessment criteria.  
 
The question then is not just whether or not a hospital is able to use its 
pharmaceutical budget as efficient as possible, but also if the total budget for 
health care is used in an optimal way. A comprehensive approach would include 
transparency of resource use and outcomes for the entire hospital and also in other 
health care sectors, and the flexibility to reallocate available budgets. In the end, 
this approach may allow for comparisons to be made between expenditures for 
health care and other public goods (e.g. education), so that benefits associated 
with possible expansions can be related to the question whether or not the health 
care budget should be increased to meet the health needs of the population. 
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Discussion 
The social problem of expensive drugs is new and enormous in the Netherlands, 
and likely also in other western countries. If the current policy is not changed, the 
16 medicines now classified as ‘expensive’ will cost approximately up to €600 
million in about 5 years. This amount is comparable with the current turnover of all 
drugs in all hospitals (Steenhoek & Rutten 2005). This is not just a problem of 
hospitals, sooner or later it will become a social problem again. Governments 
should intervene before the problem gets out of control, as a financial problem, a 
quality problem, or an ethical problem related to increasing treatment inequalities. 
This paper has pictured the development of the problem and identified fundamental 
issues that need to be resolved. Will budget impact be allowed to overrule cost-
effectiveness? And, does this give legitimacy problems? These questions are a 
signal that reflection on the value of health is necessary and the available budgets 
have to be reconsidered. These questions quickly need answers, because of the 
enormous speed with which the cost explosion is developing. Since many 
expensive drugs are used especially in the field of oncology, the current lack of 
political action is worrisome. The transparency of its high expenditures may make 
this field vulnerable to budget cuts (Van Bochove 2006). On the other hand, the 
severity of many types of cancer also stimulates discussion about fairness. 
Hopefully oncologists will be able to use this discussion to their advantage and 
stimulate a public debate about the real issue that system changes are needed to 
guarantee that patients get the treatment they need. 
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Introduction 
While the benefit package for pharmaceutical care in Dutch health care has been 
defined at the national level, most decisions on the actual provision of 
pharmaceutical care are made in the doctor’s office. There is growing recognition 
that these bedside decisions do not necessarily reflect the same values that guided 
the delineation of the benefit package. For example, in 1991 the Health Council 
noted that some therapies were routinely performed, despite a lack of proven 
effectiveness (Gezondheidsraad 1991). The council concluded that doctors might 
sometimes lack the specific knowledge that is required to make optimal decisions. 
Against this background, the government has developed a series of tools that 
promote rational prescribing, aiming to improve the quality and efficiency of care, 
and enabling the control of pharmaceutical health care expenditures. Note; the two 
objectives, improving quality and efficiency, and trying to contain costs, are not 
easy to incorporate in one measure as they have a tendency to contradict each 
other.  
 
Recently, the policy of conditional reimbursement has received increasing 
attention. Policymakers may influence medical decisions through guideline 
development, installation of expert committees, record keeping of treatments 
provided, and financial incentives (e.g. to promote prescription of generic drugs) 
(Stolk & Poleij 2005). In comparison with the aforementioned policy measures, 
conditional reimbursement influences prescribing behaviour using more compelling 
means, potentially giving the government a higher level of control. Because a 
tension may exist between this policy objective and the views of the medical 
community, the effectiveness of conditional reimbursement in influencing medical 
practice is not self-evident. To determine the future scope for policy interventions 
using conditional reimbursement, we evaluated several Dutch experiences with 
conditional reimbursement until now. 
 
The goal of conditional reimbursement is to promote effective and efficient use of 
certain pharmaceuticals (College voor zorgverzekeringen 2005). For this purpose, 
reimbursement of a service is made conditional to specific criteria or rules. For 
example, the application of a drug may be restricted to specific categories of 
patients, prescriptions may only be provided by authorized physicians, or prior 
authorization must be obtained from the health insurance company. Mostly, 
conditions apply to those drugs that are considered expensive and/or have a risk of 
inappropriate use (Van Oostenbruggen et al. 2005); conditions are then defined to 
limit off-label drug use and promote drug use for indications where effectiveness 
has been established. Spontaneous expansion of use of these medicines is not 
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allowed, so that a consolidating effect on volumes of use is expected. All drugs, to 
which these conditions apply, are included in the so-called Health Insurance Fund 
(Provision of Pharmaceuticals Regulation Schedule 2, in Dutch ‘Regeling 
Farmaceutische Hulp 1996’ (RFH 1996) Bijlage 2). Criteria for inclusion are: high 
costs, risk of inappropriate use, or the need for specific expertise in order to ensure 
appropriate patient selection.  
 
In other countries, such as Finland, Germany, and the United Kingdom, similar 
policy-instruments are used, albeit that these countries have different health care 
systems (Kooijman 2003; Marx 2000; Raftery 2001; Vuorenkoski, Toiviainen & 
Hemminki 2003). The ‘Anlage 4 der Arzneimittel Richtlinien’ (AMR) regulates the 
prescription of particular types of medication in Germany (Marx 2000). In the UK, 
all drugs with conditional reimbursement are added to ‘Schedule 11 of the National 
Health Service (General Medical Services) Regulations 1992’. Additionally, the 
NICE technology appraisals may restrict drug use to specific patient groups 
(Raftery 2001). In Finland, there are three reimbursement categories: limited, 
special (75 percent), and complete (100 percent), where conditions apply to the 
higher reimbursement categories (Vuorenkoski, Toiviainen & Hemminki 2003). 
Obviously, differences may exist between the country specific regulations. But, 
there are also many similarities in applying the principle of conditional 
reimbursement. The drugs that are conditionally reimbursed in the Netherlands are 
often reimbursed under conditions in other countries too; moreover, the types of 
conditions for reimbursement are often alike (Niezen et al. 2004).  
 
Apparently, conditional reimbursement is regarded as an important policy tool to 
promote the appropriate use of medicines. However, evidence about its 
effectiveness in daily practice is limited. Therefore, the Dutch Health Care 
Insurance Board commissioned a study to evaluate the effectiveness of conditional 
reimbursement as a means to stimulate appropriate drug use, and to identify 
potential issues for improvement. 
The Dutch conditional reimbursement policy 
In the Netherlands, pharmaceuticals do not automatically qualify for 
reimbursement. The Minister of Health decides whether or not a drug will be 
reimbursed, based on advice of the Commission for Pharmaceutical Care (CFH) of 
the Health Care Insurance Board (CVZ) about the therapeutic value, efficacy and 
cost-consequences of a drug (Stolk and Poleij 2005; Van Oostenbruggen et al. 
2005; College voor zorgverzekeringen 2000a). When included in one of two so-
called ‘positive lists’ (Schedules 1A and 1B of the RFH 1996), medications are 
reimbursed. Schedule 1A consists of clusters of similar medications, with a 
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reimbursement limit for each of these clusters. Schedule 1B contains non-
substitutable medications for which no price limit is set. If conditions are to be met 
for reimbursement, the medicines are listed in Schedule 2. While the CFH advises 
the Minister of Health about Schedule 1A and 1B, the CVZ directorate advises 
about Schedule 2. Because conditional reimbursement is, in The Netherlands at 
least, related to policy issues (e.g. possible risk for inappropriate use), 
policymakers, rather than pharmaceutical experts, give advice on the content of the 
conditions. After the conditions are formulated, revision is only possible when 
pharmaceutical companies formally request the Ministry of Health for widening of 
indications or admittance of new indications based on new scientific evidence, or 
when the Ministry of Health (sometimes based on CVZ advices) regards this 
necessary. 
 
The conditions that are used can be divided into the four categories listed below. 
Mostly, the restriction of the indication is combined with one or two other types of 
conditions for reimbursement. These (combinations of) conditions should prevent 
off-label drug use and promote both effective and efficient therapy and the quality 
of care:  
 
 Restrictions of the indication.  
Indications can be restricted to specific categories of patients, such as: 
children born after a pregnancy of 32 weeks or less (palivizumab) or social 
health insured, diagnosed with diabetes mellitus type 2, insufficiently 
responding to monotherapy (rosiglitazone and pioglitazone). 
 Referral to professional guidelines. 
The conditions can refer to the professional guidelines of a specialist group 
prescribing the medication, or a protocol specifically written for the 
treatment, e.g. growth hormone-prescribing must accord to the ‘Protocol 
use of growth hormone’. The guidelines vary from evidence based to 
consensus based.  
 Prescribing only by treating specialist and/or specific demands on the 
requested expertise of the prescribing physician or the treating facility. 
Sometimes prescriptions may only be provided by authorized physicians, 
as is the case for antiretroviral medicines—the drug may only be 
prescribed by a treating internist or paediatrician, who is tied to an HIV-
treating (sub) centre laid down by the Minister of Health.  
 Prior authorization must be obtained from the health insurance company. 
Until 2006, medical advisors of health insurance companies assessed the 
prior authorization requests for reimbursement of drugs such as glatiramer. 
As of January 2006, however, this category no longer exists since a new 
regulation has been introduced; the ‘Regulation Health Care Insurance’ 
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(Ministerie van Volksgezondheid Welzijn en Sport 2005). Health care 
insurers are now free to reimburse after prior authorization whenever they 
think it is appropriate, as long as this is announced in their statute.  
 
In August 2003, the Schedule 2 conditions applied to 37 (groups of) medications. 
During the research period (August 2003-September 2004) the number of 
medications included in Schedule 2 increased to 40. Eighteen changes were 
made, varying from administrative corrections to changes of indications, and also 
the addition of new drugs to already existing or new categories (Niezen et al. 
2004). Examples of these changes are: the addition of new indications in the 
condition for etanercept (March 1, 2004 and April 1, 2004) and the addition of a 
new medicine, galantamine, to the rivastigmine group (November 11, 2003). 
Although Schedule 2 has contained up to 47 (groups of) medications (December 
2005) the list now contains 42 drugs/groups (August 2006). 
Methods 
To evaluate whether or not the conditional reimbursement policy promotes 
appropriate drug use, ideally, one would collect data about drug use in the situation 
with, and the situation without, conditional reimbursement policy. Unfortunately, 
conditions are only specified when a drug enters the benefit package; hence, no 
data are available about the situation in which no conditional reimbursement policy 
exists. A direct cause-effect relation cannot be established; therefore, it is not 
possible to see how much conditional reimbursement policy affects prescribing 
behaviour and drug costs. We can, however, evaluate whether or not the desired 
effects (appropriate drug use following the requirements for reimbursement) are 
attained. Hereafter, this form of appropriate drug use will be defined as ‘authorized 
use’ whereas ‘appropriate use’ will be the desired use according to clinicians.  
 
We took a two-tiered approach to the investigation of the effects of the conditional 
reimbursement regime. First, we collected macro-level data on the volumes of drug 
use. The purpose was to explore whether the volume of drug use was at the 
expected level, in order to get a general idea of the overall functioning of the 
conditional reimbursement measure. Deviations from expectations may have 
indicated poor functioning of the measure. Next, we analysed the macro-level data 
using two indicators: the number of users in the years following introduction of the 
drug, and the annual growth. To analyse annual growth we analysed trends in the 
volumes of use of all conditionally reimbursed drugs, starting with the year the drug 
entered the market (data 1994-2002). The macro-level data were obtained from the 
so-called ‘GIP-database’, a registry of reimbursement data held by CVZ for 7.5 
million insured people who are representative for the entire Dutch population.  
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Second, we gathered micro-level data for five selected cases, as it was not a priori 
clear that inferences can legitimately be made from macro-data investigation alone, 
because there may also be other explanations of its outcomes than inappropriate 
or unauthorized use. The micro-level data were expected to provide insight into 
what fraction of individual prescriptions actually met the conditional reimbursement 
requirements. Moreover, by means of interviews (N= 65) and document analysis, 
the micro-level data were interpreted and the stakeholders’ perspectives on the 
functioning of the policy measure were obtained.  
 
The five selected cases were: TNF-α blockers, clopidogrel, thiazolidinediones, 
growth hormone and cholesterol lowering therapy. The case selection was based 
on the diversity principle; we purposively selected cases for which the data (macro-
level and interview-data) indicated proper functioning of the regime or poor 
functioning, as to gain the best understanding of the factors that promote or inhibit 
effectiveness of the conditional reimbursement policy. Moreover, the selection 
covered all types of potential conditions related to reimbursement. We collected 
micro-level data on drug prescriptions and the background characteristics of 
receiving patients from different databases. Consulted databases were: the GIP-
database
1
 (Health Care Insurance Board) for the TNF-α blockers and 
thiazolidinediones, the National Growth Hormone Database
2
 (Dutch Growth 
Foundation-National Registration for Growth Hormone, the Integrated Primary Care 
Information (IPCI)-database
3
 (Erasmus MC) for the statins (cholesterol lowering 
therapy) (Vlug et al. 1999) and the Pharmo-database
4
 (PHARMO, Institute for Drug 
Outcome Research) for clopidogrel. Using these data, we analysed what fraction of 
individual prescriptions actually met the conditions. The analyses differed by case, 
depending on the specific conditions for reimbursement
5
. For example, if 
reimbursement was limited to certain indications, we gathered data to confirm the 
indication. If the condition specified that a step-up therapeutic pathway should be 
followed, we analysed whether patients had received the specified therapies prior 
to use of the listed drug (see Box 2.A). However, with these types of analyses and 
databases under treatment is difficult to detect. Per case, the micro-level data were 
collected from the database best suited to give information about the authorized 
use and appropriateness of the individual prescriptions.  
 
                                                     
1
 http://www.gipdatabank.nl 
2
 http://www.groeistichting.nl 
3
 http://www.ipci.nl 
4
 http://www.pharmo.nl 
5
 Moreover, the analyses also differed as the databases covered data of prescribed use (Pharmo, IPCI), 
reimbursed use (GIP) and a combination of both (National Registration Growth Hormone). 
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To explain why and when over- or under-consumption occurred, we performed 
stakeholder analysis for the five selected cases. The purpose of this approach was 
to obtain specific information about what kind of requirements are more or less 
effective, and the circumstances under which conditional reimbursement policy is 
likely to be more or less effective. Where applicable, the preliminary results from 
the quantitative analysis were discussed during the interviews. We analysed the 
stakeholders’ perspectives on the conditional reimbursement policy using 
document analysis and in depth-interviews, focusing on the conditional 
reimbursement policy in general (N= 12) and its consequences for the five selected 
cases more specifically (N= 53). Most of the documents analysed were obtained 
from the archive of CVZ (among which pharmacotherapeutic- and CFH-reports and 
correspondence with the pharmaceutical industry, patient interest groups and 
specialists), and the library of the Ministry of Health. Two interviewers, MN and AE, 
held all the interviews. Each stakeholder group was represented with at least four 
respondents.  
Results 
Expected versus observed use of medications 
Table 2.1 shows the figures on expected versus observed use of medications for 
which a conditional reimbursement regimen applied. In 19 cases it is impossible to 
say whether or not the observed use is at the expected level, because no figures 
on expected use were provided by the CFH (most likely due to a lack of 
epidemiological data)
6
. In five cases, actual use was substantially higher than 
expected (e.g. no. 10, 20 and 29), while in six other cases the observed volumes 
were much lower than the estimates of the CFH (e.g. no. 15, 26 and 28). From a 
comparison of these absolute numbers it is thus hard to conclude whether or not 
the conditional reimbursement policy has a consolidating effect on drug use. 
 
                                                     
6
 Projections are mostly based on data given by the pharmaceutical company and available data in their 
own GIPdatabank 
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Table 2.1 Expected versus observed use 1999-2002 
Schedule 2 Expected 
users 
Observed users (N) Relative 
change user 
population 
(1999=100%)  
N
a
 Year
b
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1. Rubella vaccine   203 164 120 148 -27% 
2. D(K)TP-vaccine   178 131 173 158 -11% 
3. Hepatitis B vaccine   7381 7878 6047 5622 -24% 
4. Pneumococcal vaccine   1924 2124 1917 2210 15% 
5. Heamophilius Influenzae B 
vaccine 
  347 404 449 578 67% 
6. R-DNA-interferon   4462 5156 5449 5809 30% 
7. Growth hormone   2053 2268 2446 2606 27% 
8. Antiretroviral drugs   13095 14603 15942 16850 29% 
9. Epoetins   3822 5516 7789 11006 188% 
10. Cholesterol lowering 
therapy 
380000-
630000 
2000 612255 682281 773771 844872 38% 
11. Recombinant interleukine2   45 38 13 35 -22% 
13
c
 Granulocyte (Macrophage) 
Colony Stimulating Factors 
  2572 609 2970 3243 26% 
14. Acetylcysteines   104774 116359 96881 90425 -14% 
15. Alglucerase, imiglucerase 100-200 2003 46 46 46 47 2% 
16. Rabies vaccine   74 106 141 129 74% 
17. Gabapentin, lamotrigine, 
levetiracetam, topiramate 
1750 2000 7709 15478 31259 46018 497% 
18. Mycophenolate mofetil  2000 1514 2027 2377 2778 83% 
19. Rivastigmine 8750 1998 913 1454 2072 2796 -100% 
20. Apraclonidine,dorzolamide, 
latanoprost 
39.000-
85.000 
1999 45449 64936 77074 95038 109% 
21. OTC-drugs   1568 2254 2646 3755 139% 
22. Hepatitis A vaccine   2848670 1591322 1528993 1555154 -45% 
23. Palivizumab 1300 1999 - 1109 1469 1520 37% 
24. Montelukast  2000 - 5555 19610 24325 338% 
25. Clopidogrel 61269-
79616 
2003 134 3747 16550 34244 -74% 
26. Etanercept 2170-
4340  
2000 10 181 630 874 8640% 
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Table 2.1 Expected versus observed use 1999-2002 (continued) 
Schedule 2 Expected 
users 
Observed users (N) Relative 
change user 
population 
(1999=100%)  
N
a
 Year
b
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
27. Modafinil 640-
1600 
2000 - 30 493 1033 -97% 
28. Becaplermin 1134-
7560 
2000 - 2 447 352 17500% 
29. Rosiglitazone, pioglitazone 1675 2003 - - 7690 18416 139% 
31. Glatiramer  2001 - - - 314 n.a. 
32. Linezolid 300 2002 - - - 37 n.a. 
33. Anakinra  2002 - - - 210 n.a. 
34. Epoprostenol 90 2002 - - - - n.a. 
35. Bosentan 90 2002 - - - - n.a. 
36. Tacrolimus  58443-
147081 
2003 - - - - n.a. 
37. Miglustat 7 2003 - - - - n.a. 
a 
The estimates were derived from published advices of the Commission for Pharmaceutical Care (CFH) 
of the Health Care Insurance Board, who estimated the budget impact of funding new and innovative 
drugs that could be admitted into the benefit package through Schedule 1B (since 1996). The estimates 
only are available as of 1996. If a drug entered the benefit package before 1996, no estimates are 
available unless recalculations have been made. For rivastigmine and cholesterol lowering therapy 
estimates were derived from other sources (Ziekenfondsraad 1998; Gezondheidsraad 2000). 
b
 In some cases the numbers are based on recalculations, e.g. when conditions were adjusted. 
Therefore the year for which estimated numbers are available, can differ from the year of initial 
introduction in the benefit package. 
c
 Number 12, total parenteral feeding, is not included in this study. 
Annual growth and policy effects 
If pharmaceutical use had stabilized over the years, we may assume that there was 
a consolidating effect of the conditional reimbursement-instrument. This seems to 
be the case for only six drugs (excluding vaccines). On the other hand, a 
continuously strong increase in the number of users may point at a failing regimen, 
and that pattern is also found for six medicines/groups (e.g. statins (cholesterol 
lowering drugs), epoetins and antiglaucoma medicines). Nevertheless, it still is 
possible that the requirements are met as other factors and also the type of 
condition can influence the interpretation of the outcomes, e.g. guideline conditions 
may be met while substantial growth rates are observed. The other medicines were 
recently introduced (TNF-α blockers, clopidogrel and thiazolidinediones), such that 
diffusion and dissemination effects hamper interpretation of the time series data.  
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For some drugs, the conditional reimbursement policy changed during the 
observation period, allowing us to observe possible cause-effect relations. Figures 
2.1–2.3 show how the policy change probably affected the use of the growth 
hormone, OTC drugs and cholesterol lowering therapy. The arrows mark the 
moments when the policy changed. In each case there is a change in the number 
of users. These three cases suggest that conditional reimbursement may be an 
effective policy tool to steer drug use. However, the question remains to what 
extent the cases are typical for the conditional reimbursement measure.  
The restrictions for reimbursement of the growth hormone changed on several 
occasions, each time broadening the indications (Ziekenfondsraad 1997, 1999; 
College voor zorgverzekeringen 1999). Various changes in the reimbursement 
regimen (indicated by the arrows in Figure 2.1), also point at an increase in the 
medication use. 
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In 1999 the conditional reimbursement policy regarding OTC-drugs was radically 
changed (Rikken and Eijgelshoven 2000). A new measure determined that the 
OTC-drugs would only be reimbursed for the chronically ill. This is clearly shown in 
Figure 2.2; the number of users is halved although the mean number of DDDs per 
user is increased, resulting in only a marginal cost reduction. 
The arrow indicates the introduction of a new guideline for statins into clinical 
practice in 1998 by The Dutch Institute for Health care Improvement (CBO) 
(Centraal Begeleidingsorgaan voor de Intercollegiale toetsing 1998). Figure 2.3 
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shows that since 1998 the drug use pattern has changed, however the restrictions 
related to reimbursement were not altered. Therefore the time series analysis 
indicates a possible unauthorized use of the statins according to the conditional 
reimbursement policy. 
Case studies 
The micro-level data for the five case studies clopidogrel, thiazolidinediones, 
statins, TNF-α blockers and growth hormone is summarized in Table 2.2.  
Table 2.2 Inappropriate use according to Schedule 2-measure and professional 
guidelines 
Drug  Indication area Unauthorized use 
(against Schedule 
2) 
Inappropriate use 
(against 
professional 
guidelines) 
Clopidogrel
a
 Recent ischemic 
stroke, myocardial 
infarction, peripheral 
arterial disease 
13% 7% 
Clopidogrel
a
 Acute coronary 
syndrome without ST-
elevation 
24% Under-use 
Clopidogrel
a
 Percutaneous trans-
luminal coronary 
angioplasty 
29% Under-use 
Etanercept
b
 Rheumatic disease 15% 2% 
Growth hormone
c
 Faltering growth 12% 4% 
Thiazolidinediones
d
 Diabetes control 17% 0% 
Statins
d
 Hypercholesterolemia 94% 8% 
a 
Pharmo-database. 
b 
GIP-database. 
c 
LRG-database. 
d 
IPCI-database. 
Clopidogrel 
In the case of clopidogrel, the low adherence to policy guidelines has been the 
subject of heavy debate. For three indications (Table 2.2), clopidogrel is not 
reimbursed according to the conditions for reimbursement in 13%, 24% and 29% of 
the cases, respectively. Based on emerging scientific evidence, however, 
physicians considered its use appropriate for a number of indications not listed in 
Schedule 2, and adapted their guidelines accordingly. Over the past few years 
clinical guidelines were regularly updated when more patient groups, for which 
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effectiveness of clopidogrel was demonstrated in clinical studies, were identified. 
When following these guidelines, only 7% might be prescribed inappropriately, and 
even more prescriptions should have been written since under-use has been 
detected according to clinicians and patient representatives. Policymakers, 
however, had not updated the conditions since the first inclusion of the drug in 
Schedule 2, and did not allow reimbursement of its use in these new identified 
subgroups. They argued that extended reimbursement was not feasible, because 
the new indications for clopidogrel were not registered; neither by a national 
procedure (Medicines Evaluation Board), nor at a European level (European 
Medicines Agency). The pharmaceutical industry and some specialists however, 
claimed that the exclusion of these indications was based on implicit cost-
arguments. Accordingly, many respondents mentioned that the revision procedure 
for clopidogrel, as well as of other drugs, is not very transparent, and is often 
accompanied by procedural mistakes. 
Thiazolidinediones 
According to the conditional reimbursement instrument 17% of the drug 
prescriptions of thiazolidinediones should not have been reimbursed. This is why 
the adherence to the regimen became, just like in the clopidogrel case, the subject 
of debate. The high percentage of unauthorized use results from application of 
thiazolidinediones for indications not yet listed on Schedule 2. Moreover, the 
Schedule 2 conditions reflect a step-up treatment pathway, while more and more 
clinicians seem to believe that a step-down approach may be more beneficial to 
patients. Thus, where policymakers insist that, under these circumstances, policy 
guidelines should prevail, it became apparent that the professionals have another 
view on the appropriate treatment of patients with diabetes.  
Statins 
In the case of cholesterol lowering therapy, it appeared that 94% of the 
prescriptions were not according to the Schedule 2 requirements. However, when 
compared with the latest European guideline (Mantel-Teeuwisse et al. 2004) only 
8% is ‘inappropriately’ prescribed. Again, the problem of discrepancies between 
professional norms and policy restrictions seems to apply. In this case, however, 
another problem also becomes apparent. Health insurers generally believed that 
statins should be dropped from Schedule 2. The underlying idea is that monitoring 
the appropriate application of this drug in clinical practice is rather problematic. 
Additionally, they argued that the administrative costs of monitoring certainly would 
exceed its potential savings. They found that the assessment of the appropriate 
reimbursement of statins is difficult because of the large population, and the 
requested data to check whether a patient meets the requirements are not easy to 
collect. The Schedule 2 indication requires, for example, that a patient should have 
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been on a diet for at least 6 months without result prior to prescription. In addition, 
the patient must suffer from a heritable hypercholesterolemia or have a cholesterol 
level ≥8 mmol/l and at least one additional risk factor (e.g. diabetes mellitus). 
Nevertheless, policymakers found the Schedule 2 listing of cholesterol lowering 
therapy still useful, because it is a sign to physicians and health insurers that 
careful prescription is required. Moreover, policymakers consider listing important 
as it provides a legal basis for intervention, regardless of the extent of successful 
implementation in daily practice.  
TNF-α blockers 
For etanercept, the figures presented in Table 2.2 suggest unauthorized use, with 
up to 15% of users for whom the specified step-up treatment pattern was 
apparently not followed. Legitimacy and desirability of the conditions were not an 
issue, though, because the unauthorized use could, for the most part, be justified. 
When etanercept was introduced, there were insufficient supplies to treat all 
patients, and specific selection rules were applied. A national board was 
established to evaluate each request for this expensive drug. When supply 
increased, permission was extended to the initial user group, meaning that they 
were relieved from the obligation of proving having met all indication criteria. The 
timely discussions between CVZ and the members of the central assessment 
committee contributed to the efficient functioning of the restrictions, though the 
adjustments of the restrictions were not established as quickly as in the case of the 
growth hormone. In addition, the health insurers were also represented in the 
committee, keeping the connection between policy and practice very tight.  
Growth hormone  
Twelve percent of the prescriptions can be classified as ‘unauthorized’. However, in 
some cases of growth hormone use, the diagnosis of growth hormone deficiency 
was evident, so that the clinical requirements in the consensus criteria of the 
‘Protocol use of growth hormone’ were not collected (4%). The label ‘unauthorized’, 
therefore, does not really apply for these prescriptions as they do meet the content 
of the requirements. Both policymakers and health insurers agreed that the 
conditional reimbursement of the growth hormone contributed to its effective and 
appropriate use. According to the interviewees, the national (uniform) assessment 
was the main reason why the conditional reimbursement policy functioned properly, 
like in the TNF-α blockers case. 
Common issues 
Most stakeholders in the clopidogrel, statins and thiazolidinediones case studies 
shared the opinion that the required conditions were not functioning well. Actors in 
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the field of health care and health insurers considered the system to be too 
inflexible to allow timely adjustment to emerging scientific and clinical insights. 
They argued that a periodic review was missing. According to the practising 
physicians, drug prescription beyond the authorized indications, as listed in 
Schedule 2, is very common in the cases of clopidogrel, thiazolidinediones and 
cholesterol lowering therapy. They mentioned that the strict application of the 
reimbursement rules conflicts with the latest professional guidelines (Table 2.2). 
The figures may also give reason for concern, as they show that the health insurers 
do and/or cannot (always) force adherence to the regime. Health insurers claim 
that – because of new and widening indications – they are losing control of 
authorized prescription and related reimbursement. Some of them have been able 
to improve their grip on conditional reimbursement (e.g. by checking their 
registered data or implementing compulsory authorization requests), but this 
applies to only a minority of health insurers. This development was considered 
problematic by health care providers, who fear for inequalities in the delivery of 
health care.  
 
Whereas the cases mentioned above show the different problems of conditional 
reimbursement, the stakeholders in the growth hormone and TNF-α blockers cases 
seem to cope effectively with the conditional reimbursement measure. The health 
insurers were satisfied with the national assessment committees, because these 
generally led to clear, feasible and manageable conditions. The committees were 
constituted by order of CVZ and, instead of the individual health insurers, centrally 
assessed the claims for reimbursement of the medications in a uniform way, using 
objective criteria
7
. Unauthorized drug use is therefore not very likely to occur. This 
way of decision-making was considered very positive by not only the health 
insurers, but also by the specialists and patient representatives. Whereas health 
insurers appreciated its uniformity and the use of strict criteria, the specialists were 
pleased with a certain degree of flexibility and discretionary space for exceptional 
cases, and the patient representatives felt they were done justice because of the 
presence of specialists in the assessment committees. Overall, the different 
stakeholders felt their voices were heard. Moreover, the growth hormone case 
shows a dynamic conditional reimbursement policy, in which scientific 
developments, professionals’ views and policy considerations are in a continuous 
process of interaction. 
 
                                                     
7
 The individual central assessment committee for TNF-α blockers (2004) and growth hormone (2005) 
have been abolished and subsequently integrated in the National Evaluation of Applications of Drugs 
(Landelijke Beoordeling van Aanvragen Geneesmiddelen (LABAG), http://www.labag.nl) financed by the 
Dutch health insurers. The assessment of difficult cases still includes the expertise of (mostly the same) 
specialists. 
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During the interviews, the stakeholders generally agreed with the policy objectives 
of the conditional reimbursement instrument. However, they expressed not being 
satisfied with the decision-making procedures for considering the inclusion of drugs 
in Schedule 2, the definition of the conditions, and (lack of) adjustments. Moreover, 
they tended to disagree with policymakers about the interpretation of evaluation 
outcomes. On the one hand, policymakers tend to evaluate the outcomes from a 
rather ‘mechanical’ perspective, focusing on merely the compliance with 
reimbursement rules. Clinicians, on the other hand, evaluate the outcomes from a 
broader perspective. From their viewpoint, the policy is expected to be 
implemented in accordance with general criteria for reimbursement, clinical 
objectives and available medical evidence. As knowledge and expertise are 
continuously shifting, clinicians advocate a dynamic view when interpreting the 
policy outcomes. Generally, the policy guidelines restrict use to a smaller group of 
patients than professional clinical guidelines do. This is partly due to the fact that 
conditions are not always revised when the body of clinical evidence grows. 
Obviously, the consequence is that the two parties heavily disagree about the 
extent of inappropriate or unauthorized prescribing (see Table 2.2). 
Discussion 
From our study, we can conclude that the policy of conditional reimbursement is 
currently not as effective and efficient as was expected by policymakers. Analysis 
of expected versus observed volumes points at substantial unauthorized drug use 
in a number of cases. These findings were confirmed in five case studies that also 
suggested that adherence to professional clinical guidelines is higher than to 
restrictions related to conditional reimbursement. Interview data showed that 
conditional reimbursement generally is considered as a valuable instrument for 
improving the quality and efficiency of pharmaceutical care. However, respondents 
also identified a number of problems related to the policy measure’s effectiveness, 
mainly concerning the communication of the conditional reimbursement regulation 
and the cooperation within its affected arena. The underlying bottlenecks of these 
identified problems; transparency, legitimacy, feasibility and commitment on the 
part of the stakeholders, should be dealt with for a successful implementation of 
the conditional reimbursement policy.  
 
All respondents mentioned the lack of good and timely cooperation between 
policymakers and health insurers, medical specialists, patient organisations, and 
pharmaceutical industry. This lack of cooperation leads to a lot of ‘noise’ and delay 
in the communication. Under the current regime, this leads to a polarizing attitude 
among the different stakeholders. Practising physicians blamed health insurers for 
their policy regarding the reimbursement of certain drugs, but often proved to be 
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unaware of the fact that insurers merely execute a national policy. This lack of 
knowledge often results in a negative spiral of misunderstanding and 
miscommunication. Failing communication may be illustrated by the fact that many 
of the interviewed physicians and pharmacists were unaware of the additional 
conditions applying to statins and the thiazolidinediones. Also, both policymakers 
and specialists hold on to their definition of ‘appropriate use’, without 
communicating which definition should be used and why or how.  
 
Actors in the field of health care expressed the opinion that the processes of 
selecting drugs for conditional reimbursement and defining the corresponding 
criteria were not transparent and ambiguous. The pharmaceutical industry and 
health insurers criticized the policy for a lack of transparency and accountability. 
The pharmaceutical industry questioned the consistency of decision criteria (e.g. 
clopidogrel) and thus its legitimacy. Therefore, they asked for the possibility to 
participate in the decision-making process. Also, representatives of patient 
organisations and physicians shared these concerns because inequalities in 
treatment regimes that are not evidence based are considered to be unjustifiable. 
In their view, a more consistent application of the regulation would increase its 
understanding and acceptance. Health insurers stressed the importance of their 
involvement in the decision-making process about conditional reimbursement, in 
order to improve the feasibility of the restrictions in daily practice. For example, 
central assessment committees proved to be efficient for some drugs, whereas 
authorization by the patient’s health insurer, though potentially effective, was 
considered to be too time-consuming, very elaborative, and sometimes seen as 
interfering with the professional autonomy of physicians (e.g. cholesterol lowering 
therapy).  
 
CVZ is the key stakeholder in the conditional reimbursement policy, and is 
responsible for its implementation in daily practice. However, the success of the 
policy is highly dependent on the commitment and cooperation of health insurers, 
medical professionals, patient organisations, and the pharmaceutical industry. This 
means that CVZ has to balance between policy goals set at a national level, and 
the feasibility of the policy measures in daily practice. From this perspective, CVZ 
first needs to improve its own commitment and display its pro-active involvement. 
In addition, they should improve the transparency, legitimacy, and feasibility of the 
system and enhance the commitment of other stakeholders. Improving regulations 
‘on paper’ does not easily solve the lack of transparency. To improve the 
transparency of the measure, CVZ should take into account the different interests 
and goals of the stakeholders. Subsequently, CVZ should translate its own target 
into practical goals that are understood and can be implemented by the other 
stakeholders. Improving the legitimacy does not only mean the involvement of 
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stakeholders in the decision-making process, but also means giving the 
stakeholders enough space to adapt the regulations in such a way that these are 
optimally feasible in practice. In addition, feasibility problems may be anticipated by 
increasing the understanding on the part of CVZ of the organisational processes 
used in daily practice.  
 
A transparent conditional reimbursement policy can only be reached when clear 
tasks are defined and all stakeholders know their responsibilities. The policy would 
benefit from a central and stimulating position of CVZ during the preparation, 
implementation and carrying out of the measure, with maximum involvement of 
other stakeholders. Intensive interaction between the different parties is needed to 
share experiences in the field of appropriate drug use, knowledge about recent 
scientific developments and available data on the appropriate use of medications. 
This knowledge can be used to continuously and timely update the conditional 
reimbursement regulations. National policymakers also should communicate more 
clearly towards the health insurers and field actors. The conditional reimbursement 
policy requires a pro-active attitude of the policymakers concerned. Good 
information at the beginning of the policy chain prevents problems later on. This 
pro-active attitude can be realized by improving the quality and accessibility of 
information, and by making the policy process more open for intermediate 
discussion. 
Conclusion 
Conditional reimbursement can be an effective and efficient tool for enhancing 
appropriate drug use. However, its implementation is hampered by a lack of 
transparency of the system, doubts about the instrument’s legitimacy, blindness to 
feasibility, and a low commitment amongst medical specialists and pharmacists. 
Our analysis of the conditional reimbursement in Dutch pharmaceutical policy 
shows that controlling and sanctioning did not contribute much to its effect. Instead, 
its effect hinges on the way prescribing conditions are developed and especially on 
how these conditions changed the relations between clinical and policy practices. 
Rather than monitoring, it is the extension and involvement of the actors, their 
objectives and their mutual relationships that seemed to affect the clinical practice 
of drug prescriptions. Therefore bottlenecks should be simultaneously handled in 
close collaboration with the principal stakeholders, acknowledging the mutual 
dependency that exists between the various parties. Thus, taking into account the 
characteristics of the actors, their objectives and the relationships between them, 
seems to be a promising direction for the further development and use of the 
conditional reimbursement measure.  
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Box 2.A. The conditional reimbursement regime for five cases on 1 January 2004 
Medicine Conditional reimbursement regime Testing authorized use 
Clopidogrel Only for an insured who, after a 
myocardial infarction or ischemic 
cerebrovascular accident or with a 
peripheral arterial disease, cannot be 
treated with acetylsalicylic acid because 
of hypersensitivity for acetylsalicylic acid 
or has another absolute contra indication 
for acetylsalicylic acid 
Population: All patients who 
had received clopidogrel within 
one month after admission to 
the hospital for a cardiovascular 
event; 
Analysis: We examined medical 
records to confirm 
appropriateness of clopidogrel 
use given the diagnosed 
cardiovascular event; 
Database: Pharmo 
Rosiglitazone 
and 
pioglitazone  
 
Only for an insured suffering of diabetes 
mellitus type 2 who insufficiently 
responds to mono therapy with a 
sulfonylurea derivative and has contra 
indications or intolerance for metformin 
Population: everyone who used 
thiazolidinediones at least once 
between 2001 and 2003; 
Analysis: we traced their 
medical treatment history to 
see if the specified step-up 
therapeutic pathway was 
followed; 
Database: GIP. 
Etanercept
a
 Only for an insured with active rheumatic 
arthritis and an insufficient response to or 
intolerance for disease modifying 
antirheumatic drugs (DMARDs), including 
at least methotrexate except when 
methotrexate is contraindicated. The 
insured is only eligible for reimbursement 
when s/he is treated following clinical 
guidelines, by a specialist, and use of 
etanercept was authorized by the insurer 
Population: everyone who used 
etanercept at least once 
between 2000 and 2003; 
Analysis: we traced their 
medical treatment history see if 
the specified step-up 
therapeutic pathway was 
followed; 
Database: GIP. 
Growth 
hormone
b 
 
Only for an insured with growth hormone 
deficiency, who has not yet reached 18 
years of age, the medicine is prescribed 
by an internist according to the ‘Protocol 
use of growth hormone’, each time for 
maximal one year, with prior authorization 
of the health insurance company;  
The protocol specifies how the diagnosis 
of growth hormone deficiency should be 
confirmed. It also specifies an 
effectiveness criterion (minimally 
expected growth in cm). 
Patients: patients younger than 
18 years of age, who started or 
continued growth hormone 
treatment between 1998-2002;  
Analysis: We examined their 
medical data included in the 
registry to see if the diagnosis 
was confirmed and if effect of 
growth hormone on growth met 
requirements; 
Database: National Growth 
Hormone Registry. 
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Box 2.A. The conditional reimbursement regime for five cases on 1 January 2004 
(continued) 
Medicine Conditional reimbursement regime Testing authorized use 
Cholesterol 
lowering 
drugs 
Only for an insured:  
suffering from familial 
hypercholesterolemia 
with a strongly increased chance of 
suffering from atherosclerotic 
cardiovascular disease as a consequence 
of a cholesterol level ≥ 8 mmol/l with at 
least one, or as a consequence of a 
cholesterol level 6 mmol/l at least two of 
the following additional risk factors: 
coronary artery hart diseases (CAHD) in 
the anamnesis; 
a family anamnesis of CAHD; 
diabetes mellitus; 
hypertension; 
and over 6 months a diet was not effective 
Patients: all persons whose 
general practitioner initiated 
cholesterol-lowering therapy 
with statins in 2002 or 2003;  
Analysis: we examined their 
medical data to confirm the 
diagnosis of familial 
hypercholesterolemia, or the 
cholesterol levels and co-
morbidity. We did not 
investigate if people had been 
on a diet; 
Database: IPCI. 
a
 Presented are the conditions for reimbursement of etanercept in adults with Rheumatoid 
arthritis. The conditional reimbursement scheme further specifies when patients with juvenile 
arthritis, ankylosing spondylitis, and psoriatic arthritis are eligible for reimbursement of 
etanercept.  
b
 Presented are the conditions for reimbursement of growth hormone in children with growth 
hormone deficiency. The conditional reimbursement scheme further specifies when patients 
with Turner syndrome and Prader-Willi syndrome are eligible for reimbursement of growth 
hormone.  
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Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and severity of 
illness play or should play a role in drug reimbursement decisions (Briggs & Gray 
2000; Drummond, Jonsson & Rutten 1997; Stolk, Brouwer & Busschbach 2002; 
Van Oostenbruggen et al. 2005). Lesser consensus can be found for the role of 
budget impact as an additional decision criterion. Especially health economists 
argue that the budget impact argument undermines cost-effective allocations, and 
therefore leads to suboptimal distributions of health in the populations (Niezen et 
al. 2004; Trueman, Drummond & Hutton 2001; Van Luijn 1999). Nevertheless, 
given increasingly stringent budget constraints, policymakers have a need to know 
what the impact of any new technology will be on their limited budget. Budget 
impact analyses provide such information (Mauskopf 2005, 1998; Neumann 2007). 
Budget impact refers to “the total costs that drug reimbursement and use entail with 
respect to one part of the health care system, pharmaceutical care, or the entire 
health care system, taking into account the possible reallocation of resources 
across budgets or sectors of the health care system” (Cohen, Stolk & Niezen 2007, 
p728). If, on the basis of cost-effectiveness information, a positive reimbursement 
decision is suggested, budget impact addresses the question of what amount of 
resources would be needed to implement the decision. For reimbursement 
purposes, several national health technology assessment agencies, including the 
Health Care Insurance Board in the Netherlands (CVZ) and the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) in Australia, already require that drug 
manufacturers submit both cost-effectiveness and budget impact analyses of newly 
approved pharmaceuticals (Mauskopf 1998). 
 
Advocates of the budget impact criterion point out that cost-effectiveness analysis 
fails to meet the needs of policymakers, whose overriding concern is not so much 
the cost-effectiveness of the interventions, but their budget constraints (Trueman, 
Drummond & Hutton 2001). Cost-effectiveness analysis does not address 
affordability. This is especially a problem when resource requirements for the 
funding of new technologies are relatively large. The precise role of budget impact 
and its rationale in drug reimbursement decisions have not been made clear in the 
literature. Whereas a small number of studies have addressed descriptions of 
methods for conducting budget impact analysis (Mauskopf 2005; Mauskopf et al. 
2007; Orlewska and Mierzejewski 2004; Trueman, Drummond & Hutton 2001), the 
literature on drug reimbursement decisions is still dominated by formal cost-
effectiveness and severity of illness-analyses. This may be due to the fact that 
budget impact is not perceived as a legitimate decision criterion, as it lacks 
scientific rigor; meaning rational use of evidence based, and explicit knowledge 
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(Bal and Lindeloof 2005). In this study, we outline current policy practices in which 
budget impact plays a role in drug reimbursement decisions. Next, we provide a 
synopsis of results gathered from interviews with eleven key stakeholders involved 
in drug reimbursement decisions in the Netherlands. Subsequently, we examine 
possible rationales underlying the use of budget impact as a decision criterion for 
resource allocation. In doing so, we hope to provide more explicit knowledge for 
the use of the budget impact as an argument for allocation in health care. 
Method 
Our initial examination of the role of budget impact as a decision criterion consisted 
of a literature search in PubMed covering the period 1990-2007. Instead of using 
Mesh or Emtree terms, we used more specific (combinations of) keywords; 
‘budget(ary) impact,’ ‘affordability,’ ‘drug reimbursement and budget impact / 
affordability,’ and ‘drug reimbursement and rationing / prioritization.’ In addition, we 
used a snowball method to generate references starting with the milestone articles 
by Trueman, Drummond & Hutton (2001) and Mauskopf (2005). We supplemented 
the literature review by conducting semi-structured interviews with eleven key 
stakeholders involved in drug reimbursement decisions in the Netherlands (see 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2). 
Table 3.1 Background of interview respondents 
Organization Employment (N) 
Ministry of Health Policy associate Drugs and Medical 
Technology 
2 
Health care Insurance Board (CVZ) Policy associate benefit package 
decisions 
2 
CEO 1 
Dutch organization for innovative drugs 
(Nefarma)*  
Policy associate drug reimbursement 2 
UMC St Radboud, Department of 
Epidemiology, Biostatistics and Health 
technology assessment  
Health economist / scientific researcher 1 
Canisius-Wilhelmina Hospital CEO 1 
The NVZ Dutch Hospitals Association Policy advisor health care 1 
Erasmus MC, Institute of Health Policy 
and Management 
Professor in ‘Societal aspects of hospital 
drug policy’ and also a hospital 
pharmacist 
1 
* An umbrella organization for the Dutch innovative pharmaceutical industry 
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Table 3.2 Topic list semi-structured interviews 
 How do you define budget impact? 
 What is the relevance of budget impact as a criterion in drug reimbursement 
decision-making? 
 When is budget impact used as a decision criterion?  
 In what decision-process (e.g. budget re-allocation, admission to the benefit 
package, etc.) 
 When is budget impact used in the drug reimbursement decision-making process? 
 Is budget impact’s use formally acknowledged (official reports on budget impact 
similar to cost-effectiveness and severity of illness) 
 Is budget impact mere addition to cost-effectiveness information or can it trump 
cost-effectiveness and severity of illness arguments too? 
 Can you name specific drug types (e.g. orphan drugs, drugs for life-style 
conditions) for which budget impact is most likely to play a role? 
 Do you know of specific cases in which budget impact played an important role? 
 What motives or argumentations are there to use budget impact as a decision 
criterion in resource allocation? 
 Have you used budget impact analyses to guide your decisions? 
 If yes, what was your motivation to do so? 
 
The interviewees were selected on the basis of their involvement in reimbursement 
decisions of pharmaceuticals in which budget impact had been a major discussion 
point. The interviews were recorded and converted to transcripts, which have been 
hand coded to analyze the content of the interviews. The codes were discussed 
among the researchers (code words were, e.g., budget impact/costs, cost-
effectiveness, objective/scientific rationing, uncertainty, opportunity costs, and 
equality) (Green & Thorogood 2004).  
Current practice 
Use of budget impact is very much a reality in current health care decision-making; 
policymakers use budget impact as a decision criterion in certain instances. 
Results from a multinomial modelling of NICE decision-making, for example, 
showed that interventions with a high budget impact were more likely to be 
recommended for conditional reimbursement and use, that is, with restrictions, 
holding clinical- and cost-effectiveness, as well as other considerations constant. 
The model showed that “[t]he potential budget impact [. . .] was significantly higher 
for those interventions that were recommended for restricted use than those 
recommended for routine use, without restrictions” (Dakin, Devlin & Odeyemi 2006, 
p358).  
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In the Netherlands, it appears that budget impact also played a significant role in a 
number of drug reimbursement decisions (Niezen et al. 2007). Some examples are 
the reimbursement decisions for clopidogrel, trastuzumab, and the entire class of 
statins. In 1999, CVZ advised the Ministry of Health to admit clopidogrel for all 
approved indications to the health benefit package, on the grounds of its 
favourable clinical- and cost-effectiveness profiles. However, because of its 
relatively high cost compared with existing therapy (acetylsalicylic acid), combined 
with the potential for substantial off-label use, CVZ recommended severe 
restrictions on the use of clopidogrel. Despite CVZ’s recommendations, the Ministry 
of Health decided not to reimburse clopidogrel at all, citing budget limitations 
(Eijgelshoven et al. 2003; Niezen et al. 2004; Van Luijn 1999). Subsequent to the 
Ministry’s decision, a successful legal challenge by the drug manufacture obliged 
the Ministry of Health to reimburse clopidogrel for all approved indications. 
Nevertheless, the Ministry has not reimbursed new indications for clopidogrel, and 
continues to place severe restrictions on its reimbursement and use. Again, the 
Ministry refers to high budget impact, due to the potential for substantial off label 
use in a large patient population (Amerongen 2003; Eijgelshoven et al. 2003). The 
Ministry of Health expressed similar concerns about the reimbursement of statins 
(Niezen et al. 2007). The large pool of potential users of statins suggests that a 
positive reimbursement decision would exert significant upward pressure on 
pharmacy expenditures. This reasoning led to the Ministry’s decision to place 
conditions on the reimbursement of statins (Hoedemaekers & Oortwijn 2003).  
 
Although reimbursement of statins for specific subpopulations may be explained by 
stratified cost-effectiveness analyses (across sub-populations), Niezen et al. (2007) 
show that strictly prescribing in accordance with the conditions of reimbursement 
imposed on statins entails under-treatment, according to the (evidence based) 
professional guidelines. This example demonstrates that budget impact likely 
played a role. A third example, the in-patient cancer drug trastuzumab (breast 
cancer), is generally seen as cost-effective. The drug’s budget impact is high, 
owing to its relative high price per patient and the relatively high volume of breast 
cancer patients who would be considered eligible for its use. Recent research 
demonstrates that trastuzumab was unevenly distributed among patients in The 
Netherlands (Borstkankervereniging Nederland 2005). Although hospitals received 
additional funding for trastuzumab, the cost of the drug grew much faster than the 
assigned budget, causing great pressure on the hospital pharmaceutical budget 
(Niezen et al. 2006). Evidently, unequal access was caused in part by the 
‘intolerably’ high impact unrestricted reimbursement has on the local budget of 
certain hospitals.  
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Interviews 
Most interviewed policymakers confirmed that budget impact did play a role in 
certain specific cases, such as clopidogrel and sildenafil. Budget impact becomes a 
more important factor when the uncertainty regarding other criteria, such as cost-
effectiveness and severity of illness is high. However, the interviewed policymakers 
could not explain how the budget impact criterion precisely interacts with 
effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and severity of illness. The respondents 
confirmed that budget impact played a role, but that its role was intuitive or based 
on a ‘gut feeling’ (Respondent VIII, 2006). The most common reply was that “it 
depends on the other case specific factors”. Moreover, policymakers did not 
provide a concrete definition of what is meant by budget impact and what budget 
impact analyses specifically assess.  
I do not know the term budget impact very well, thus my understanding of it would 
depend on the context in which I encountered it, and not as part of my 
understanding of health economics. (Respondent X, 2006)  
The lack of clarity surrounding the concept ‘budget impact’ does not appear to 
hamper its use.  
The higher the budget impact, the more therapeutic value there must be and 
efficiency determines the outcome, just because the effect on the budget is bigger. 
As uncertainty [regarding an intervention’s effectiveness] increases, one could 
choose to be more reserved in deciding to fund. Nevertheless, patients’ interests 
and therapeutic value are the focus of interest, also for the Minister [of Health]. 
Only, the Minister is also responsible for not exceeding growth targets and thus will 
be more critical. (Respondent IX, 2006)  
Policymakers have little incentive for formally discussing their concerns regarding 
the impact of reimbursement decisions on the (pharmacy) budget. Since 
reasonable arguments supporting the use of budget impact are lacking or not (yet) 
formulated, policymakers typically concentrate on using arguments of 
effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and severity of illness. Thus, policymakers rely on 
and interpret the available scientific, technical, and clinical data, contained in 
evidence based ‘cost-effectiveness analyses’ or ‘health technology assessments.’ 
Such analyses offer them the supposed promise of a rational grasp of, and 
concomitant ‘control’ over, health care decision-making (Bal and Lindeloof 2005; 
Berg, Van der Grinten & Klazinga 2004). Consequently, policymakers often rely 
only on information gathered from cost-effectiveness analyses to justify their 
decisions, instead of explaining how budget impact had an effect on the decision.  
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Because we really think it is important to maintain efficacy and therapeutic value, 
because yes. . . that forms the core of the decisions that we make. So that cost or 
what you call budget impact, that is at the bottom of the list. (Respondent VIII, 
2006)  
Actually, we do not like the cost discussion. Because, indeed, in the case of 
clopidogrel, yes, we are not going to formally acknowledge it [cost or budget impact 
led to the decision]. And in the case of sildenafil, well, it felt more normal; you could 
explain more easily that we do not pay for erection disorders and that type of stuff. 
Yet, clopidogrel is sometimes a life-saving medication, although it is only so for one 
in a hundred users. But you do not want to go into a cost discussion. (Respondent 
VIII, 2006)  
The citations above show how uncomfortable policymakers are with formally 
acknowledging that budget impact plays a role in reimbursement decisions. 
Implicitly, budget impact already seems to have a place in priority setting, although 
explicitly budget impact seldom is used as an argument for denying a drug 
reimbursement outright or imposing conditions on its reimbursement, given that it 
appears to lack scientific rigor or a rationale.  
Rationales in favour of the budget impact criterion 
Although the respondents did not give explicit rationales for budget impact, 
literature does show some rationales that justify budget impact’s use as a rationing 
criterion. These rationales comprise the opportunity costs of reimbursement 
decisions, the fact that each decision involves gains and losses that are evaluated 
differently, uncertainty and equal opportunity.  
Opportunity costs  
One of the main arguments in favour of using budget impact analyses found in the 
literature, is a deficiency in common cost-effectiveness analyses; opportunity costs 
are disregarded (Birch & Gafni 2006; Cohen, Stolk & Niezen 2007; Gafni et al. 
2007; Harris 2001; Sendi, Gafni & Birch 2005, 2002; Sendi & Briggs 2001). 
Expansion of the benefit package will typically be considered when a drug has a 
favourable incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER), suggesting that incremental 
health gains are worth the incremental costs. Most of the recently developed drugs, 
though, have positive cost-effectiveness ratios. Consequently, a positive 
reimbursement decision for a new intervention suggests the need to expand the 
budget for health care, or some of the existing benefits in the benefit package 
would have to be eliminated, to fund the new intervention. Whichever solution one 
chooses, there is an opportunity cost involved that must be considered. The 
opportunity cost of a positive reimbursement decision increases with the size of a 
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drug’s budget impact. One will have to sacrifice increasing amounts – there is less 
to spend on other public programs or existing health benefits - to fund the new 
drug. The higher the opportunity cost, the more one has to sacrifice, the less likely 
it will be for a drug to be reimbursed.  
 
Moreover, the opportunity cost argument necessitates a re-evaluation of the 
justification of the value of the incremental ICER thresholds and their use in 
decision-making (Gafni & Birch 2006; Sendi, Gafni & Birch 2002; Sendi & Briggs 
2001). Health care payers operating within a constrained budget may deny 
reimbursement of new medical technologies with a high budget impact, because 
funding these interventions would lower the lambda (λ), or threshold ICER, which is 
equal to the ICER of the last program selected for reimbursement before the 
budget is exhausted. In other words, λ reflects the opportunity cost of marginal 
health care resources, or benefits foregone of the last unit of health care resources 
spent (Birch & Gafni 2006; Gafni & Birch 2006; Gafni et al. 2007; Sendi, Gafni & 
Birch 2005). A lower λ could mean that other pharmaceuticals, already in the 
benefits package, would no longer meet the threshold. However, because not all 
cost-effectiveness ratios of treatments included in the current benefit package are 
known, neither is λ known. Accordingly, Gafni & Birch (2006) suggest that 
policymakers require actual information on the opportunity costs of marginal 
resources. A possible approach to priority setting combining information on 
(opportunity) costs, cost-effectiveness, and health related benefits of drugs, is 
program budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA). “PBMA addresses allocative 
efficiency by providing a systematic framework for maximizing health related 
benefits for a given budget considering both the outcomes from, and costs of 
providing, a range of services” (Peacock 1998, p.2).  
Loss aversion; endowment effects  
Policymakers may be more reluctant to exclude than to include drugs from the 
collectively funded benefits package. A shared feeling among policymakers we 
interviewed is that taking something away from patients that works and with which 
they are already familiar, outweighs the benefit of adding something new. This 
rationale is closely tied to opportunity costs. However, in this case, it directly 
concerns what happens when a treatment is eliminated from the benefit package. It 
reflects the people’s tendency to prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains. Budget 
impact makes it possible to consider the actual felt loss, the endowment effect, in 
rationing decisions. The higher the budget impact, the more one has to sacrifice, 
the more loss is felt by health insurance payers and patients and less likely the 
decision is accepted. To illustrate, a person who loses $100 will lose more 
satisfaction than another person will gain satisfaction from a $100 windfall. In turn, 
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there is a discrepancy between an individual’s maximum willingness to pay for a 
good and the minimum compensation demanded to give up the good. There are 
several explanations for this phenomenon, described by Dupont & Lee (2002) 
including the ‘endowment effect’ which captures the overvaluation of a good that is 
in already in one’s possession; the ‘status quo bias’ which describes the preference 
to remain in a current state; and ‘prospect theory’ where losses impact the agent’s 
utility more than gains of the same magnitude (Dupont & Lee 2002; Kahneman & 
Tversky 1979). The inherent difficulty of having to exclude treatments from the 
current benefit package is increased by the fact that policymakers also have to 
choose which interventions to eliminate. However, they have no list of interventions 
which are ranked on unfavourable (cost-) effectiveness. Consequently, they have 
to justify their choices to society, and may fear the public backlash that may ensue 
as happened in the Netherlands concerning the IVF reimbursement policy 
(Ministerie van Volksgezondheid 2006). An additional complication is that society 
interpreted the social health insurance package as a ‘social contract’ which cannot 
just be broken from one side (Anand & Dolan 2005). 
Uncertainty  
A third rationale for considering budget impact in resource allocation decisions is 
uncertainty. Invariably, there is uncertainty about the actual cost-effectiveness of 
new health interventions (Harris et al. 2001). Likewise, in health care finance, the 
budget implications of expansion of the benefit package are usually uncertain, due 
to the fact that at the time of launch little is known about the extent to which a drug 
will be used (Niezen et al. 2007). It is simply hard to estimate the size of the user 
population. Will a newly approved drug only be used by those who suffer severely 
from a particular condition, or will it also be used by those who have a milder form 
of the condition? Similarly, a newly launched drug may experience a broadening of 
indications through off-label use, further increasing uncertainty (Al, Feenstra & 
Hout 2005). Programs may therefore require more resources than initially 
budgeted. In case reimbursement results in budget overspend, or when large 
deficits loom, uncertainty is a particularly acute problem. Uncertainty may explain 
why small-scale programs are often favoured over large-scale programs (Harris et 
al. 2001). Policymakers have to adhere to strict budgets and therefore must 
consider opportunity cost. Typically, the potential for large deficits increases with 
the size of the patient population. Hence, policymakers prefer to diversify their 
‘investments’, which leads to an improved handling of uncertainty regarding 
unexpected costs, and a concomitant reduction in the risk of overspending (Sendi, 
Al & Rutten 2004). Thus, a large budget relates to more uncertainty and an 
increased need in a more precise budget impact analysis. 
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Equal opportunity  
Budget impact may also play a role in reimbursement decisions as a way to 
preserve equal opportunity. Policymakers appear to allocate resources to all 
people who suffer from a disease, irrespectively of the (cost-) effectiveness of 
treatment. This reflects a viewpoint of justice, that is, that people favour an equal 
distribution of health resources regardless of each person’s potential to benefit 
from those resources. This concern with equality works two ways: it explains the 
tendency to reimburse ineffective treatments for rare diseases or small groups, and 
also the tendency not to reimburse certain treatments with high budget impact 
(Ubel et al. 1996). For example, there are orphan drugs with unfavourable cost per 
QALY ratios, which are funded nevertheless, for example, imiglucerase and 
laronidase (McCabe, Claxton & Tsuchiya 2005). Positive decisions to fund orphans 
appeal to the fact that the number of patients taking each orphan drug is very 
small, therefore the budget impact is limited (Cohen, Stolk & Niezen 2007). When 
all orphan diseases are taken together, however, it is estimated that 1 in 12 people 
in Europe have a rare disease. This is a fairly large group to make exceptions for 
(Cohen, Stolk & Niezen 2008). There are also instances in which costly, yet cost-
effective medical interventions, would consume more resources than available, if 
given to all eligible patients. Consequently subsidized access to the intervention 
cannot be guaranteed to all patients. In such circumstances, “people [appear to] 
place greater importance on equity than is reflected by cost-effectiveness analysis” 
(Ubel et al. 1996, p.1174) and would therefore rather choose a less cost-effective 
intervention available to all, than a very cost-effective intervention for some. Budget 
impact analysis can then be used to assess whether it is affordable to offer the 
cost-effective intervention to the entire patient population so that equal opportunity 
can be guaranteed, or whether instead a less cost-effective intervention can be 
offered to the entire population. Similarly, the rationale of equal opportunity 
explains why policymakers might prefer to preserve resources rather than spending 
most of it at once. 
Policy implications 
Budget impact, we demonstrate in this article, plays a role in drug reimbursement 
decisions. Also, we demonstrated, Dutch policymakers do not easily admit that 
they consider budget impact. In fact, policymakers are reluctant to explicitly use 
budget impact as a formal criterion. Therefore, this study is relevant for 
policymakers who, to remain accountable by the public at large, are confronted 
with a transparency requirement.  
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This study identified four rationales for considering the budget impact of new drugs 
when a decision needs to be made about reimbursement. The first rationale is 
opportunity costs: a positive reimbursement decision for a new intervention 
suggests the need to expand the budget for health care, or to eliminate existing 
benefits to fund the new intervention. Whichever solution one chooses, there is an 
opportunity cost involved that must be considered. The second rationale relates to 
loss aversion: people may be generally unwilling to eliminate funding for existing 
benefits in favour of a new intervention. Budget impact considers the felt loss by 
assessing the amount of resources needed to make free. Third, budget impact is 
considered in relation to decision uncertainty. Fourth, people seem to favour an 
equal distribution of health resources regardless of each person’s potential to 
benefit from those resources, reflecting equal opportunity concerns. These four 
theoretical rationales indicate budget impact’s relevance in reimbursement 
decisions.  
 
Economic consequences of positive reimbursement decisions, we argue, are not 
sufficiently explored when only cost-effectiveness of a new product is considered 
and not its budget impact. Therefore the question is how to integrate budget impact 
into a framework for reimbursement decisions that is based on cost-effectiveness. 
The application of cost-effectiveness is not as simple and straightforward as it is 
often advocated, due to inflexible budgets, risk of overspending, and political 
pressures. For example, budget impact can trump the cost-effectiveness argument. 
An unfavourable ICER for a pharmaceutical treatment is less relevant to the 
policymaker when the total budget impact is low. Conversely, an adequate ICER 
can be trumped when the budget impact is high. However, what levels of budget 
impact and cost-effectiveness warrant such tradeoffs? We need to identify 
conditions under which a decision-maker can comfortably withhold or initiate 
treatment, and can be assured of a tolerable balance between the conflicting 
concerns. If guidance is lacking, the cost-effectiveness criterion cannot be put to its 
full potential, consistency of decision-making is at risk, and decision-makers will be 
vulnerable and exposed. Therefore, we need an open discussion to define what is 
acceptable or unacceptable. Such a discussion should also shed light on the 
motives for considering budget impact, because we need to acknowledge the fact 
that budget impact and cost-effectiveness analyses can be assessments based on 
different distributional and egalitarian rationales, namely equal opportunity and 
maximizing health. If budget impact is considered mainly because of the equal 
opportunity rationale, it is considered fair to ensure treatment for all patient groups, 
irrespective of the total health outcomes achieved. In other words, this particular 
rationale for budget impact calls into question if it is fair to allocate resources on the 
basis of a utilitarian principle; the equal opportunity rationale reflects that people 
may also strive for resource allocation fairness by some form of procedural justice 
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that ensures availability of treatment for all. Implications for the decision-making 
framework will then go beyond the need to facilitate application of cost-
effectiveness, and require rethinking of the basis for resource allocation decisions.  
 
Policymakers walk a fine line between increased transparency and increased 
efficiency; between specifying which criteria are used and how they should be used 
in explicit, evidence based assessments, and providing information within a 
reasonable time-frame taking into account an implicit “societal correction” on the 
technical assessments to guarantee decisions are fair (Braat, Van Rijen & Ottes 
2007). Inevitably, certain decision factors remain implicit, partly because 
policymakers lack the time to reflect thoroughly on the decisions that they believe 
are sound, and also because they do not want to expose themselves to criticism 
from the public at large. Nevertheless, as we and others have shown, when put to 
the test of accountability, policymakers fail on account of their inadequate attempts 
to explain certain key policy decisions (Ham & Coulter 2001). In this study, we have 
demonstrated that budget impact can and should be openly discussed as a 
legitimate criterion in the context of drug reimbursement decisions. Open 
discussion of budget impact’s role will enhance policymakers’ accountability. 
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Introduction 
Health policy is saturated in information technologies (Fox, Ward, & O’Rourke 
2006; Roos, Menec, & Currie 2004). Paper-based records and scattered databases 
have been replaced by electronic records, data warehouses, and national 
population-based registries (Bowker 2005; De Mul, Adams, & de Bont 2009). As 
more and more clinical data are stored electronically, efforts to accumulate and 
organize it have increased. Furthermore, since it is now available in relatively easily 
accessible forms, clinical data have become both an object (something to be 
managed) and an instrument (something to manage with) and thus vital to a range 
of clinical, organizational, and governmental practices (Freeman 2002). 
 
The aim of this chapter is to understand if and how the efforts to accumulate and 
organize clinical data and the increasing use of databases
1
 in clinical, research, 
and policy practices have transformed the regulation of clinical practices. Data 
infrastructures such as databases mediate between clinical practitioners and 
regulators; the same data retrieved from clinical practice are used in clinical and 
policy practices and affects both. Databases can, first, facilitate self-regulation and 
quality assurance by national professional bodies, thereby allowing regulatory 
authority to be delegated to clinical practices (de Bont, Stoevelaar, & Bal 2007). 
They can also act as instruments of oversight. Data retrieved from local clinical 
practices can be stored externally in distant databases, which policymakers use for 
regulatory purposes (de Mul, Adams, & de Bont 2009; Waring 2007; Orr 2009). 
With access to detailed clinical data, policymakers believe they can impose order 
on clinical practice. For instance, health care policymakers can use clinical data to 
decide which therapies for which individuals should be reimbursed by health 
insurers. 
 
This chapter’s focus lies on how databases shape and are shaped by clinical and 
policy practices. Our empirical material derives from a study of the regulated use of 
pharmaceuticals in the Netherlands. Since late 1990s, the Dutch government has 
supported the development of clinical databases in order to gain insight and 
simultaneously construct evidence of the effectiveness of some expensive 
medicines in daily practice. In 2001, the Growth Hormone (GH) Database was the 
first clinical database employed to control the use of an outpatient drug. Similar 
databases have been developed for five outpatient medicines considered 
                                                     
1
 The concept ‘databases’ in this article can be seen as a synonym for ‘data registries’. Whereas in the 
field of outcome research one prefers to speak of data registries, we have chosen to use the concept of 
‘databases’ as used within Science and Technology Studies. It refers to the infrastructure allowing for 
the collection and processing of data as well as the data stored in these databases. 
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expensive at the time: antiretroviral therapy, paclitaxel, Interferon Beta, 
imiglucerase, and tumor necrosis factor-alpha (TNF-a) blockers
2
. In 2006, this form 
of regulation was extended to inpatient medicines. The Population-Based 
Haematological Registry for Observational Studies (PHAROS) is one of the first 
registries monitoring inpatient medicine use. The registry collects population-based 
data of especially new and costly treatments of three major haemato-oncological 
diseases, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, chronic lymphocytic leukaemia, and multiple 
myeloma in daily practice. In this chapter, we reconstruct the employment of the 
GH Database and PHAROS registry.  
 
The setup of the chapter is as follows. In the next section, we introduce the work of 
Beaulieu, Keating & Cambrosio, and Hine about the employment of databases. 
Their work provides a perspective to understand if and how the use of databases 
reconfigures the relation between clinical and policy practices (Keating & 
Cambrosio 2004; Hine 2006; Beaulieu 2001). Instead of studying the contribution 
of information to science, policy, or practice, these studies focus on how 
technologies take part in and contribute to forming policy practices. As Keating and 
Cambrosio (2007) have described, science depends upon regulations, especially in 
fields where evidence is collected collaboratively -such as in pharmaceutical 
research and other fields in biomedicine (Keating & Cambrosio 2007). In these 
settings, ‘regulatory work’ as embodied in the information infrastructures becomes 
a constitutive component of clinical work (Cambrosio et al. 2006; Keating & 
Cambrosio 2007). In the Regulatory Work in Clinical Practice section, we 
reconstruct the regulatory work that was needed for the collective production of 
data. Moreover, we explore the use of internal clinical practice regulation for 
external oversight. In the Collective Internal Regulation and External Supervision 
section, we aim to understand how the way ‘evidence’ or what is considered 
‘objective data’ is constructed, may lead to new forms of regulating medicines. We 
explore whether and how these new forms of regulation in clinical practice changed 
the relation between clinical and policy practice. In our discussion, we summarize 
our findings and argue that databases not only have transformed the regulation of 
clinical practice but also have reconfigured and complicated the relation between 
policy and clinical practice too. 
                                                     
2
 For the treatment of HIV (antiretroviral therapy), lung, ovarian, breast cancer, head and neck cancer, 
advanced forms of Kaposi's sarcoma and the prevention of restenosis (Paclitaxel), multiple sclerosis 
(Interferon Beta), Gaucher’s disease (imiglucerase) and rheumatic arthritis, Crohn’s disease, psoriasis 
and colitis ulcerosa (TNF-α blockers), respectively. 
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Regulatory work and objectivity 
In this section, we take a closer look at the notion of objectivity to understand the 
intermediate role of databases between internal and external regulation of clinical 
practice. In her study on the Human Brain Project, Beaulieu (2001, 2004) shows 
how repositories shape and are shaped by a particular notion of objectivity—digital 
objectivity (Beaulieu 2004; Beaulieu 2001). Digital objectivity refers to a mechanism 
for the production and validation of knowledge (pooling data) making use of 
quantification, standardization, and automation, and a search for bypassing human 
judgment. According to Beaulieu (2001), digital technologies such as cameras, 
scanners, and computer technologies provide interfaces which prescribe or 
regulate how to work and handle data methodologically since they standardize and 
automate work practices. Subsequently, digital technology has led to the 
introduction of new elements of control and restraint. The digital atlas is not only a 
research tool combining and integrating the various versions of the brain produced 
by the different disciplines in neuroscience; it also is built up into data sets that 
have a normative potential. For example, the individual scan which varies from the 
norm is marked on a brain map (Beaulieu 2001). 
 
Cambrosio et al. (2006) take a next step in the construction of what is considered 
‘‘objective.’’ By studying the collective production of evidence in biomedicine, they 
introduced the notion of ‘‘regulatory objectivity’’ (Cambrosio et al. 2006). The term 
regulatory objectivity refers to ‘‘a new form of objectivity ( . . . ) that generates 
conventions and norms through concerted programs of action based on the use of 
a variety of systems for the collective production of evidence’’ (Cambrosio et al. 
2009, p.654). The authors demonstrate that the work of biomedicine practitioners in 
the laboratory and the clinic depends upon a network of conventions that must be 
considered to conduct a single measure or to make a certain diagnosis. The 
conventions range from sometimes tacit and unintentional to formal modalities 
(Cambrosio et al. 2006, 2009). According to Cambrosio et al. (2006), regulatory 
objectivity thus ‘‘turns the focus away from objects toward collective forms of 
expertise combining people (clinicians, researchers, administrators, patients, etc.) 
and objects (entities, instruments, tools, techniques, etc.) connected by specific 
coordination regimens’’ (Cambrosio et al. 2006, p.194).  
 
Digital and regulatory objectivity are distinct from other notions of objectivity, such 
as mechanical objectivity (Porter 1992, 1995), because of their unprecedented 
levels of reflexivity (Cambrosio et al. 2006; Keating & Cambrosio 2009). This 
reflexivity points at the deliberate and conscious formation of internal consensus on 
how to proceed objectively as part of the continual and endogenous development 
of regulation within (clinical) practice. Within the framework of regulatory objectivity, 
Reconfiguring policy and clinical practice 
83 
the process of reaching consensus is as important as the object of the resulting 
convention (Cambrosio et al. 2006). Medical professionals organized in groups 
across hospitals / institutions (and different from the professional associations) 
make collective agreements. These agreements, which are seen as the current 
state of evidence, are transformed into guidelines or standards. However, new 
scientific findings or new configurations of practices may open up the conventions 
previously taken for granted; the evidentiary hierarchies start changing and 
previously established agreements on the ‘evidence’ are reopened (Thevenot 
2009). The regulatory objectivity framework revolves around the configuration of 
shared rules of action in the submission, definition, and collective investigation of 
‘uncertainty’ (Cambrosio et al. 2009). The temporary agreements needed for 
internal regulation are under constant scrutiny and actors involved in the 
consensus process raise doubts about the reached ‘conventionality’ based on, for 
example, ongoing research. It is exactly this uncertainty of the ‘conventionality’ that 
glues the collective together and contributes to the dynamic and reflexive character 
of the process (Moreira, May, & Bond 2009; Rabeharisoa & Bourret 2009). In the 
following sections, we analyze the development of databases for the regulation of 
expensive medicines in the Netherlands to come to an understanding how such 
dynamic reflexive processes affect clinical and policy practices.  
Regulatory work in clinical practice 
Since the early 1990s, the Dutch government and its relatively autonomous 
agencies have undertaken much effort to regulate pharmaceutical care stringently, 
mainly by emphasizing the role evidence should have in decision making on the 
appropriate use of drugs at all levels, from decisions on insurance schemes 
coverage to prescriptions at the point of care (College voor Zorgverzekeringen 
2007; Commissie Dunning 1991; Gezondheidsraad 1991). The Dutch government 
has developed a series of tools to promote rational prescribing—such as 
professional guidelines authorized by state agencies, real-time monitoring systems, 
and expert committees that must authorize prescriptions -aimed at improving the 
quality and efficiency of care, and enabling the control of pharmaceutical health 
care expenditure (College voor Zorgverzekeringen 2005; Niezen et al. 2007). One 
specific measure is the conditional reimbursement regulation (Schedule 2 of Health 
Insurance Regulation
3
) which makes the reimbursement of particular medicines 
conditional to specific criteria or rules. For example, the use of medicines is 
restricted to specific categories of patients (e.g., based on indications) and/or place 
in treatment lines (e.g., step-up treatment). 
 
                                                     
3
 The Health Insurance Regulation regulates the execution of the Dutch Health Insurance Act (ZVW). 
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Emphasizing the need for evidence-based policy allowed for the redefinition of 
‘appropriate use’ of medicines in terms of diagnosis, cost-effectiveness, and 
effectiveness as happening within clinical practice. This redefinition enabled 
decision-makers to request data from clinical practice in the first place. Moreover, 
the new notion of appropriate use seems to have legitimized the regulation in the 
view of decision-makers; it makes it more logical to keep track of a 
pharmaceutical’s cost and effectiveness in clinical practice and to connect its 
additional funding to the delivered cost- and pharmaceutical effectiveness of care 
or categorization of diagnosis. 
 
In this section, we take a closer look at the regulatory work in clinical practice and 
the use of internal clinical practice regulation for external oversight. We base our 
research findings on an exploration of two databases in the Netherlands: the GH 
Database and the PHAROS registry (on expensive oncolytics such as Ibritumomab 
tiuxetan and Alemtuzumab). We conducted individual interviews (N = 61) and focus 
group interviews (N = 5) to collect data on the two databases in the period 2003-
2009. The respondents were decision-makers, health managers from the 
pharmaceutical industry, as well as health insurers, academic researchers, and 
medical professionals. We audiotaped and transcribed verbatim the interviews as 
well as the focus group sessions. In addition, we observed conferences and 
informal meetings, and analyzed minutes, e-mail exchanges, and policy documents 
including documents from archives of the main policy actor, the Health Care 
Insurance Board (College voor zorgverzekeringen, CVZ). 
Regulating growth hormone 
In 1998 it became possible to produce GH outside the human body. As a result, 
GH turned from a scarce drug into an expensive drug. Subsequently, policymakers 
requested GH monitoring. Not only because the treatment is expensive (€23,000 
per treatment per year in 2004), but also because the number of treatments could 
increase. GH treatment is indicated foremost for children with growth hormone 
deficiency (GHD), whose bodies do not produce sufficient GH (somatotropin) levels 
which results in growth failure. The treatment, however, could be broadened to 
other indications than GHD.  
 
In an attempt to control costs, a clinical guideline focusing on the diagnostic criteria 
to determine GHD was authorized by CVZ. Since health insurers are only allowed 
to cover GH treatment if patients are diagnosed and treated according to this 
authorized guideline, the diagnostic criteria derived from clinical research and 
experience (the professionals’ guideline) became a policy tool. Additionally, 
clinicians were obliged to lodge patient data in a national GH Database (a former 
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multicenter trial database) including laboratory test results, dosage, and possible 
tumours, managed by the National Registration of Growth Hormone (Landelijke 
Registratie Groeihormoonbehandeling, LRG).  
 
The GH database shows how data registration represents a mechanism for the 
production and validation of knowledge.  
Respondent 1: Here it [GH registration] is a combination of prevention of excessive 
use of an expensive medicine with the simultaneous collection of an amount of 
knowledge on such a medicine [GH] which is also useful, and which can diminish 
its use in the future. For example, now we see that the dosages go down. (Medical 
professional, 2003)  
Regulation of appropriate medicine use, thus, required pooling data from individual 
patient records into a national database, and subsequently allowed for gaining 
knowledge on GH dosages. Moreover, lodging patient data in the GH database 
required the quantification and standardization of clinical practice. Previous 
diagnostic criteria were transformed into numerical thresholds, determining the 
different patient categories by severity and likelihood of GHD (Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1 Patient categories by severity of growth hormone deficiency and likelihood 
of growth hormone deficiency 
Patient 
category 
Technical description Likelihood of diagnosis GH 
deficiency 
Category 1 Very low maximum GH level (<5 mE/l) 
and very low IGF-1 or IGFBP3 <P3 
Certain 
Category 2 GH peak value < 10 mE/l en IGF-I of 
IGFBP3 <P50. 
Almost certain 
Category 3 Combination of GH peak value < 10 
mE/I and IGF-I of IGFBP3 > P50 
Or: GH peak value 20-30 mE/l and IGF-I 
of IGFBP3 <P50 
Probably partial deficiency 
Category 4 GH peak value 20-30 mE/l and IGF-I of 
IGFBP3 <P3 
Possibly partial deficiency 
Category 5 GH peak value 20-30 mE/l and IGF-I or 
IGFBP3 between P3 and P50. 
Low probability 
Category 6 GH peak value > 20 mE/l and IGF-I or 
IGFBP3 >P50 
Unlikely 
Category 7 GH peak value > 30 mE/l and IGF-I or 
IGFBP3 <P3 
Probable Laron-type 
dwarfism 
Source: (Ziekenfondsraad 1997) 
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The registration of data on GH diagnoses and prescription in a database not only 
allowed for the production and validation of knowledge, it also introduced an 
element of control. The obligation of data lodging made it possible to control the 
diagnosis and reimbursement of GH treatment. The patient record changed from 
‘notes’ on a patient’s condition to ‘obligatory fields’ to fill in. Only when all the boxes 
are checked, and the diagnosis is made according to the predefined categories, 
will a patient receive pharmaceutical treatment with GH. Patients placed in 
categories 1-4 in Table 4.1 should be treated with GH, and their treatment is 
eligible for reimbursement (Ziekenfondsraad 1997). A specialists’ forum should 
make the decision for patients in category 5, as the diagnosis of GH deficiency is 
less certain for these patients. All requests for treating patients in categories 6 and 
7 should be rejected. With data retrieved from the patient records it becomes 
possible to check whether patients treated with GH are classified in categories 1–5 
and that none of the patients receiving GH are actually in categories 6 and 7 (see 
Table 4.1). 
Respondent 2: . . . I mean, nowadays it is so easy . . . It goes into the computer 
and then you can work on, look at and do things with [the data] . . . ehm, I think that 
is the right thing to do since each clinic only has a limited amount of patients. 
Therefore we don’t know how patients are treated in The Netherlands overall, or 
how we perform as paediatricians, for example, in growth hormone treatments. 
(Medical professional, 2004) 
The formalization of clinical (research) practices has brought database use into the 
decision-making process and has enabled the development of monitoring functions 
within medical practice that were formerly located in the realm of policy. The 
database forms part of the work needed to ‘objectify’ clinical work. 
Regulating oncolytics 
In 2006, conditional reimbursement regulation was extended from outpatient 
medicines to inpatient medicines through the High-Cost Medicines Policy 
Regulation (Beleidsregel Dure Geneesmiddelen, BDG
4
). The BDG regulates the 
additional funding of hospitals for expensive medicines. Importantly, this regulation 
includes evidence development on the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of 
listed medicines in clinical practice after market approval. The BDG was installed to 
speed up the introduction of new inpatient medicines. New treatments for patients 
with haematological malignancies are constantly introduced, and are also subject 
to ongoing adaptations (e.g., different doses, introduction at other treatment stages 
                                                     
4
 The High-cost Medicines Policy Regulation (Beleidsregel Dure Geneesmiddelen: BDG) is maintained 
by the Dutch Health Care Authority (NZa) and is based on Article 57 of the Health Care Market 
Regulation Act (WMG). 
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and in new combinations with other treatments). To counter the rapid introduction 
and reimbursement of these new medicines, policymakers ensured that the BDG 
was introduced with the prerequisite to maintain the option to reconsider earlier 
reimbursement decisions. Whereas in the past the regulation of expensive 
medicines was based on the (modeled) outcomes of trial research and fitted within 
a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ reimbursement regime, the BDG shows a new and broader view 
toward the assessment of appropriate medicine use. It is based on ongoing data 
retrieval from clinical practice demonstrating effectiveness in daily practice. The 
conditional listing is used by policymakers to collect ‘missing’ data to decide on a 
pharmaceutical’s effectiveness in practice and on further reimbursement. Data 
must be collected for three years on a medicine’s cost-effectiveness and 
effectiveness in clinical practice (College Tarieven Gezondheidszorg 2002; 
Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit 2006; Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit 2008).  
 
Like the GH Database, PHAROS is built upon an existing registry -a regional 
cancer registry that is part of the Dutch Cancer Registry- in combination with 
follow-up data retrieved from medical records. Oncolytics thus have a history of 
registration in medical practice and will continue to be registered. Since 1989, the 
Dutch Cancer Registry has been collecting data on cancer patients in order to map 
the national occurrence of cancer (see http://www.ikcnet.nl). The regional cancer 
registry contains medical data on patient, disease and treatment (tumour 
identification, diagnostics, and treatment), and administrative data concerning other 
characteristics (name, date, address, etc.) of all cancer-diagnosed patients from 
the cooperating hospitals in the region.  
PHAROS will look at the influence of newly introduced diagnostic- and therapeutic 
developments on the care delivery process and its outcomes. ( . . . )  
PHAROS serves for scientific sound reporting on the amount of influence newly 
introduced so-called expensive medicines have on costs and especially benefits. 
This way, the data in PHAROS can also be used for cost-effectiveness analysis, as 
meant by the High-Cost Medicines Policy Regulation. (Uyl & Huijgens 2009, 
Description PHAROS project translated by MN)  
The data stored in PHAROS enables the detection of: trends in diagnostics, 
treatments, treatment results, and survival for patients with haematological 
malignancies. PHAROS also enables the analysis of the effective use in daily 
practice of two high-cost medicines: Ibritumomab tiuxetan and Alemtuzumab.  
Respondent 3: Most important is that the medical professionals are provided with a 
tool [the PHAROS database] that can enhance the quality of care. And suppose 
this database shows that on average only three courses of treatment with medicine 
X are provided . . . that is rather remarkable since the label states that eight 
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courses should be given. These are the kind of munitions which medical 
professionals can use to discuss appropriate treatment. Thus, a database can 
enhance the quality of care and simultaneously allows for monitoring whether 
treatment according to guidelines occurs. If there is no guideline adherence, the 
medical professionals should discuss whether the provided treatment is 
inappropriate or guideline adjustments are required. (Employee Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturer, 2008).  
With the PHAROS databases, physicians took on the obligation to achieve results 
that matched with the results of a clinical trial. As shown in clinical trials, 
appropriate drug use can only be achieved in clinical practice if the same or similar 
guidelines are followed and similar patient groups are selected. Yet in the particular 
context of Ibritumomab tiuxetan and Alemtuzumab used in tertiary cancer care 
(PHAROS) -and most other cancer treatments on the BDG list- medical practice is 
already highly regulated and preregistration research is highly protocolized. 
Therefore, the difference between the regulations in trial settings and clinical 
practice is relatively small.  
Respondent 4: In some cases the situation in clinical practice is controlled to such 
an extend, that, for example with regard to the hematological diseases, you can 
almost say it matches a randomized clinical trial. The patients are so tightly 
monitored that the border between clinical practice and an experimental setting just 
isn’t that rigid anymore. (Policymaker CVZ, 2008).  
The protocols used for Ibritumomab tiuxetan and Alemtuzumab in clinical trials are 
also used in daily practice after their market authorization and thus continue to 
dominate the use of oncolytics in clinical practice after their registration. However, 
the effectiveness in daily practice differs from the trial settings due to, for example, 
more variation in the patient groups and, more importantly, ongoing insights in 
pharmacotherapy. It is such differences, alongside the continuation of data 
collection, that are the object of continuous reflection.  
 
PHAROS combines clinicians, researchers, and so on from various disciplines in 
order to reflect upon, shape or adjust the conventions and regulations in clinical 
practice, with the aid of objects such as information systems combining clinical and 
administrative data, protocols, and methodologies. The PHAROS data and 
conventions are discussed at least twice a year by the various actors in the 
PHAROS collective.  
Respondent 5: The steering committee on the data registration of expensive 
oncological medicines meets once every six to eight weeks. Professor Z takes her 
two PhD-students with her and together we take a look at the data generation and 
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registration . . . The committee also includes representatives from the Health Care 
Insurance Board [CVZ]. (Medical professional, 2008)  
These discussions not only lead to innovative treatments but also give shape to an 
innovative form of regulating clinical practice. To assure quality of treatment as well 
as maintain both up-to-date and effective treatments, the PHAROS collective 
depends upon an arrangement of conventions (data collection, data analysis, and 
discussion) which must be considered when prescribing or adjusting appropriate 
doses of Ibritumomab tiuxetan and Alemtuzumab, possibly in combination with 
other treatments. What is considered up-to-date, effective and assured quality of 
treatment has become the subject of formal regulations and reflections. 
Externalization of regulatory work in clinical practices 
It may not be a coincidence that both databases we explored are used to control 
already highly regulated medicines. Prescribing these expensive medicines is often 
preserved for specialized medical centers. Highly protocolized health care 
practices, such as GH treatment and tertiary cancer care, enable the collection of 
standardized data. In both cases, the data registries predated the government’s 
prerequisite of data collection for financial compensation. In fact, the development 
of both databases is closely connected to the development of guidelines and 
protocols. The GH guideline has been developed at the request of the Dutch 
Minister of Health in order to ensure the GH treatment was provided appropriately, 
meaning, according to the conditional reimbursement regulation. This official 
national GH treatment guideline mainly determined what data are collected in the 
GH Database (1998-2001). Therefore, while the definition of the different patient 
categories for GH treatment (Table 1) points to a situation which is both 
protocolized and easily quantifiable, it actually is the result of much foregoing work; 
the bureaucratic innovation preceding the development of data collection 
technologies (Bowker 2005). Similarly, the tertiary cancer care involves much 
preregistration research, which requires highly protocolized practices. Therefore, it 
may not be coincidental that most of the medicines listed in the BDG are used in 
cancer treatments (seventeen of the thirty by October 2008). In this way, 
government regulation is based on the regulatory work of the clinic which is 
assessable through guidelines, protocols, and data collection. Both cases depict a 
history of regulatory work, the registration of clinical data, and prior bureaucratic 
innovations such as guideline development within clinical (research) practice. Data 
registration merely has facilitated the externalization of the regulatory work already 
inherent and constitutive to clinical practice (Keating & Cambrosio 2004; 
Cambrosio et al. 2006; Keating & Cambrosio 2009). 
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Collective internal regulation and external supervision 
It appears that regulatory authority is delegated to a network of physicians, who 
achieve control by self-regulation and uphold quality assurance. Would the 
presence of internal regulation and the externalization of the regulatory work within 
clinical practice, allowing for policymakers to supervise appropriate 
pharmacotherapy and its reimbursement, then mean that the gap between policy 
and practice has been bridged? In this section, we explore whether and how 
databases changed the relation between clinical and policy practices, using the GH 
and PHAROS cases as an example. In particular, we focus on how databases 
construct ‘evidence’ or ‘objective data’ potentially leading to new forms of 
regulating medicines. We follow the dynamic process of the constant adjustment of 
conventions on appropriate medicine use within clinical practice, and its relation to 
the construction of evidence informed reimbursement regulations. 
Adoptions in GH guidelines and reimbursement decisions 
The GH case shows how the collective shaping of clinical practice regulation was 
formed around the uncertainty of unknown side effects of GH treatment. Dutch 
paediatric endocrinologists meet four times a year in the Advisory Group on Growth 
Hormone (AGH). On the request of the AGH, the LRG analyses the GH database 
data. The LRG, for example, compares all patients with partial GHD and reports on 
the clinical results of their treatment. These data are then fed back into the 
guideline-development process. Draft revisions of the guideline are discussed with 
all paediatric endocrinologists in the Netherlands at their annual meetings. The 
purpose of these discussions is to reach shared agreements on best practice. If 
these agreements are reached, all paediatric endocrinologists receive an update or 
a supplement to the guideline. The following two quotations depict how the 
diagnostic criteria of GHD, and its categorization, have become the subject of 
clinical practice’s reflexive assessment. 
Respondent 6: There’s also much debate on . . . Let’s put it this way, there’s a lot of 
discussion whether you should treat all people who meet the criteria. That is what 
is heavily debated.  
Interviewer: Where do these debates then take place?  
Respondent 6: Ehm, mostly on conferences and within the literature. The question 
is if someone who meets the standard criteria . . . , who, according to the tests, of 
which I believe the ITT is de most important test, is eligible for growth hormone 
treatment, should also be given the growth hormone. (Medical professional, 2004) 
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The GH database allowed for internal consensus on how to proceed objectively, as 
part of the continual and endogenous development of regulation within (clinical) 
practice.  
Respondent 7: The indications have shifted. For example, if we think this is a 
neurosecretory dysfunction we used to have a problem with how to act upon this, 
what norms we should use and so on. Well, at a certain point in time the Advisory 
panel Growth Hormone has documented this; this is the way we define 
neurosecretory dysfunction in The Netherlands. When in doubt a growth hormone 
profile should be made. In the past these growth hormone profiles in turn would be 
point of discussion; ‘‘What are the normal values? Is there a difference between 
laboratory results?’’ Well, these normal values have been documented and the 
laboratories have been aligned. In this sense, the GH database has offered a clear 
threshold. (Medical professional, 2004) 
In 2005, the LRG presented more detailed data about patients who use GH (see 
Table 4.2). In the report to CVZ, the professionals concluded that 2 percent of the 
patients treated with GH should not have received the drug according to the 
guideline. The policymakers disagreed. According to them, 13 percent of the 
patients did not meet the formal indication criteria for GH treatment and thus for 
reimbursement. Whereas the policymakers compared the decisions to treat 
patients with the predefined decision framework -the published and authorized 
guidelines- the professionals referred to the most recent guidelines. Over the 
years, professional norms and more specifically the guidelines shifted as scientific 
work progressed. The database and its infrastructure allowed for the continual 
adaptation, updating, and modification of the side effects and diagnostic 
categories. Accordingly, the technical description of the patient categories and the 
likelihood of diagnosis GHD changed. Subsequent to a new indication, the 
professionals adjusted their clinical guidelines whereupon the first authorized GH 
guideline became outdated, as the LRG explained. This continual and reflexive 
assessment of the uncertainty around the formation of GH regulation is 
endogenous to and essential for the dynamics in the GH network. Yet, CVZ 
insisted that 13 percent of the decisions to treat GH were inconsistent with existing 
regulations. Despite requests for more explanation and additional investigation and 
several meetings, policymakers and professionals did not come to an agreement. 
Regardless of the formal national regulations the professionals seemed to feel it 
was unthinkable to go against their professional norms. CVZ took the opposite 
stance and seemed to find it unthinkable to go against national regulations, 
especially as the professionals shifted their norms without informing policymakers 
and patient representatives.  
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Table 4.2: Distribution of decisions according to CVZ authorized and updated 
professional guideline 
Diagnosis Categories Distribution of 
patients 
according to CVZ 
authorized 
guideline 
Distribution of 
patients 
according to 
updated 
professional 
guideline 
Certain GH deficiency  Categories 1-4 84% 96% 
Uncertain GH deficiency  Category 5 2% 2% 
Certainly no GH 
deficiency  
Categories 6 and 
7 
13% 2% 
GH: growth hormone 
Source: (de Bont, Stoevelaar & Bal 2007) 
 
CVZ had no problem understanding the explanation given. The problem was, as a 
CVZ employee explained in an interview, ‘‘how to rule when the rules change.’’  
 
With the introduction of the GH database, meant to supervise and regulate clinical 
practice, the relation between CVZ and the professionals became less defined by 
the interpretation of the regulations. In fact, the relation became more defined by 
standards and the knowledge of professionals as embedded in the database and 
translated to updated guidelines. Not only did regulations change guidelines, the 
guidelines also changed the regulations. With that, new adoption problems 
between policy and practice emerged. In the GH case, the collective production of 
evidence ultimately, rather than bridging the divide between clinical and policy 
practice, rearticulated the relationship between the two in terms of differing time 
frames or, more specifically, in a dichotomy between dynamic and static 
regulations. 
The process of PHAROS data registration and policy decisions 
In the PHAROS case, policymakers had learned from the GH case and changed 
coordination practices accordingly. In order to cope with the constantly changing 
regulations in clinical practice, CVZ decided not to steer by the outcome of 
regulation as with GH but by its process. Therefore, the configuration of the 
evidence informing appropriate medicine use and reimbursement in practice should 
be a derivative of the data collected and registered in a database in the three-year 
research period by the collectives of researchers, medical professionals, and 
pharmaceutical industry. By focusing on the regulatory process in clinical practice, 
CVZ acknowledged the dynamic nature of clinical research and practice.  
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Respondent 4: When pharmaceutical industry and medical profession apply for 
additional reimbursement we do not ask to just provide [cost-effectiveness] data, 
we only say: ‘explain how it should be . . . provide an indication of the medicine’s 
efficiency’. And, when they explain how they will collect data on and research the 
(cost-) effectiveness of the medicine in clinical practice, then, in essence we are 
done for t=o [Start of the research period MN]. And then, in essence the product 
can be admitted to the policy regulation. Only after three years we look at the 
provided evidence in order to give us the feeling that it can be uphold [whether the 
medicine’s additional reimbursement should be continued]. (Policymaker CVZ, 
2008)  
In the PHAROS case, CVZ did not define a prior decision framework or threshold 
but focused on how to use data collection as a reflexive instrument for clinical 
practice. Moreover, whereas within the GH database, the medical professionals 
solely decided what data were lodged in the registry, in PHAROS, other 
stakeholders such as the pharmaceutical partners, The Netherlands Organization 
for Health Research and Development
5
 and CVZ were able to co-decide what data 
should be collected.  
Respondent 8: That is why we decided in yesterday’s meeting by telephone [with 
the pharmaceutical manufacturers and professor Y of the comprehensive cancer 
center] to write a letter to The Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and 
Development in which we state not to agree upon the proposed research 
construction. We want to maintain the population based registry. We will include 
some detailed data because the Health Care Insurance Board [CVZ] is also 
interested in over- and under dosages. The pharmaceutical industry has asked this 
question which is based on their experience in earlier dossiers. The clinicians 
preferred not to include these data, however after a separate phone call with the 
Dutch Cooperative Group on Hemato-Oncology they have agreed upon this. 
(Professor in health technology assessment, 2008)  
CVZ decides what evidence is required to determine the effectiveness in daily 
practice, what type of test provides acceptable evidence and how it will be judged 
and by whom. These data are used to steer clinical practice. In turn, the data 
available for collection in clinical practice determines the kind of decisions the 
policymakers can make.  
 
However, despite the ‘common language’ offered by PHAROS, and its focus on the 
process of data collection, it did not reduce the distance between policy and 
practice. In the end, CVZ is expected to account for the continuation of 
reimbursement of an expensive medicine when the process of data collection is or 
                                                     
5
 The Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and Development (ZonMW) manages the 
subsidies for the process of evidence building (databases) required by the BDG. 
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should be finished (BDG allows for a three-year period of data collection). It was 
expected that more dynamic regulation would follow dynamic clinical practice, yet 
would allow for the control of cost-effectiveness in medicine use too. CVZ, 
however, has to freeze this dynamic process at a particular moment in time to 
make choices based on the process of data collection and the evidence provided 
thus far. Whereas clinical practice regards evidence as ‘in process,’ policymakers 
must treat the information as an available outcome, at least at the moment a 
decision has to be made. This pressure for transparency and accountability for the 
additional and conditional funding of expensive medicines comes not only from the 
political context (democratic legitimacy) but more importantly also from the 
pharmaceutical industry which lobbies government to steer on outcomes and prior 
defined decision frameworks and thresholds. 
Respondent 9: And how will we distinguish later on . . . the situations of which we 
believe the applicants have a good report on the process of data collection, that 
allow for regulating (cost-) effective use in clinical practice, but lack outcomes and 
therefore are given the benefit of the doubt. Of course we need to try to maintain 
that group of medicines as small as possible. So, the group ‘yes’ [inclusion in the 
regulation MN] should be as big as possible as well as the club of ‘no’- decisions. 
The grey area in between should be as small as possible. (Policymaker CVZ, 2008)  
At that point, the focus of CVZ changes from process to outcomes. The outcomes 
are modelled, by means of health economic methodologies, into the best prediction 
of long-term effects and cost-effectiveness, and so on. At this point precisely, policy 
and clinical practice rearticulate their relation in the form of the static-dynamic 
dichotomy. The regulatory environment of policy requires ending the process of 
data analysis as the focus is on fixed categories to account for and decide upon 
appropriate medicine use and reimbursement. In contrast, the regulatory 
environment of clinical practice requires further data analysis as its focus lays in 
gaining new insights (e.g., in patient categories or dosages) and address 
uncertainties in appropriate medicine use. 
Discussion 
In this chapter, we sought to analyze how the use of databases has transformed 
the regulation of clinical practices through case studies of the Dutch GH and 
PHAROS databases. The Dutch government requires physicians to collect clinical 
data into a database as a condition for the reimbursement of certain, expensive 
drugs. The government supported the development of drug databases to gain 
oversight in prescription and reimbursement practices. The ideal of appropriate 
drug use, however, is reached not so much through direct steering based on the 
outcomes of the databases, but indirectly by stimulating data collection and the 
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continuous reflection upon the data by researchers and clinicians. These internal 
regulations provide a framework for establishing the ‘appropriate medicine use’ on 
which to base decisions on pharmaceutical reimbursement by health policy 
regulators. Without the demand for data collection through the conditional 
reimbursement regulations, this process of clinical practice regulation would have 
remained implicit and more importantly have less connection to the realm of health 
policy. Moreover, since health policy regulators codetermine what data should be 
collected, they are able to steer what information the medical professionals use to 
inform their practice. The databases are in this way coproduced by the collectives 
of clinicians, researchers, and policymakers who set regulations in clinical practice 
about what is considered appropriate medicine use.  
 
Does, the presence of internal regulation and the externalization of the regulatory 
work within clinical practice mean that the gap between policy and practice has 
been bridged? Not so. Rather, the existence of regulatory objectivity in clinical 
practice added further complexity to the relation between policy and practice. 
Rather than bridging the policy-clinical practice divide through the collection of data 
or through the delegation of regulated authority to clinical practice, the continual 
process of reflection of appropriate pharmacotherapy led to new frictions. 
Regulations within clinical practice are formed in response to the constant 
adaptation, updating and modification surrounding the uncertainties of 
pharmaceutical treatment. The collectively determined conventions only 
temporarily provide closure on the uncertainties related to the effective use of 
expensive pharmaceuticals in daily clinical practice (Cambrosio et al. 2009). The 
‘closed’ uncertainties are continually challenged because of the clinicians’ reflexive 
use of data in the databases in combination with their experience in daily practice. 
Clinical work has become integral to regulatory bodies such as CVZ, and 
regulatory bodies have become integral to the dynamics of clinical practice (cf. 
Cambrosio et al. 2006; Hogle 2009). Yet, the ultimate goal of the current policy 
regime thus far remains a stable and closed list with reimbursable drugs. Whereas 
regulations in clinical practice are continually being reshaped, governmental 
practices -because of the need for accountability- still require some static moments 
of ‘proven appropriate medicine use.’ In fact, the requirement of databases in the 
new conditional reimbursement regulation has stimulated the dynamic and ongoing 
process of data collection and interpretation in clinical practice. However, the actual 
policy decisions to be made in the end still require the closing down of this process 
in a single ’yes’ or ‘no’ decision about reimbursement. Moreover, the 
reimbursement regulation is monitored as if rules did not change, despite decision-
makers’ intention to allow for a dynamic regulation.  
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As our research on the evolution of databases as regulating instruments provides a 
glimpse of the period 2004-2009, it will be interesting to see how data collection for 
regulatory purposes develops in the future, especially in the field of innovative 
medicines. Professional networks developing around the regulatory medicinal- or 
population-based databases will gain in importance, similar to the increasing 
importance of benefit-package management. This form of coordination is about to 
define key areas of medical governance (ACP meeting, Health Care Insurance 
Board, September 11, 2009). The cases we studied have made some steps toward 
this. Compared to the collectives using the GH database, PHAROS shows an 
increasing focus on the process of data collection and reflection. This widening of 
the governmental focus has led to a more dynamic regulatory environment in both 
policy and clinical practices. Regulating pharmaceutical care via databases is a 
promising approach for stimulating appropriate medicine use and reimbursement. 
Especially when the focus is maintained on the continual process of collective 
production of evidence, combining data provided by the databases and reflections 
on the data collection, regulatory tools such as guidelines or models of action will 
be produced, stimulating appropriate medicine use and reimbursement in clinical 
practice. However, legitimating policy decisions currently stands in the way of such 
dynamic practices as they imply fixing ‘appropriate medicine use’ at a particular 
moment. Whereas initially policymakers believed databases promised insight in 
clinical practice and subsequently control, the PHAROS case provides a glimpse of 
the renewed promise of databases and regulation of ‘appropriate medicine use.’ In 
the PHAROS case, CVZ tried to shift focus from health outcomes toward a process 
of evidence building and the constant and dynamic adjustment of pharmaceutical 
care regulations. This dynamic process of continual data collection and reflexivity 
by medical professionals and researchers fulfilled the health regulators’ goal of 
stimulating appropriate medicine use and reimbursement in clinical practice during 
the three-year period of data collection. However, the current Dutch legislation 
does not (yet) allow for such a shift, since it is based on an ‘in’ or ‘out’ logic of 
benefit package management.  
 
We should be aware that not all medical practices can be regulated through this 
new form of governance –coverage with evidence development through data 
collection in clinical practice. Especially in clinical practice settings where data are 
less likely to be registered as part of clinical work, one should be hesitant about 
governing (pharmaceutical) care through data collections. For example, conditional 
reimbursement of statins (cholesterol-lowering medication) has already been 
shown to be rather problematic, and most likely this will also hold true for medical 
aids (Niezen et al. 2007; Zuiderent-Jerak & Van der Grinten 2008). An implication 
for clinical practice is that eligibility for additional funding, based on the prerequisite 
of data collection, depends on the degree of regulatory work already existing in 
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clinical practice. Both of the databases we analyzed existed prior to the policy 
requirements to collect data. Rather than developing new databases, the 
policymakers built on this existing infrastructure. They stimulated and subsidized 
the development of the databases to inform regulations. In the event conditional 
reimbursement and its prerequisite of data collection increase in importance as a 
policy tool and the requirements concerning the effectiveness in clinical practice 
increase, we expect the less protocolized clinical practices will find eligibility for 
funding more difficult. In this event, other types of governing care might have a 
better fit. 
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Introduction 
Legitimate decision-making is an issue on many policy agendas. Especially when 
public goods such as health care are at stake, justifying and accounting for 
policymakers’ decisions is crucial. Legitimate decision-making entails that the 
public considers the decision-making framework, process and outcomes to be just 
or socially robust. The limited resources for health care in general – and medicines, 
more specifically – have led to an increased awareness for legitimate and/or fair 
priority setting processes related to medical technologies, including 
pharmaceuticals (Hoedemaekers & Dekkers 2003; Daniels 2000; Lehoux 2006; 
Cookson & Dolan 2000). Governments and regulatory agencies must decide how 
to divide and allot scarce resources and, for example, define a minimum benefit 
package that is paid for collectively. Issues related to legitimate decision-making 
are normative and the choices that are made can easily be contested. The 
legitimacy of decision-making is highly important since decision makers need to 
maintain the credibility and authority that enables them to continue making difficult 
rationing decisions.  
 
Health technology assessment (HTA) is the main response in dealing with the 
problem of health technology and the prioritization and allocation of the public good 
‘health care’ (Lehoux 2006; Drummond et al. 2008; Noorani et al. 2007). HTA 
entails the promise of an evidence based approach to decision-making. 
Prioritization decisions, in this logic, are based on objective scientific research on 
the safety, clinical and cost-effectiveness of medicines. These evidence based 
criteria are expected to secure the decisions’ legitimacy. Subsequently, within the 
Netherlands, much like in most other Western countries, it is believed that services 
should only be reimbursed – and preferably used – if scientific evidence is strong 
(Briggs and Gray 2000; Drummond, Jonsson & Rutten 1997; Stolk, Brouwer & 
Busschbach 2002; Van Oostenbruggen et al. 2005; Niezen et al. 2009). The 
benefit package advice provided by the Dutch Health Care Insurance Board (CVZ) 
to the Ministry of Health focuses on the clinical effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of medicines based on scientific research such as randomized 
clinical trials (College voor zorgverzekeringen 2007; Raad voor de 
Volksgezondheid en Zorg 2007a). Similarly, the work of the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) in appraising the cost-effectiveness of (mainly 
expensive) new medical technologies in the UK is based on explicit and national 
rationing (Drummond et al. 2008; National Institute for Clinical Excellence 2004). 
While the US has lagged behind HTA developments compared to European 
countries, President Obama’s proposed reforms now also emphasize a greater 
attention to e.g. comparative effectiveness research and renewed attention to just 
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organisation of health care provision (Bridges et al. 2010). European experiences 
are therefore increasingly relevant to US health policymakers. 
However, not all HTA activities and decisions are received uncontested by the 
public and other relevant stakeholders (Syrett 2003). The technocratic solution 
offered by HTA is argued to be insufficient to warrant legitimate decision-making 
(Lehoux 2006; Syrett 2003). For example, decision-makers must often deal with 
incomplete and / or inconclusive scientific evidence, potentially diminishing the 
rationality of their decisions (Ashmore, Mulkay & Pinch 1989; Sendi & Al 2003). As 
science becomes more important for political decision-making, its authority is 
increasingly questioned (Bijker, Bal & Hendriks 2009). Alternatively, the impact of 
HTA on decision- and policy-making and active dissemination of HTA findings is 
called into question (Battista et al. 1994; Battista et al. 1999). For example, a lack 
of long-term planning and decision-makers’ vested interests limits the use of HTA 
(Hivon et al. 2005). Moreover, to account for the reasonableness of prioritization 
decisions, the processes of these deliberations and evaluations of scarce health 
care resources should be transparent (Daniels & Sabin 2008).  
 
In response to these criticisms, many health regulatory agencies emphasize that 
an evidence based approach is the way forward, and the decision-making process 
itself should be more transparent. How evidence is incorporated into actual 
decisions should be more apparent to those not involved in this process. Therefore, 
to govern the process of priority setting a set of ‘meta-rules’ should be created 
(formalization) (Holm et al. 1998).This increase in demands for transparency can 
be observed in all aspects of health care over the last few years (Bijker, Bal & 
Hendriks 2009).  
 
Despite a clear decision-framework (scientization), and a transparent decision-
making process (formalization), policy-makers still experience problems in the 
execution of reimbursement decisions. The execution of health regulations in daily 
practice appears to deviate substantially from the intended policy and its underlying 
principles (Niezen et al. 2007). “The evidence that NICE guidance has made a 
difference either to the quality of care or to variations in practice is mixed” (Sheldon 
et al. 2004, p.6). The definition of formulary lists (medicines eligible for funding) 
presumes that appropriate medicine use and reimbursement not only can be 
defined, but subsequently can be implemented in health care provision. Like NICE 
and other national agencies, CVZ uses multiple structures, procedures and 
responsiveness to stakeholders in order to construct its legitimacy in health care 
decision-making. Nonetheless, these formal forms of legitimacy do not appear to 
be sufficient for stakeholders and public to adhere to decisions. These problems 
may be due to the incompleteness of the decision framework, because health 
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regulators always require more evidence, or because regulation lags behind the 
dynamic clinical practice (Niezen, Bal & De Bont forthcoming). The deviation 
between policy and practice, and the debate of reimbursement decisions, points at 
potential legitimacy problems requiring further research. Is legitimacy achieved 
when evidence in the form of (economic) modelling and decision procedures are 
applied appropriately, or is the legitimacy of decisions otherwise constructed? And 
if so, in what way?  
 
Currently, the activity of ‘making legitimate choices’ in health care is related to 
concepts such as public accountability (informing about one’s conduct), 
transparency (full and open information) and the public interests involved (e.g. the 
principles of quality, accessibility and efficiency of health care) (Daniels 2000; 
Daniels & Sabin 2008; Bal, Bijker & Hendriks 2004; Jasanoff 2009; Suchman 
1995). Many national governments are searching for a ‘grand solution’ to the 
problem of legitimate decision-making and its related normative questions, such as: 
when is decision-making regarding the prioritization of medicines considered 
legitimate, or even, how it can be made legitimate? Yet, legitimacy of decision-
making needs work. The public’s trust in the carefulness and accuracy of the 
deliberation concerning prioritization is not given, but depends on different building 
blocks.  
 
In this article, we analyze how legitimate choices are made during Dutch decision-
making on the reimbursement of medicines. Making use of the Sociology of 
situated judgement in combination with a Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
approach, and following the footsteps of Moreira (2005), we explore how health 
decision-makers in the Netherlands (try to) construct legitimacy for decisions in 
complex situations, such as choices on how to divide scarce resources (Thevenot 
2002; Moreira 2005). The objective of this exploration is not to provide for a ‘grand 
solution’ to the problem of legitimate decision-making, but to provide insight in both 
the dynamics of argumentation used, and the organizational and material 
arrangements used, to support or complement a given line of argumentation. 
Exploring three case studies, we examine what it means for decision-makers to 
deal with the claims for legitimate decision-making, and how the different 
stakeholders involved regard ‘justifications’ (Thévenot 2007) for argumentations 
and evaluations differently. The three case studies are: the conditional 
reimbursement of a) outpatient and b) inpatient medicines and c) the possible 
addition of a decision criterion to the decision framework respectively. Below, we 
first describe our research methodology; we provide a short description of the three 
case studies, as well as the empirical data and theoretical lens we use. In section 
‘Dutch benefit package management infrastructure’ we outline the context of Dutch 
benefit package management infrastructure and the way legitimacy currently is 
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constructed. In section ‘The legitimacy of prioritization decisions and knowledge 
claims’ we focus on what forms of knowledge are considered and produced in the 
prioritization decision-making process and how these underpin legitimacy of 
prioritization decisions. We identify the different repertoires present in the decision-
making process, and how each repertoire differs in attributing worth to a medical 
technology and its reimbursement decision. In the section ‘Interaction between the 
different repertoires in the reimbursement decision-making process’ we examine 
more closely the interplay between the different knowledges or repertoires (as 
defined in section ‘The legitimacy of prioritization decisions and knowledge claims’) 
and the way this interplay is incorporated in the decision-making process. Finally, 
we discuss how current benefit package management infrastructure is performative 
in shaping the legitimacy of prioritization decisions. 
Method 
In order to analyze legitimacy problems within health care decision-making, we 
draw upon the following three case studies: a) the conditional reimbursement of 
medicines in the outpatient setting, b) the conditional reimbursement of medicines 
in the inpatient setting, and c) the possible addition of a new rationing criterion to 
the decision-framework for benefit package management; ‘budget impact’. These 
case studies provide insight in how the Dutch benefit package management 
system aims to produce legitimacy for its decisions. They involve the exploration of 
policy measures and tools aimed to govern appropriate drug reimbursement and 
use (conditional reimbursement) and the exploration of the construction of 
evidence used in decision-making (budget impact). The first case study examines 
the conditional reimbursement of outpatient medicines (Schedule 2 of Health 
Insurance Regulation
1
). This policy tool makes the reimbursement of particular 
medicines conditional to specific criteria or rules. For example, the use of 
medicines is restricted to specific categories of patients (e.g. based on indications) 
and/or place in treatment lines (e.g. step-up treatment). By conditionally 
reimbursing specified drugs, the Health Care Insurance Board expected to 
stimulate the appropriate use in practice supported by evidence based policy 
(College voor zorgverzekeringen 2005). The second case study has a starting point 
in 2006, when the conditional reimbursement regulation was extended from 
outpatient medicines to inpatient medicines through the High-Cost Medicines 
Regulation. Importantly, the High-Cost Medicines Regulation includes the 
prerequisite of evidence development on the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 
of listed medicines in clinical practice (Raad voor de Volksgezondheid en Zorg 
2007a; College voor zorgverzekeringen 2006; Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit 2006). 
                                                     
1
 The Health Insurance Regulation regulates the execution of the Dutch Health Insurance Act (ZVW). 
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The evidence development based on data collection in databases was intended to 
inform and govern decision-making on the reimbursement of inpatient medicines, 
as well as to promote rational prescribing. The last case study does not focus on 
how a policy tool might contribute to the legitimacy of the decision-making 
infrastructure, but on the possible completion of the decision framework. The 
current Dutch decision framework explicitly entails the criteria of effectiveness, 
cost-effectiveness, and severity of illness. The role of budget impact remains less 
obvious despite the official request for budget impact estimates to inform the 
decision-makers in the decision-making process (Niezen et al. 2009; Cohen, Stolk 
& Niezen 2008). Exploring the possible addition of budget impact as a rationing 
criterion to the decision-making process or framework allowed for insight in the 
type of evidence used in decision-making and gaining legitimacy of the decision-
making process. We do not explore how each case study contributes to legitimate 
decision-making individually, but rather focus on how they, taken together, provide 
insight in the activity of making legitimate decisions. 
 
Data from field research on the three cases orient the analysis, and are offered as 
evidence throughout this paper. The data consist of various sorts of ‘texts’ and 
observations collected from several sources; in-depth interviews with the key 
participants (N=80), documents such as pharmacoeconomic reports, and reports 
on meetings and public statements put out by CVZ, Ministry of Health and other 
relevant stakeholders. In each case similar stakeholders were interviewed, and 
similar texts retrieved. The interviews, observation reports, documents and minutes 
were hand-coded independently in two rounds. In the first round we used in vivo 
coding (creating codes using words from the empirical data, without paraphrasing) 
to determine a saturation point (no new information) and generate an inductive 
code list (paraphrasing and categorizing) related to the different aspects and / or 
perceptions of the concepts ‘legitimacy’ and ‘legitimate decision-making’. In the 
second round we coded deductively, using theoretical perspectives on legitimacy 
and legitimate decision-making to further order and analyze our data using insights 
from Thevenot (2002) and Moreira (2005) – see further in section ‘The legitimacy of 
prioritization decisions and knowledge claims’. We developed a framework of 
different forms of judgement and coded the various repertoires found in the 
evaluation of medicines in the three cases studied. We use this framework to 
structure the analysis of empirical data below.  
Dutch benefit package management infrastructure 
In this section, we provide a description of the current benefit package 
management infrastructure for health care allocation in the Netherlands. The Dutch 
drug reimbursement system is based on a political decision-making model. The 
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Ministry of Health formally requests advice from the Dutch Health Care Insurance 
Board (CVZ) on benefit package decisions. As an independent agency of the 
Ministry of Health that must function in a political setting, CVZ tries to remain 
incorruptible, reliable and sensitive. The main focus of CVZ in providing legitimate 
decisions is to strive for transparency in the criteria and values that have been 
judged as an appropriate base for evaluating a medicine. In line with the 
international trend, CVZ mainly bases their assessments on the criteria of 
efficiency, effectiveness and severity of illness and focuses on an evidence based 
procedure, and puts much effort in rationalising the decision-making procedure. In 
its assessments, it aims to have a societal perspective in mind, which in the Dutch 
case represents strong principles of justice and solidarity. Since the Dutch 
government represents the citizens of the Netherlands, and CVZ takes into account 
a societal perspective in health care prioritization procedures, it is expected that the 
resulting choices and policies have value for the Dutch citizens.  
 
The Health Care Insurance Board decision-making process has evolved from a 
consensus model on appropriate reimbursement to a technological assessment of 
medical technologies and more recently, to a two-phased organisation of the 
decision-making process. In the first phase a technological assessment is 
conducted by the Medicinal Products Reimbursement Committee (CFH). This 
Committee consists of external experts, such as hospital pharmacists, 
mathematicians and oncologists. They systematically assess the therapeutic value 
of medicines (based on health outcomes research and when relevant experience, 
feasibility and user-friendliness) for as long as scientific evidence is available of 
new medicines in comparison to standard treatment, or care as usual. Moreover, 
the CFH estimates the costs related to admission (budget impact) prior to 
admission in the benefit package on behalf of CVZ. A CFH-meeting on a particular 
medicine focuses on several elements that together result in a ‘rational 
consideration’ of the eligibility of this medicine for reimbursement (College voor 
zorgverzekeringen 2000b). The assessment phase is followed by an appraisal of 
the medical technology (societal exam) by the Advisory Committee Benefit 
Package (ACP). The ACP consists of external experts with experience and 
knowledge on the fields of social security, care and insurance from a scientific-, 
practice- and patient- perspective. The ACP appraises the value of medical 
technologies from a societal perspective, e.g. taking into account the collective 
solidarity principle and the possibility for equal access to a particular medicine. 
According to CVZ, the evidence found in the two phases is subsequently presented 
as objectively as possible, after which the Ministry makes a final decision on the 
admission of a drug in the benefit package (College voor zorgverzekeringen 2007). 
The resulting definition of the benefit package presumes that appropriate medicine 
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use and reimbursement can be defined and, subsequently, be implemented in 
health care provision. 
The legitimacy of prioritization decisions and knowledge claims 
In this section we focus upon the formal regulatory intervention of prioritization 
decision-making and explore how legitimacy of prioritization decisions is 
constructed. There are different approaches in exploring legitimacy of health care 
allocation decisions. According to the sociology of organizations approach, as 
described by Suchman, legitimacy involves “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” 
(Suchman 1995 p.574). Legitimacy then is connected to the authority of an 
organization. Another approach is the deliberative democracy perspective, of which 
the accountability for reasonableness framework by Daniels is most known 
(Daniels 2000; Daniels & Sabin 2008). The health economic perspective on 
legitimacy in decision-making is one of the main approaches in current practice of 
health care allocation. Legitimacy can be achieved when complexity is reduced and 
the argumentation for choices is narrowed down to a set of standardized criteria 
and principles. All three approaches assume that legitimate decision-making, 
reached either through attribution of authority, proper organisation of the decision-
making process and / or well functioning economic modelling in decision-making, 
results in implementation and execution of such reimbursement policies and 
decisions in clinical practice.  
 
We believe that the exploration of the act of constructing legitimacy for decisions 
might benefit from an alternative approach. Recently, Moreira (2005) explored the 
diversity in clinical guidelines, drawing on a combination of the Sociology of 
situated judgement and the Social Science and Technology approach, to 
understand the relationship between knowledge practices and political processes 
in setting rationing standards. In line with Moreira’s article we further explore how 
the evaluation of medicines is constructed in order to reach legitimate decisions 
(Thevenot 2002; Thévenot 2007; Moreira 2005). In contrast to the Sociology of 
organizations perspective or deliberative democracy approach, the analysis from 
the Sociology of situated judgement approach takes into account how each context 
might require or involve different repertoires (see further, below), subsequently 
resulting in different lines of action. The construction of legitimacy is no longer 
related to the social acceptance of an organization or the amount of scientization 
and formalization of the decision-making process, but is more case-specific and 
relates to the different repertoires of evaluation of medical technologies that link 
knowledge claims and conceptions of justices and fairness (Moreira 2005; Moreira 
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2011). In contrast to the other approaches to legitimacy in health care decision-
making, the ‘knowledge’ and values used in the decision-making are not separate 
domains. There are, however, different forms of knowledge. This diversity of 
knowledge is linked to different forms of (collective) judgement on the value of 
public goods. It is these collective judgements, or repertoires of evaluation, that we 
are interested in; not only at a macro or meso-level, but also at the micro level. 
Such an analysis is highly relevant, since the perceived legitimacy of the policy 
tools, by different stakeholders, increasingly seems to be connected to the actual 
implementation of the policy in daily practice. 
 
The French sociologist Laurent Thevenot considers legitimacy to be situational at 
all times. Whether the actions of regulators are considered legitimate is enclosed in 
the interplay between the regulators and their environment (Thevenot 2002). 
Thevenot approaches the different ‘repertoires of evaluation’ and diverse criteria 
within evaluations and regulations justifying these repertoires, from a political 
philosophy point of view. The evaluation of medicines can, in its striving for 
‘objectivity,’ not be seen separately from politics and morality. In fact, the activity of 
making legitimate decisions can be seen as situational in different social styles and 
institutions (Boltanski & Thevenot 2006; Thevenot 2002). Thevenot focuses on how 
actors draw upon common modes of judgement to orient their involvement in 
disputes. These are not merely ‘rationalisations’. Rather, they are “recurrent forms 
of judgement deployed by social actors in considering the worth of an object, 
person, etc. as means of harmonizing their actions with others” (Moreira 2005, 
p.1977). Each repertoire has its own characteristics and dynamics providing actors 
with symbols, stories, world views, material and organizational arrangements from 
which they can select different elements to shape their action and solve problems. 
Moreover, each repertoire is in principle accessible to everybody to draw from, in 
order to shape one’s evaluation of a health technology (Te Kulve 2006). The 
repertoires used, and the actions attributed to these repertoires, are connected to 
the ordering of the objects – in this case, the prioritization of medicines. Thus, in 
order to be able to compare one public good with another, value is attached to 
each particular public good. The prioritization process of medicines involves the 
evaluation of their worth as a public good. This evaluation involves multiple criteria 
and various types of expertise.  
 
Since the evaluation of medicines can, in its quest for ‘objectivity’, not be seen 
separately from politics and morality, we find it worthwhile to explore what types of 
repertoires are used to evaluate a medical technology and how these repertoires 
are incorporated in the current drug reimbursement decision-making process. In 
this section, we make use of the conception of the ‘different orders of worth’, or 
‘repertoires of evaluation,’ as defined by Boltanski and Thevenot, and follow the 
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footsteps of Moreira, in identifying the set of repertoires used within the Dutch 
reimbursement decision-making process (Thevenot 2002; Boltanski & Thevenot 
2006; Moreira 2005). In the coded material, four primary repertoire themes are 
evident: 1) the repertoire of science, 2) the repertoire of clinical practice, 3) the 
repertoire of equity and 4) the repertoire of process. By discussing each repertoire 
individually, we show how each repertoire entails different forms of knowledge, 
which, in turn, attribute value to a particular reimbursement decision. We then show 
how these repertoires can interact within one setting and how this interaction is 
important in establishing which (combination of) repertoires can produce legitimacy 
at a certain point in the decision-making process. Each repertoire resembles the 
conceptions of justice or legitimacy connected to the knowledge claims to which 
different groups within the deliberative process adhere (Moreira 2011). The 
labelling and identification of the various repertoires is based upon the 
categorization used by the interviewees when talking about health care decision-
making. Subsequently, we explore what forms of knowledge are considered and 
produced in the decision-making process and gain insight in the work needed to 
legitimize decisions. 
The repertoire of science; robustness of evidence 
The ‘repertoire of science’ is focused on the technological assessment of a medical 
technology, and its users are concerned with the technical robustness of the 
evidence presented to base the prioritization decision on (Moreira 2005). Questions 
asked in the ‘science repertoire’ to judge the value of a medical technology are: 
What is the technical robustness of the evidence presented regarding its health 
(economic) performance? What quantity of reliable studies and / or number of 
patients is involved? What criticism could health researchers and specialists have 
on the provided evidence? The efficiency of a medical technology, more 
specifically the costs per QALY, is often the main outcome under discussion.  
 
The Medicinal Products Reimbursement Committee (CFH) is one particular 
location in which the science repertoire dominates. A CFH meeting on a particular 
medicine focuses on several elements that together result in a ‘rational 
consideration’ of the eligibility of this medicine for reimbursement. The results of 
these meetings are reported in both a phamaco-therapeutic report and a CFH-
report, in which the committee’s findings and conclusion regarding the assessment 
of the medicine is described. The CFH assesses a medicine in comparison with 
other available medicines or (non-pharmaceutical) treatments preferably through 
the assessment of randomized double blind and comparative research (College 
voor zorgverzekeringen 2000b). According to a former secretary of the CFH, a 
medicine is found eligible for reimbursement when it has added value compared to 
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the standard treatment, preferably established in two or more independent 
researches. 
No, you have to have more on offer. You need to offer more effectiveness or fewer 
side effects for the patient. That’s what we think is really an improvement. And, if 
you can show that, preferably through two independent research studies, then I am 
always of the opinion that you must be well-grounded if you want to prevent such a 
drug from being put on the market. That also doesn’t happen. Because then the 
social pressure is large, the pressure from physicians, acting on behalf of patients, 
to get reimbursement is enormous (Secretary CFH, 2008) 
When evidence is lacking (despite experience in daily practice), the CFH claims it 
cannot conduct a proper assessment, and therefore cannot provide advice for 
inclusion or exclusion in the benefit package. The assessment thus leans heavily 
on the availability and quality of scientific evidence. The reimbursement decision 
procedure seen from a scientific repertoire leans on a hierarchy of evidence in 
which the randomized clinical trial (RCT) delivers the highest value of evidence. 
Outcomes of certain types of research receive more weight than other outcomes 
produced by less-valued research (Raad voor de Volksgezondheid en Zorg 
2007b). A part of the hierarchy of evidence becomes visible in the recent re-
assessment of etanercept, a drug used in autoimmune diseases. The re-
assessment focuses on the possible extension of etanercept’s reimbursement 
conditions to include treatment of therapy-resistant uveitis. The CFH reports to 
have conducted a literature review of the most recent files in Medline, Embase and 
Cochrane, and using appropriate search terms. This literature review, the CFH 
reports “... resulted merely in two clinical studies on treatment with etanercept for 
therapy-resistant uveitis and no randomized, double-blind and placebo-controlled 
study” [italics added] (College voor zorgverzekeringen 2011). The CFH therefore 
concludes, based on available information, there is insufficient evidence for a 
rational therapy of therapy-resistant uveitis with etanercept. In this hierarchy of 
evidence a meta-analysis of multiple RCTs is regarded as the highest form of 
evidence and the uncontrolled studies and expert opinions represent the lowest 
form of evidence. This does not imply that expert opinions on e.g. effectiveness in 
daily practice are not included in the CFH assessment, however these have less 
weight.  
 
The repertoire of science characteristically leans heavily on systematic and 
objective evaluation of outcomes research information. The internal structure of its 
logic makes use of the hierarchy of evidence, of which the RCT is valued highest. 
This structure allows for assessing the quality of evidence presented on a particular 
health technology and assumes that this evidence is unproblematically derived 
from experiments. Infrastructural requirements for making legitimate prioritization 
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decisions then are a complete and non-contradictory set of rational and evidence 
based decision rules. 
The repertoire of clinical practice; evidence from daily practice 
The repertoire of clinical practice refers to a medical-professional ‘model’ that 
acknowledges a pharmaceutical treatment as appropriate as soon as medical 
professionals find the evidence for efficacy and effectiveness to be sufficient, and 
the treatment is better than or different from the standard treatment (Trappenburg 
2005). The evidence under discussion includes scientific publications in 
acknowledged medical journals combined with experience in particular treatments 
in trials and in daily practice. In comparison to the scientific repertoire, evidence is 
not only based on scientific research (preferably RCTs) or claims by health 
economists, but evidence originating from clinical practice itself is as important. 
Whenever the treatment is used in medical practice, it should be eligible for 
reimbursement. Members of this repertoire are concerned whether the value of a 
medical technology is based upon the possibility to change the health care practice 
for the better. ‘For the better’ then, does not necessarily mean the best health 
outcomes in terms of effectiveness. Clinical expertise may point at other outcomes 
of delivered care, such as better quality of life, or better support in an illness (Mol 
2008). Since each patient is unique, the treatment should be based on the 
appropriateness of the treatment for a particular patient, and not the 
appropriateness within a national framework. Clinical knowledge thus plays an 
important role in the clinical practice repertoire. 
 
In order to evaluate the worth of a drug reimbursement decision, the participants 
using the clinical practice repertoire rely on consensus building within the medical 
professional associations and the individual health care delivery institutions. In this 
consensus building, medical professionals appraise the value of reported research 
and combine this with their experience in daily practice. A logical place to find this 
type of repertoire is within clinical practice. 
We have evening-courses in which we discuss recent studies and amplify the 
current guideline for a particular treatment. After these meetings, everyone returns 
to practice, is given additional training, and is up-to-date in current treatments… 
thus we are practicing evidence based medicine as desired by the Minister of 
Health. And then we are hindered by a health insurer representative, claiming that 
we go on ahead of reimbursement regulations. Yet, we truly believe this treatment 
is in the patient’s best interest (Medical professional 1, 2004). 
Although the medical professional associations play a marginal formal role in the 
two-phased decision-making process - they can only react to CVZ’s (preliminary) 
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decisions by invitation - the clinical practice repertoire can be found in the decision-
making process. Whereas the CFH is supposed to do the technological 
assessment including the assessment of the clinical value of a medicine based on 
scientific research outcomes, the Advisory Committee Benefit Package (ACP) is 
asked to take a societal perspective in the evaluation of a medicine. Yet, in the 
discussion on acetylcysteine, for example, the ACP departs from the preliminary 
advice provided by CFH to exclude the medicine from the benefit package.  
ACP-member 1: “Do you know anything else about those who use it? How many 
people are there? And, what categories of people use acteylcysteine and why? 
Can we connect the objections by the NVALT and NCFS with specific patient 
groups? …The NVALT thinks that there’s an indication in the area of pulmonary 
fibrosis and the NCFS in the area of intestinal obstruction”. 
After short discussion, the chair of the ACP concludes that the ACP will, in the 
interest of being careful, take the position of requesting that the CVZ try again via 
the patient association to collect evidence regarding the reasons for use or to 
eradicate doubts that something has been missed. 
Chair ACP: “If we want to give a careful advice, then we need to clarify these 
points. That is, we can follow the exclusion advice, but under the condition that 
CVZ returns to this issue of the specific patient group” (Observational notes ACP 
meeting 2008)
2
. 
The knowledge to make a carefully deliberated decision on the exclusion of 
acetylcysteine from the benefit package requires knowledge on the use of the 
medicine in daily practice for a specific patient group. Because the relevant 
professional association has lodged objection to complete exclusion of the 
medicine from the benefit package, the ACP is of the opinion that their knowledge 
should be included in the decision-making process, prior to final decision-making. 
Subsequently, this might lead to an appropriate advice on the reimbursement 
status of acetylcysteine and its execution in clinical practice. This example shows 
that within the clinical repertoire, experiential knowledge from medical 
professionals about the worth of a medical technology for specific patients is 
valued. 
 
A segment, characteristic of the clinical practice repertoire, is the consensus 
building model in which scientific research is combined with experiential 
knowledge. Whereas the dominating view in the repertoire of science relates to 
impersonal experimental knowledge, building on the value of a prioritization 
                                                     
2
 Respondents represented in the observations of the ACP-meetings are referred to as ACP-members, 
and with no reference to their function(s) outside the ACP. 
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decision for entire patient groups, the repertoire of clinical practice leans more on 
professional and experiential knowledge building on the value of a prioritization 
decision for each unique patient. In other words, the internal structure of logic 
within this repertoire builds on evidence derived from both experiment and 
experience and assumes that evidence is perishable.  
The repertoire of equity; solidarity and other societal considerations 
In the repertoire of equity, the relevance of evidence for the admission of a 
medicine in the benefit package is discussed from an equity perspective. Users of 
this repertoire wonder whether the prioritization decision reflects the minimal 
provision of health care in order to be able to participate as a citizen in Dutch 
society. In other words, this repertoire reflects the moral worth of (individual) 
patients as citizens. The repertoire of equity is highly visible within the ACP. The 
evidence used includes data on the necessity and severity of illness of 
pharmaceutical treatments. Also, the expertise of the different members plays an 
important role in the discussions. The experts vary from a patient representative 
and a former Minister of Justice, to professors in Health Technology Assessment 
and in Health Care Ethics. The goal of the discussions is to reach consensus on 
the societal aspects related to a pharmaceutical treatment, which should be part of 
the Minister of Health’s deliberation about possible admission in the benefit 
package.  
 
Within Dutch society, solidarity is a principle that has been highly valued since the 
establishment of health insurance after WWII. The Advisory Committee Benefit 
Package appraises a medicine on its worth for society, implicitly taking into account 
the collective solidarity principle. They explicitly discuss the possibility for equal 
access to a particular medicine. The tension between collective regulation based 
on rational decision-making frameworks and evidence based standards on the one 
hand, and individual patient situations on the other hand, is often discussed by the 
ACP.  
ACP-member 1: I have a moral dilemma… I miss the entire empathy with people 
who are ill! I am wondering whether I, as a representative for the patients’ 
perspective, even should participate in this type of commission in which the method 
of QALY’s and severity of illness are central and shifts [in perspective] are difficult. 
ACP-member 2: I am quite happy, even as a surgeon, with this entire rational and 
quantitative approach. That does not exclude also taking a good look at the 
individual level. 
ACP-member 3: I think you fall short on yourself as a patient representative. 
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ACP-member 1: Well, I wonder to what extend does empathy with people and 
society fit with the discussed framework of severity of illness?  
ACP-member 2: What kind of decision-making do you want then? Decision-making 
based on media attention? Hopefully not! 
ACP-member 4: This is exactly the problem. We have to do the PR that we, as 
ACP, are specifically here to also take into account the individual cases in the 
decision-making process. We are here to make sure that the money is allocated to 
those people who need it the most. 
Chair ACP: We are here to get a feel for such questions and experiential 
knowledge. We cannot do that without facts about interventions. The economic 
models are needed to put into perspective the degree to which the numbers play a 
definite role in the decision. Patient representation in the ACP is thus very 
important! (Observational notes ACP meeting 2008) 
In the discussion on biosimilars
3
, again the balance between the interests of 
individual patients and the collective interests is at stake.  
ACP-member 4: the problem with the file on biosimilars is that we struggle with two 
ethical directives. One, what is the best thing to do for the patient? And two, how 
can the costs of the system be contained, also for the future? When the individual 
patient’s interest is put at risk, there should be strong arguments to go ahead with 
replacing previous medication with biosimilars. So far, I have not heard such 
arguments, and I am of the opinion that an existing patient is damaged when he or 
she is prescribed a biosimilar (Minutes ACP-meeting 2011). 
The moral dilemma, the ACP faces, is how the individual patient is represented in 
the abstract reports on medicines. The committee realizes that chopping up the 
appraisal, according to different criteria and related documents, is an aid 
supporting the ACP in formulating advice on how to allocate available money to the 
people who need it the most. The committee must therefore take up the task to 
make a socially just appraisal and cannot miss the facts and figures on the 
interventions or diseases. However, in dealing with the abstract reports on cost-
effectiveness and necessity (severity of illness) the ACP remains to put the 
individual ill human central in its appraisal of the worth of a medicine (Minutes 
ACP-meeting, 2008, 2011). 
 
Because the ACP is relatively new (it was erected in 2008) the societal repertoire is 
not only found in the locus of ACP meetings, but also in other situations, such as 
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 Biosimilars are new (sometimes slightly adapted) versions of existing biopharmaceuticals made by a 
different pharmaceutical manufacturer following patent and exclusivity expiry on the innovator 
biopharmaceutical. 
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when patient representative organizations use this repertoire to plea for access to 
specific medicines, and more specifically, at the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of 
Health in the end has the ability to deviate from the advice provided by CVZ based 
on political and societal considerations, although this does not often happen. One 
of the best-known cases was the Ministry of Health’s decision not to include 
sildenafil (Viagra®) in the benefit package. Through an official notification on the 
decision on sildenafil, the Ministry of Health states:  
Among the medicines that will not be included is the new medicine for erectile 
dysfunction (Viagra). Given that the value of this medicine is largely a result of the 
increased ease of use, and that this medicine is not more effective than the 
medicine that is already included in the package, the Minister is of the opinion that 
the high costs that accompany inclusion of Viagra is not justified. (Monthly use of 4 
tablets by 75,000 persons would result in costs of 60 million Dutch guilders per 
year.) By excluding Viagra, the Minister will create room to include medicines that, 
in the interest of public health, absolutely must be included in the package (for 
example, new breakthrough medicines intended for severe diseases) 
(http://www.minvws.nl, April 12, 2000). 
This decision departs substantially from CVZ’s advice to admit sildenafil under 
conditions for a specific patient group, based on scientific evidence for the cost-
effectiveness of this treatment (Stolk, Brouwer & Busschbach 2002). 
 
The repertoire of equity is a rather dynamic and evolving repertoire. The 
(discussion on the) conceptualization of equity and the fundamental values on 
which human dignity depends is drawn upon by the repertoire of equity users. A 
characteristic segment is the negotiations about how to define solidarity, for 
example regarding life style diseases. These negotiations are less formal and less 
systematic. The hierarchy of logic within the equity repertoire highly values social 
sciences such as ethics. Evidence derived from social studies or personal 
experience, however, is not received unproblematically, but debated on its value 
for the conceptualization of equity in each case. 
The repertoire of process; transparency and participation 
In the repertoire of process, members are concerned with the procedure through 
which prioritization decisions are reached. Users of the repertoire of process reflect 
upon the appropriateness of the amount of transparency and the participation of 
stakeholders within the decision-making process and the final reimbursement 
status of a medicine. Does the outcome of the entire deliberation process match 
with the evidence and methods used in this process? It is therefore important, 
within this repertoire, to map the different objectives at stake. This process can 
take place self-reflexively by the health regulators, but is also part of the discussion 
on the drug reimbursement status by other stakeholders such as representatives of 
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the pharmaceutical industry, medical specialist organisations and other 
stakeholders.  
Many professional organizations fail to realize how the policy of admission and 
reimbursement of medicines works. It is much more of a closed procedure between 
the manufacturer and the commission for pharmaceutical aids (technological 
assessment). It all happens out of sight of the public at large, but also of doctors 
(Pharmaceutical manufacturer, 2004).  
Only the pharmaceutical industry is able to participate in the decision-making 
procedure, since they request the admission of a medicine to the benefit package. 
The participation of the pharmaceutical industry, however, is limited to the 
procedural aspects of the decision-making process and not the (medical) content of 
the CFH advice in the assessment phase, or the societal considerations in the 
appraisal phase. Other stakeholders are rarely involved, and therefore have limited 
insight in the decision-making procedure, and even less influence on the outcomes 
of the decision-making process. The repertoire of process is most often used when 
actors believe the outcome of the prioritization process insufficiently reflects all 
available knowledge on the appropriateness of a medicine for admission in the 
benefit package.  
 
During the development of a manual for outcomes research for expensive inpatient 
medicines, the repertoire of process also played an important role. A team of 
experts was asked by CVZ to write a manual for the outcomes research, to be 
conducted in a timeframe of three years, to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of 
the medicine in clinical practice. The discussion focused on the methodological 
choices for the required data registration, in order to be eligible for the conditional 
reimbursement measure. The working party defined ‘outcomes research’ and what 
data was needed. Subsequently, this was discussed in an invitational conference 
with attending stakeholders, amongst which representatives from the 
pharmaceutical industry, patient organizations, medical professional associations, 
health insurers and health researchers. Several experts of the working party 
presented the different elements in the manual, for example the clinical data and 
patient characteristics, the costs, the patient reported outcomes or modelling 
versus empirical studies.  
 
After the presentation of the different elements, the attendees of the conference 
were allowed to respond to the presentations. Most of the questions asked related 
to the procedural and methodological aspects of the manual. “Why does the 
manual focus on quality adjusted life years for which a panel from society is 
needed and not on the descriptive ‘quality of life’- questionnaires?” “Are registries 
suitable for comparing treatments considering the enormous bias in registries?” “Is 
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the argumentation of a drug’s efficiency more important than its outcome?” “I 
understand that besides the term of three years of research, there is also some 
uncertainty about how the research should be conducted?” (Observational notes 
invitational conference, 2007). These questions all reflect concerns whether the 
process of outcome research –what stakeholders are involved and what type of 
data is collected– appropriately affects the final decisions on the admission in the 
reimbursement regulation. Whereas the working committee focused on an 
appropriate procedure for outcomes research, the pharmaceutical industry argued 
that the manual was incomplete. They argued that a final decision framework, upon 
which decisions are based, was lacking.  
There needs to be an assessment framework in order to interpret the results of 
research. If the decision-making process is eventually based on a cost-effect ratio, 
then the question is how to deal with this. [It] is still unclear how the results of the 
efficacy research will add to long-term decision-making. We are of the opinion that 
this central question must be answered first, before any scientific meaning can be 
added (Letter from a representative organization of the pharmaceutical industry to 
the working committee, 2007). 
The industry uses the repertoire of process by referring to the idea that legitimacy 
of decisions is only possible when the outcomes research on the medicines are 
similarly interpreted and subsequently assessed. 
 
Another location where the repertoire of process can be found is in the ACP. 
Although its members most often make use of the repertoire of equity, they 
sometimes also reflect upon the question whether the outcome of the deliberation 
process so far is an appropriate reflection of the evidence and methods used to 
reach that particular preliminary decision. Below a discussion on the task of the 
ACP is depicted between its members. 
ACP-member 2: NICE has a certain distantiation from the population. Use the 
formula approach and then also indicate what that means for individual cases. 
Chair ACP: How do we present the considerations? How do we communicate that 
to the outside world? These are relevant questions for the ACP. 
ACP-member 5 indicates that he would like to have the data and information 
regarding the technological assessment of certain medicines. “Then we can make 
an appraisal. Now, we can’t”. 
ACP-member 2: The CFH is responsible for the assessment, but we can still look 
at it and see if we agree. 
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Chair ACP: Bottom line, we need to see the background information, so we can 
see if all available evidence has been included. 
The ACP members conclude that how they present their considerations 
(transparency) is of highest value for appropriate decision-making. Therefore, they 
also need to (re)consider evidence from the earlier assessment phase in the 
decision-making process. 
 
Although the repertoire of process is one of the less dominating repertoires, it often 
surfaces whenever a decision is debated on the representativeness of its outcome 
with the evidence and methods used in the process. Both, in the ACP discussion 
and in the development of the manual for outcomes research of inpatient 
expensive medicine, this repertoire has indirect influence on the final 
reimbursement decision. It might lead to a renewed assessment based on the 
addition of previously unconsidered evidence, or the involvement of new 
participants providing knowledge upon which the decision can be refined. Thus, the 
repertoire of process discusses the value of prioritization decisions based on the 
amount of transparency of the priority setting process as well as the way it has 
taken into account the interests of all relevant groups.  
Interaction between the different repertoires in the 
reimbursement decision-making process 
In the previous section we established that, throughout the decision-making 
process, different forms of knowledge dominate in the different repertoires for 
determining the value of prioritization decisions. Although the decision-making 
process of CVZ clearly depicts the presence of the different repertoires within the 
decisions process, even within one phase or committee, the interaction between 
the repertoires seems limited. Current decisions and recommendations by CVZ 
reflect a rather formal approach to the entire decision-making process. In fact, CVZ 
distances itself from attributing values to the different evidence presented in the 
two phases and aims to present the different rationalities regarding a particular 
medical technology as objectively as possible.  
What we must assess in the assessment phase, as benefit package managers, is 
the burden of illness, costs, effectiveness, etc. We’ll also organize the societal 
debate in the appraisal. Then, we try to explain to the Ministry of Health, what the 
different social issues are. These are thus other rationalities we want to add to our 
advice. But, it is still the case that we don’t make the decisions – that’s up to the 
politicians. Since, politicians, at a certain point, have to attribute a certain amount of 
weight to the various arguments. We don’t (Director CVZ, 2008). 
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This approach to decision-making results in what Moreira would call a public 
dialogue model in which legitimacy is gained by integrating the different values and 
perspectives on appropriate reimbursement in the decision-making process, yet 
still implies that science and society can be seen as separated domains (Moreira 
2005). Such an approach to legitimacy problems in decision-making continues to 
preserve the tension between science and values, and does not permit an 
interaction between the different phases in the decision-making process or even 
between the different repertoires. Then how do the different repertoires interact? 
And, how are these different repertoires (the different judgements on how 
knowledge entails morally sanctioned actions) balanced in prioritization decisions? 
These questions prove relevant, since even CVZ itself struggles with the different 
forms of knowledge, and subsequently different evaluations of medical 
technologies, and possible new ways of governing appropriate medicine use and 
reimbursement in practice.  
 
Since CVZ offers advice, including transparent arguments for choices made or 
values attributed to specific types of knowledge, one can expect that the interaction 
between the different repertoires can also be seen in the current decision-making 
process. An example of such interaction between different repertoires is a 
discussion on the ‘quit smoking program’. In 2008 CVZ published its report, 
Supporting stop smoking: insured care?, in which it claimed that many preventive 
interventions already were reimbursed, and the nicotine replacing medicines, 
bupropion and varenicline were excluded from reimbursed pharmaceutical care. 
However, in 2009 the discussion on ‘stop smoking programs’ and reimbursement 
continued and focused on whether an integral program including medicines should 
be admitted in the benefit package.  
ACP-member 4: I read the report by replacing ‘smoking’ with ‘obesity’. Since this 
report is likely to be followed by similar reports I think it is of importance to take a 
good look at the arguments used here. 
ACP-member 2: What is so different from 2008? There are more general remarks, 
yet there is no known RCT of an integral treatment compared to mono-treatment. 
ACP-member 5: In 2008 we concluded that stop smoking treatments did not belong 
to necessarily reimbursed care. The treatment costs can fall under one’s own 
account since the costs of treatment are somewhat similar to the costs of smoking 
itself. Moreover, the effect of reimbursing or not reimbursing in relation to the 
participation in the stop smoking program is unclear. And the current research is 
questionable. 
CVZ-employee: The material, the evidence, is the same as in 2008. However, now 
we have a different focus. The material that supports the combination, the integral 
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treatment, will follow since it is currently still in research. However, the preliminary 
results affirm the cost-effectiveness of combination therapy. 
ACP-member 5: For me, the escape clause is that smoking harms others and that 
could be a reason to define the treatment as not one’s own responsibility. Can you 
provide numbers for the harm done to the environment?  
ACP-member 2: In general I believe there is need for more evidence. In one year I 
would like to re-evaluate (Observational notes ACP-meeting 2009). 
The discussion above reflects how different repertoires interact within one 
committee (appraisal phase). Yet, the interaction between the different repertoires 
does not take place across the borders of the phased decision-making process. 
Since the ACP-members are uncertain about the provided scientific evidence 
regarding the stop smoking program, engaging a discussion with the scientific 
repertoire (e.g. in the form of CFH-members using this repertoire) could be 
worthwhile in exploring the certainty of the knowledge used within each repertoire 
and co-determining the weight which should be provided to each repertoire and 
subsequently possibly producing new knowledge. However, since the scientific 
repertoire reflects the scientific assessment of a medical technology and the equity 
repertoire the societal appraisal, they are perceived as separate domains that 
should not interact. Such interface does not, and should not, take place. The 
precedent effect of admission bears witness of a process repertoire, while the 
discussion on (the lack of) evidence of effectiveness reflects a scientific repertoire. 
The normally dominating equity repertoire is used when the ACP members wonder 
what arguments can be provided to indeed admit the stop smoking program in the 
benefit package. Since, amongst others, admitting this program might restrain the 
admittance of other more necessary care, the ACP adviced not to admit the 
program in the benefit package (equity repertoire). In the final report to the Ministry 
of Health, again the ACP’s different arguments from different repertoires are 
presented separately. Without a thorough interaction between the different 
repertoires, available in the different phases of the decision-making process, the 
Board of CVZ decided to advice the Ministry of Health to admit the program to the 
benefit package since the potential preventive effect was provided more weight 
than the ACP’s argumentations. In other words, the different knowledge types 
remain different attributes of a medical technology which should be discussed 
separately. Subsequently, the knowledge base for the reimbursement decisions is 
not generated by a collective co-production of (new) knowledge, but merely 
generated by a display of the separate repertoires and related knowledge in the 
decision-making process. Based on these different forms of knowledge presented, 
a decision is made. However, an interaction between the different repertoires might 
have led to another hierarchy of evidence. Both, the certainty of the knowledge 
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reflected, and the situation in which the reimbursement decision should be 
executed, could have been part of the discussion. This example shows that the 
challenge of the different repertoires to interact, is not merely to present the 
different types of knowledge that shape the attributed value to a prioritization 
decision. The challenge lies in combining these different repertoires, attributing 
weight to each repertoire, and perhaps even co-producing new knowledge.  
 
This challenge is problematized, however, by the current arrangement of the 
decision-making process. Although current decision infrastructure acknowledges 
the presence and value of the different repertoires, combining these repertoires 
and attributing weight to them is more difficult.  
In the new health care system, the CVZ has the important task of managing the 
insurance packages. Yes, this gives us the task of being responsible. Thus, we 
have a lot on our plate, we also have to think about the whole issue of breadth in 
the package; how heavily does the severity of a condition weigh? How do you 
weigh the availability of alternatives? Where do we set the limit for efficiency – is 
there even such a limit? ... There’s not a delineated decision-tree. I don’t think there 
is a formula that comprises all of these issues because the… you also have 
societal interests that also play a role of course. … The severity of the illness, the 
availability of alternatives, but also the costs for the individual patient… (Director 
CVZ, 2008). 
In other words, CVZ struggles with the formal norms laid upon them to provide 
transparent and evidence based decisions (primarily making use of the scientific 
repertoire) and the judgements related to the different forms of knowledge 
embedded in the decision-making process (such as the clinical or equity 
repertoire). More specifically, in practice, CVZ is asked for an advice and thus 
required to formulate, based on its findings, a ‘judgement’ on the most appropriate 
prioritization decision. The following quote shows how the director of CVZ 
acknowledges that value-free advice is difficult to provide, for example, when 
asked when budget impact, an implicit rationing criterion (see Niezen et al. 2009), 
will likely play a role in the decision to admit a medicine to the benefit package: 
Interviewer: And thus, budget impact only plays a role for CVZ as one of the criteria 
that VWS asks about? <Yes.> And that’s it for the CVZ?’ 
Director CVZ: Yes, in principle, we have an informing function, but not really a 
valuing function. However, that could change, because as soon as you begin 
working with opportunity costs, it’s almost impossible to be value neutral. What you 
are going to select as reference points, or alternatives, interventions that we could 
exclude – that can hardly be value neutral. 
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Decision-making in practice thus offers more leeway in incorporating well-founded 
choices and/or values in reimbursement advices than the formal procedure 
suggests. 
Interviewer: Is it important that CVZ’s advice is always value neutral? 
Director CVZ: No, and we’re not afraid to make certain choices and give 
transparent arguments to support them. But then we are far removed from the 
traditional pattern of expectation from the Ministry of Health, which sees the CVZ 
as medical advisor, and is primarily interested in cost-effect analysis of the 
therapeutic value of a medicine.  
Interviewer: Is the CVZ free to formulate the advice as they want? 
Director CVZ: We do have some freedom. Moreover, the debate with VWS takes 
place at two different levels: on the one hand, it is about the theoretical division of 
roles and then it’s difficult for us; on the other hand it’s about the cases in practice 
and then VWS is very happy with all of the information that we give them. It turns 
out okay (Director CVZ, 2008). 
While CVZ is expected to assess a medicine on the most up to date evidence from 
science and clinical practice, CVZ’s director also acknowledges the situational 
character of prioritization decisions. The request by the Ministry of Health for an 
advice, and the delegated freedom in how to fill in this advice, provides room for a 
more situational approach.  
 
In order to be able to attribute weight to each repertoire and co-produce new 
knowledge, the context in which the reimbursement decision should be made and 
executed, must be part of the decision-making process. The situational approach 
allows for the incorporation of other types of knowledge, and specifically the 
interaction between these knowledge types in the decision-making processes. By 
making use of different knowledge bases, a prioritization decision can be grounded 
in its context. Context can influence which (combinations of) repertoires may 
produce legitimacy at a certain point in the decision-making process. Examples of 
the importance of context are reflected by the ACP’s consideration of the 
decreasing economy (this section) or in the discussion on specific patient 
categories in the area of pulmonary fibrosis (section Dutch benefit package 
management infrastructure). The decreasing economy is no issue in the 
discussions by the CFH, yet of importance for the ACP to make use of the equity 
repertoire in supporting argumentations for inclusion in, or exclusion of, the benefit 
package. An analysis of legitimacy and the act of making legitimate decisions 
therefore cannot take place without an analysis of the context. Hereby, a more 
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situational approach is arguably more able to cope with the complex reality, which 
is difficult to grasp in solely (economic) modelling or a fixed process.  
 
One of the important contexts that should be taken into account in the decision-
making process is the connection between health regulation and execution. The 
repertoire best representing the knowledge from a policy execution’s perspective is 
the repertoire of clinical practice. This repertoire has been acknowledged as 
containing relevant knowledge for decision-making since it is reflected in both the 
CFH and ACP meetings. It is also important because it shows the contingency of 
certain processes on the contexts in which they take place. The repertoire of 
clinical practice deviates from the repertoire of science and current ideas on 
legitimate decision-making as it is less rationalistic and more contingent (Bal 1998). 
Exactly this more contingent characteristic of the repertoire of clinical practice 
allows for the addition of knowledge on whether the policy decision likely will be 
implemented in practice. In an earlier paper, Niezen, Bal & De Bont (forthcoming) 
have shown how regulation of medical technologies is constitutive of the practice in 
which the medical technology is used. Regulation produces information that, in 
turn, entails a transformation of the medical technology informed about. This can 
lead to new forms of governing appropriate medicine use and reimbursement that 
are in line with latest scientific research and are feasible and executed in clinical 
practice as well (Niezen, Bal & De Bont forthcoming). The contingency of the 
repertoire of clinical practice allows for the deliberate and conscious formation of 
prioritization decisions that are situation dependent and not the production of 
abstract decisions that embody the ideal of (context-free) objectivity. 
 
Importantly, the interaction between the different repertoires in the decision-making 
process should not involve the elimination of the phased assessment and appraisal 
of medical technologies. As (Bal 1998) argues, heterogeneity of repertoires within 
one phase or forum does not contribute to optimal decision-making. In fact, the 
different repertoires should be separated from one another organizationally. This 
separation, allows for channelling potential conflicts and for the opportunity to refer 
uncertainties to other repertoires. In addition to Bal, Moreira argues that these 
repertoires should interact whenever uncertainties or disagreements between 
repertoires arise, subsequently leading to the generation of new knowledge 
(Moreira 2011). This implies on the one hand that the different and separate 
committees within CVZ should assess and appraise a medical technology’s worth. 
On the other hand, when uncertainties arise within these committees on the 
knowledge presented, for example the technological possibilities or societal 
willingness to pay for a medical technology, conscious acknowledgement and 
addressing of different knowledge types and the context within which prioritizations 
decisions should be made and implemented is necessary. To facilitate such 
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acknowledgement and addressing of different knowledge types and relevant 
context, some sort of forum for interaction is required. This forum allows for the 
interaction of the different repertoires in such way that it may lead to new 
knowledge on the value of a prioritization decision. However, the current vertical 
organisation, the two-phased and linear decision-making process, insufficiently 
allows for such interaction.  
Co-production of knowledge and legitimacy in decision-making 
The purpose of this paper has been to analyze how legitimacy for decisions in 
health care allocation is constructed. The current benefit package management 
system in the Netherlands is organized in a rather rational-logical process – a 
linear two phased decision-making process – presuming that appropriate medicine 
use and reimbursement not only can be defined, but subsequently can be 
implemented in health care provision. However, problems in the implementation of 
(non-) reimbursed medicines and medicine regulations in clinical practice point at a 
tension between the different perspectives on appropriate medicine use and 
reimbursement and subsequently the legitimacy of prioritization decisions. In 
section ‘The legitimacy of prioritization decisions and knowledge claims’ we 
demonstrated that the activity of decision-making is based on the use of different 
repertoires. Each evaluation of and subsequent decision on of a medical 
technology’s worth, can be regarded from different perspectives, and entails 
different types of knowledge and related conceptions of the moral economy. 
Acknowledging this diversity of forms of knowledge in the construction of legitimacy 
of decisions, might be a fundamental step in understanding the lack of impact of 
some of these prioritization decisions. 
 
By examining CVZ’s decision-making process on the admission of medicines to the 
benefit package, making use of the combination of the Sociology of situated 
judgement and Social Science and Technology approach, we demonstrated that 
legitimacy in practice is closely related to the interaction between the repertoires 
and the context influencing what (combination of) repertoires can produce 
legitimacy at a certain point in the decision-making process. The importance of 
context is already established by Lehoux & Blume (2000) when analyzing the HTA 
of the cochlear implant. Lehoux & Blume (2000) argue that HTA should be 
informed by a broader set of perspectives, taking into account the wider (social) 
context in which technologies, such as medicines, are used. The interaction 
between the different repertoires allows for the inclusion of these different 
perspectives and the social context of a medical technology. By analyzing the 
presence of different repertoires in the decision-making process, the relationship 
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between the different forms of knowledge and attributing worth to a medical 
technology in making prioritization decisions becomes more contextualized. 
 
Although the current prioritization decision-making process does take into account 
other forms of knowledge and related values – that is, other repertoires – these 
different repertoires have limited possibilities to interact. The current decision-
making process has been developed to focus on the governmental (macro) level of 
decision-making, with limited consideration of the regional or community (meso) 
level, or the physician-patient (micro) level. The context of a medical technology 
(the location in which it is used and by whom, as well as the organizational and 
material arrangements in place), is lacking. Subsequently, the current organization 
of the decision-making process provides more theoretical value for legitimacy than 
practical utility since it lacks context.  
 
This rather formal approach to the decision-making process, results in a public 
dialogue model in which legitimacy is gained by integrating the different values and 
perspectives on appropriate reimbursement in the decision-making process, yet 
still implies that science and society can be seen as separated domains (Moreira 
2011). In addition, Moreira claims, a co-production of knowledge model departs 
from the view that science and society are intimately linked, and allows for a 
pragmatic balance between rules and cases. Moreover, such an approach 
acknowledges that regulation is an integral component of medical technology 
innovations and practices; regulation and practice are not separate domains.  
 
In practice, this means that the formal decision-making process can be interrupted 
by ad hoc public discussions of controversies regarding a medical technology. In 
these discussions membership is open, the general public (representing lay 
knowledge), together with experts and e.g. patient representatives, discuss the 
uncertainties regarding a medical technology on an equal base. The focus within 
these discussions is on the relationship between the technical and the political 
within the knowledge claims. Exactly this interaction between different repertoires 
allows for contextualisation. Also, it allows for the debate of evidence or knowledge 
from different perspectives as well as existing uncertainties on this evidence and 
knowledge. Such debate, subsequently, leads to generation of new knowledge 
which in turn can make related decisions more socially robust (Moreira 2011).  
 
The exploration of uncertainty should be the core of health care priority setting 
systems and supplies increased social robustness (Moreira, May & Bond 2009; 
Bijker, Bal & Hendriks 2009). Especially, to gain legitimacy for decisions regarding 
medicines with much uncertainty, the co-production of knowledge can be a solution 
to derive at socially robust decisions. The current framework is limited in this 
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respect as it is based on the assumption that legitimacy can be gained and 
maintained by putting (knowledge of) clinical practice at a distance. These 
repertoires should not be added to the decision-framework as a separate criterion 
or a decision phase in order to complete or close this framework, but rather should 
find a place in the decision-making process in relevant situations. Health 
regulators, for example, could check what repertoires are relevant in the decision-
making process in order to integrate social, political, and ethical aspects of health 
technology in the evaluation of its worth. 
 
Despite the fact that this research is based in the Netherlands, it can be of value to 
other countries with regard to organizing reimbursement decision procedures and 
prioritization of medical technologies. Depending on the different political and 
institutional systems, other strategies for decision-making procedures and policy 
measures will be used. However, similar repertoires are likely to be found important 
to integrate in the decision-making procedures (see e.g. Moreira 2005 on NICE). In 
this paper, we have predominantly focused on CVZ, the benefit package manager, 
since it is responsible for constructing the decision-making process and decision-
framework. Yet, the relation between CVZ as benefit package manager and 
advisor to the Ministry of Health is worthwhile to examine further. The relationships 
between advisory agencies such as CVZ, NICE, FDA and a final decision-maker 
such as the Ministry of Health, NHS and Medicare / Medicaid respectively, might 
influence the potential of re-designing the prioritization decision infrastructure. 
There is space between the considerations in the assessment of a medicine and 
the ultimate political considerations regarding the final prioritization decisions. Note 
also that although we speak of “final” decisions, these merely define the preliminary 
end station of medicine’s reimbursement status until new evidence or uncertainties 
rise, requiring renewed analysis of the medicine’s value once more. 
 
In conclusion, we argue for a decision-making process in which different 
repertoires can interact when uncertainties arise, since the current benefit package 
management infrastructure insufficiently addresses how to promote the design of 
innovations that are likely to be more valuable than others (Lehoux 2006). Whether 
the products of HTA, the recommendations of appropriate drug reimbursement and 
use, are disseminated depends on the network of providers, consumers, 
manufacturers and the habits, routines, established practices, expertise, rules and 
laws that regulate the relations and interactions (Lehoux 2006; Edquist & Johnson 
1997). Yet, HTA as a means of implementing knowledge-based change within 
health care systems falls short since the linear, rationalistic process underlying the 
benefit package management fails to take into account its environment; to 
sufficiently seek dialogue with or consult the network, and to integrate related 
routines and regulation. Our analysis of the (interaction) between the different 
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repertoires provides insight in the infrastructure, its environment and regulatory 
mechanisms that may contribute to the implementation of reimbursement 
decisions. Yet, such an approach in the prioritization decision-making process 
requires the development of an alternative decision-making model. In this model 
the focus lies on providing a forum for different repertoires, and the potential 
discussion and co-production of knowledge between these repertoires, when 
necessary, even outside the borders of the formal organization of the decision-
making process. It is the process and the activity of decision-making that warrants 
the legitimacy of prioritization decisions and not the robustness of evidence or the 
formal procedure followed alone. 
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The research in this thesis has started with the question how current infrastructures 
govern appropriate medicine use and reimbursement and construct legitimacy for 
prioritization decisions. In my study, I was guided by a science and technology 
studies (STS) perspective. In particular, the notion of ‘infrastructure’ allowed for 
gaining insight in the practice of medicine evaluation. It is the infrastructural work in 
defining units to measure, putting into place a set of agreements embodied in 
practice that allows for priority setting, and defining appropriate use and 
reimbursement of medicines. I have studied the knowledge practices in 
prioritization decision-making processes, in order to gain insight in the different 
aspects of the work needed to legitimize decisions. In particular, I was interested in 
what kind of (new) forms of knowledge, objectivities and social relations are 
produced by the new approaches of the Dutch national government and the Health 
Care Insurance Board (CVZ) –an independent agency within arm's length of the 
national government- in governing appropriate medicine use and reimbursement. 
In this thesis, the different solutions to legitimize prioritization decisions enacted by 
Dutch decision-makers are explored. The questions addressed in this study were: 
 
 What work is conducted to legitimize decision-making regarding 
appropriate drug use and reimbursement? 
 How does the decision-making infrastructure, such as the conditional 
reimbursement regulations and databases, govern appropriate drug use 
and reimbursement in (clinical) practice? 
 What (new) forms of social relations, objectivity and knowledge does the 
benefit package management infrastructure produce, and how might this 
lead to new governing mechanisms of appropriate drug use and 
reimbursement? 
 
In the period 2003-2009, I conducted three case studies of drug reimbursement 
regulation and related policy tools: a) the conditional reimbursement of outpatient 
medicines, b) the conditional reimbursement of inpatient medicines and c) the 
exploration of the possible addition of a new explicit rationing criterion to the 
decision-framework for benefit package management –‘budget impact’. These case 
studies depict a continual quest for legitimate decision-making. Below, I will shortly 
present the findings of the previous five chapters in relation to the research 
questions, as articulated above. 
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Research findings 
How current infrastructure legitimizes prioritization decisions 
Dutch priority setting infrastructure presumes that its evidence based character, as 
well as a transparent and consistent decision procedure, result in legitimate 
decisions. Much effort has gone into the scientization and formalization of the 
decision-making process. Legitimizing decision-making, in these accounts, entails 
improving the transparent use of evidence to inform decision-making processes. 
However, despite the expansions of this infrastructure, the problem of legitimacy 
remains. 
 
Chapter one has set the stage for this thesis and indicated that for decision-makers 
to deal with the problem of medicines, appropriate use and reimbursement should 
be stimulated by making prioritization choices. The chapter depicted how Dutch 
government tried to cope with the exponential growth of health care costs relating 
to pharmacotherapy. The ‘regulation expensive medicines’ was introduced to aid 
hospitals in their financial distress. It listed several high costs medicines pressing 
on the hospital budget which were to be co-financed for 75% by the Dutch health 
insurers. Although this regulation provided (temporarily) relieve, it also had 
perverse effects. Pharmaceutical manufacturers now aimed at reaching the 
prognostic threshold of consuming at least 0,5% of the total pharmaceutical 
expenses of hospitals, to be incorporated on the regulation. Moreover, medical 
professionals argued that this co-financing would not solve the problem of high cost 
medicines and subsequently postcode prescribing. The solution should not be 
sought in improving technical efficiency –the more effective provision of care–, as 
has been the case in the 1980s and 1990s. But, the solution can be found in 
stimulating the productive efficiency –the maximization of health outcome for a 
given cost, or the minimization of cost for a given outcome. Productive efficiency 
leads to a better quality of health care provision, as well as sustainability of health 
care costs. In other words, the solution for governing appropriate medicine use and 
reimbursement lies in the use of scientific and clinical evidence in decision-making.  
 
In chapter two, I observed that the legitimacy of the conditional reimbursement tool 
was contested. The legitimacy of the instrument was sought in the evidence based 
decision-making, and subsequently controlling and sanctioning. CVZ relied on 
constructing evidence based boundaries in defining appropriate medicine use and 
reimbursement and subsequently expected these boundaries to be found 
legitimate by health insurers, medical professionals, pharmaceutical industry and 
patient organizations. Yet, health insurers and pharmaceutical industry disputed 
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the legitimacy of the policy tool, referring to the lack of transparency of the 
decision-making process and the lack of consistency in the use of decision criteria.  
 
Not only was the legitimacy of prioritization decisions sought in evidence based 
decision making, the decision framework was also made more precise by adding 
new criteria. Chapter three therefore focused on completing the decision 
framework, by exploring the possibility of making the budget impact criterion 
explicit by providing for a rationale. Budget impact’s implicit use and influence on 
decision-making has already been established in previous research (Van Luijn 
1999; Trueman, Drummond & Hutton 2001; Stolk, Brouwer & Busschbach 2002). 
The elaboration of the framework allowed for increased transparency, since the 
criteria upon which the decisions are based are made explicit. Four rationales were 
identified for considering the budget impact of new drugs when a reimbursement 
decision needs to be made: opportunity costs, loss aversion, decision uncertainty 
and equal opportunity. Whereas decision uncertainty seemed a plausible and 
pragmatic explanation for the implicit use of budget impact in the decision-making 
process (see also Koopmanschap, Stolk & Koolman 2010) it is especially the last 
rationale that might offer some ethical foundation from a societal perspective. The 
equal opportunity rationale reflects that people may strive for resource allocation 
fairness by some form of procedural justice that ensures availability of treatment for 
all.  
 
Despite the expansions of the decision-making infrastructure, the problem of 
legitimacy remained. For example, the ‘equal opportunity rationale’ for budget 
impact calls into question whether it is fair to allocate resources on the basis of a 
utilitarian principle alone. Implications for the decision framework will then go 
beyond the need to facilitate application of cost-effectiveness, and require 
rethinking of the basis for resource allocation decisions. If legitimate decision-
making consists of the use of explicit criteria and a completed decision framework, 
this has important consequences for the efficiency and complexity of the decision-
making process and might even decrease the legitimacy of priority setting decision-
making.  
How current policy tools and regulations govern appropriate medicine use 
and reimbursement in practice 
The current decision-making infrastructure assumes that by constructing evidence 
based boundaries to the reimbursement of a drug, the practice of prescribing by 
medical professionals and reimbursing by health insurers will be inclined to follow. 
My analyses in chapter two and four demonstrate how the current decision-making 
infrastructure indeed enables governing appropriate drug use and reimbursement. 
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Yet, not in the way health decision-makers had expected it would. Decision-makers 
expected strict control and real time monitoring to stop inappropriate medicine use. 
The conditional reimbursement regulations however provided new governing 
mechanisms in current decision-making infrastructure, i.e. a changed relationship 
between policy and practice and new forms of self-regulation of clinical practices. 
 
Chapter two gave a detailed example of the difference between the expected and 
developed practices. In this chapter, the outcomes of my analysis of conditional 
reimbursement as a policy tool for stimulating the appropriate prescription and 
reimbursement of outpatient medicines are described. Although in general the 
conditional reimbursement instrument was regarded by all stakeholders as 
promising, its execution in daily practice was lower than expected. In practice, the 
established evidence-based boundaries of appropriate medicine use, by specifying 
conditions for reimbursement, were crossed more often than anticipated. Analysis 
of expected versus observed volumes points at substantial unauthorized drug use 
in a number of cases. In contrast, medical professionals felt the regulation 
restricted the provision of appropriate care, which is supported by our findings that 
adherence to professional clinical guidelines is higher than to restrictions related to 
conditional reimbursement.  
 
Similarly, the production of evidence did not contribute to informing both policy and 
clinical practice as was expected. Chapter four explored and compared how two 
databases, the Growth Hormone Database and the PHAROS registry, were 
intended to be employed to control the use of growth hormone, Ibritumomab 
tiuxetan and Alemtuzumab. In my study, I analyzed how the two databases, that 
were part of the infrastructural work in defining units to measure, supported the 
production, maintenance and regulation of both policy and clinical practice. I 
showed that the databases did not dissolve the separation between policy and 
practice. The differences in the dynamics of policy- and clinical practices 
complicated the relationship. Policy rules and internal regulations in clinical 
practices differed in how quickly they could change. While the employment of 
databases in clinical practices resulted in a constant adjustment of the protocols, 
policy-makers required the databases to provide for static moments of ‘proven 
appropriate medicine use’, in order to account for and define a fixed and closed 
formulary.  
 
The conditional reimbursement regulations, however, also depicted a changed 
relationship between policy and practice and new forms of self-regulation of clinical 
practices. For example, chapter two demonstrated how the effect of the policy 
measure was connected to the informal work conducted during the decision-
making process. This informal work influenced clinical practice’s medicine 
Discussion and conclusion  
138 
prescription and the execution of the conditional reimbursement regulation. It 
consisted of shaping the reimbursement conditions based on, amongst others, the 
knowledge of policy executing stakeholders, such as medical professionals. Rather 
than monitoring, it is the extension and involvement of the actors, their objectives 
and their mutual relationships that seemed to affect the clinical practice of medicine 
prescriptions. This informal work changed the relationship between policy and 
practice. 
 
Likewise, the use of databases entailed a new governing mechanism (chapter 
four). Appropriate medicine use was not reached through direct steering on the 
outcomes of the databases. Instead, appropriate medicine use was reached 
indirectly, by stimulating data collection and the continuous reflection upon the data 
by researchers and clinicians. In fact, the prerequisite of data collection and 
storage shaped both the work of decision-makers and medical professionals. The 
norms and knowledge of medical professionals guided reimbursement decisions. 
Vice versa, health policy regulators codetermined what data needed to be 
collected. Subsequently, they were able to steer what information the medical 
professionals used to inform their practice. In both policy measures the new 
governing mechanisms have shifted focus towards collective forms of expertise, 
combining people (clinicians, researchers, administrators, patients, etc.) and 
objects (entities, instruments, tools, techniques, etc) and thus creating new types of 
(regulatory) objectivity. 
How the production of (new) forms of social relations, objectivity and 
knowledge, and new governing mechanisms of appropriate drug use and 
reimbursement, can contribute to legitimate decision-making  
Deconstructing the infrastructure of benefit package management has also allowed 
me to observe how the infrastructural work enabled the production of (new) forms 
of knowledge and objectivity to emerge. A decision-making infrastructure is an 
evolving structure, i.e. it embodies processes of discussion, negotiation and 
compilation that facilitate the emergence of new governing mechanisms. These 
new governing mechanisms have the potential to substantially contribute to 
legitimizing decisions as they focus on the process, the activity of decision-making.  
 
Chapter two, for example, demonstrated that the effect of conditional 
reimbursement was tied into the way prescribing conditions were developed, and 
how this informal work changed the relationship between policy and clinical 
practices. According to both policy-makers and medical professionals, the networks 
in which medical professionals, decision-makers and health insurers collaborated 
in establishing ‘appropriate drug use and reimbursement’, were regarded the most 
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successful knowledge infrastructures. For example, the medical professionals and 
health insurers regarded conditions for reimbursement as appropriate, when timely 
adjustments of the conditions were made possible. These timely adjustments were 
possible through the involvement of central assessment committees, incorporating 
both medical professionals and health insurer representatives. The committee kept 
the connection between policy and practice tight. 
 
The development of databases as a prerequisite for the reimbursement of 
expensive medicines, explored in chapter four, is another example of a new form of 
governing appropriate medicine use and reimbursement that contributed to 
legitimizing the decision-making on appropriate medicine use. The databases 
enabled the production of a new form of objectivity. The databases allowed for 
regulatory objectivity to emerge endogenously from clinical and research activities. 
To be able to produce evidence for appropriate medicine use the collectives set 
regulations in clinical practice; regulatory work became inherent and constitutive to 
clinical practice. Once the databases were turned into policy instruments, these 
internal regulations provided a framework for defining ‘appropriate medicine use’. 
In addition, the databases stimulated reflexivity as part of the continual 
development of clinical practice’s regulation. The collectively determined 
conventions only temporarily provided closure on the uncertainties related to the 
effective use of expensive pharmaceuticals in daily clinical practice. The constant 
adjustment of regulations now defined the relationship between policy and clinical 
practice. In fact, the dynamic process of continual data collection and reflexivity by 
medical professionals and researchers fulfilled the health regulators’ goal of 
stimulating appropriate medicine use and reimbursement in clinical practice during 
the three year period of data collection and contributed to legitimizing prioritization 
decision-making.  
 
Making use of the sociology of situated judgement in combination with science and 
technology studies, chapter five demonstrated that legitimizing decision-making 
has much to do with incorporating relevant repertoires. The evaluation of medicines 
can, in its’ pursuit of ‘objectivity’, not be seen separate from politics and morality. I 
identified four different repertoires used to evaluate a medicine in prioritization 
decision-making processes. These repertoires are labelled as the science, clinical 
practice, equity, and process repertoire. The different repertoires included different 
perspectives on what legitimate decision-making and decisions constitute of. These 
repertoires combined knowledge claims and conceptions of justice and fairness. 
Moreover, each repertoire had its own characteristics and dynamics, providing 
actors with symbols, stories, world views, material and organizational 
arrangements from which they could select different elements to shape and 
legitimize prioritization decision-making. Also, each repertoire entailed different 
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forms of knowledge, such as health economic, experiential, ethical, or 
methodological knowledge. The different forms of knowledge, in turn, attributed 
value to a medicine in terms of cost-effectiveness, effectiveness in daily practice, 
equal access and transparency of the decision-making process. For example, the 
repertoire of science lend heavily on systematic and objective evaluation of 
outcomes research information. Only an infrastructure with a complete and 
non-contradictory set of rational and evidence based decision rules, preferably 
including cost-effectiveness information based on randomized clinical trials, could 
legitimize decision-making. In contrast, the repertoire of equity was a dynamic and 
evolving repertoire. Knowledge was generated through continuous negotiations on 
how to define solidarity, for example, regarding life style diseases. These 
negotiations were less formal and less systematic. The acknowledgement of the 
diversity of forms of knowledge in the construction of medicine decisions, I argued, 
therefore might be a fundamental step in understanding the lack of impact of some 
of these decisions.  
 
The challenge for decision-makers to legitimize their decision-making, however, did 
not lie in merely presenting the different types of knowledge that shaped the 
attributed value to a prioritization decision. The challenge lied especially in 
combining these different repertoires, attributing weight to each repertoire and even 
co-producing new knowledge. In chapter five, I argued that the interaction between 
the different repertoires can lead to another hierarchy of evidence, since the 
certainty of the knowledge reflected as well as the situation in which the 
reimbursement decision should be executed is part of the discussion. Such a form 
of decision-making produces information that, in turn, entails a transformation of 
the medicine informed about. This leads to a different form of governing 
appropriate medicine use and reimbursement, and likely also leads to legitimizing 
decision-making. For example, uncertainty related to a medicine is not transformed 
into a certainty, yet becomes acknowledged. In turn, difficult decisions are 
acknowledged and not shoved away. Thus, legitimizing decision-making also 
depends on the co-production of knowledge on appropriate medicine use and 
reimbursement in the decision-making process. 
General discussion 
The aim of this thesis has been to enrich our understanding of decision-making in a 
context of scarce resources. Specifically, this thesis focused on the limits and 
possibilities of the current decision-making process on expensive drug regulations. 
Based on the findings described above, three main findings can be distilled. First, 
the benefit package management infrastructure struggles with the construction of 
two separate domains; policy and practice. The current infrastructure enacts an 
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artificial separation that shuts out knowledge from (clinical) practice in policy; it 
excludes morality and politics from decision-making. Second, legitimacy of 
decision-making is not something one can simply construct, but entails much work. 
Therefore, the legitimacy of prioritization decisions should be redefined towards the 
activity of legitimizing decision-making. Last, such a redefinition entails that 
reimbursement decisions are not regarded as the end of the decision-making 
process, yet as merely one, albeit important, point in the process of governing 
appropriate medicine use and reimbursement. 
 
First, the use of evidence in decision-making, and transparent decision-making 
procedures, have contributed to the perceived authority of health decision-makers, 
and therefore the acceptance and validity of their argumentation. The assessment 
of pharmaceutical care is increasingly being standardized, as if it is a model of 
reality which can be completed by adding criteria, disregarding the need for a 
situational approach when appropriate. This ‘instrumental rationality’ guiding the 
evidence based policy approach insufficiently takes into account that policy-makers 
have to make difficult decisions while dealing with moral and factual ambiguity 
(Sanderson 2006). In other words, the authority of science and its exclusive claim 
on knowledge about reality is at best only partly a solution to legitimize prioritization 
decisions.  
 
In addition, this thesis has showed that current infrastructure of benefit package 
management pays little attention to the management of diverging rationalities 
about (the value of) medicines. Yet, working towards legitimacy in decision-making 
is about constructing socially robust decisions. Dutch benefit package management 
infrastructure’s central political objectives are good and affordable care for all 
citizens. What is believed to be the public good ‘health care’ appears to be valued 
differently by different stakeholders.  
 
Although these problems with the infrastructure of benefit package management 
were acknowledged, the solutions were sought in more scientization and 
formalization. One of the solutions sought was, for example, optimizing the benefit 
package management system. Making an implicit rationing criterion explicit –see 
chapter three on budget impact– increased the decision-making process’ 
transparency. To legitimize decision-making through the use of scientific evidence 
and increasing transparency alone, within the current infrastructure, required 
further formalization of the reimbursement decision-making processes. It is 
questionable whether the continuous quest for transparency actually contributes to 
the efficiency and robustness of decision-making (cf. Bijker, Bal & Hendriks 2009).  
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Second, chapters four and five demonstrated how another perspective on the 
legitimacy of decision-making contributed to governing appropriate medicine use 
and reimbursement. Legitimizing decision-making was related to the acceptance 
and validity of the activity of decision-making. This approach acknowledged the 
importance of the way knowledge and knowledge infrastructures are shaped. It 
showed how a decision-making infrastructure is an evolving structure. An 
infrastructure embodies processes of discussion, negotiation and compilation that 
can facilitate the emergence of new governing mechanisms. These new governing 
mechanisms have the potential to substantially contribute to legitimize decision-
making.  
 
In chapter four, I demonstrated how the activity of legitimizing decision-making was 
not only found on a governmental level, e.g. within CVZ, but was also embodied in 
the different policy tools (cf. Bejerot & Hasselbladh 2011). These policy tools 
became a coordination regime, facilitating the interaction between the different 
stakeholders, especially policy, scientific and clinical practice, and objects, such as 
databases, evaluation techniques, etc. This interaction allowed for the emergence 
of new forms of objectivity and regulation. Regulatory objectivity, in essence, was 
shaped in the interaction between the policy practice of decision-making and 
clinical (research) work. It was based on findings in clinical work and transformed, 
through the use of databases, in information usable for scientific research as well 
as policy practice. In this process, appropriate medicine use was shaped. 
 
Acknowledging the diversity of repertoires in evaluating a medicine also contributed 
to the activity of legitimizing prioritization decision-making. The different repertoires 
led to different actions and decisions regarding appropriate drug use and 
reimbursement. In the incorporation of the different repertoires in decision-making, 
it was elementary to realize that the different repertoires entailed different 
appraisals of the value of a medical technology. The question “what medical 
technologies should be collectively paid for?” has multiple answers, since the 
domains of ethics, economics and quality are ranked and valued differently. These 
differently attributed values might even conflict or at least compete with one 
another for precedence. The acknowledgement of the diversity in different 
repertoires did not reduce the complexity of governing appropriate medicine use 
and reimbursement. Instead, it allowed for a more complete evaluation of a 
medicine, making use of relevant repertoires, when uncertainties regarding the 
value of a medicine arise.  
 
The different forms of knowledge and knowledge infrastructures affect the process 
of legitimizing decision-making. The different notions of knowledge (infrastructures) 
supporting and informing health care prioritization decision-making were illustrated 
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in both the interaction between policy, science and clinical practice (chapter four), 
and the analysis of the different repertoires used to appraise a medicine (chapter 
five). Understanding of the role of (socially robust) rationalities in decision-making, 
and continual reflection on the knowledge embedded in governing mechanisms, 
therefore is crucial. Reimbursement decisions were regarded as legitimate, when 
the underlying principles were perceived as just, fair, and transparent, and did not 
conflict with or neglected the existing repertoires. Moreover, the underlying 
principles were traceable in daily practice of appropriate medicine use and 
reimbursement too. They were woven into the interactions between medical 
professionals and health care reimbursement decision-makers and resulting 
governing mechanisms. Governing appropriate medicine use and reimbursement 
thus requires room for different repertoires and the potential discussion and co-
production of knowledge between these repertoires, when necessary even outside 
the borders of the formal organization of the decision-making process (cf. Moreira 
2011).  
 
Last, legitimizing decision-making entails that reimbursement decisions are merely 
one point in the process of governing appropriate medicine use and 
reimbursement. The inclusion, or exclusion, of a medicine in a pharmaceutical 
formulary, should be regarded as the start of the stimulation of appropriate 
medicine use and reimbursement. Shaping the appropriate use and reimbursement 
of pharmaceuticals requires a continual reflection on the effects of a medicine in 
daily practice, as well as the value attributed to the medicine. This study 
emphasized the need for new governing mechanisms of appropriate medicine use. 
Studied examples of new governing mechanisms, were based on the notion of 
‘regulatory objectivity’ and the acknowledgement of the different repertoires in 
attributing value to a medicine. This does not mean that, for example, the explored 
databases should stand model for constructing legitimacy of decisions, since this 
would require e.g. far-reaching standardization of care. Instead the governing 
mechanisms embodying interaction between policy and clinical practice, as 
depicted in the exploration of the conditional reimbursement regulations, however, 
should stand model for the activity of legitimizing prioritization decision-making. For 
example, whenever uncertainty arises about the value of a medicine, relevant 
repertoires –that combine people and objects–, such as the clinical practice 
repertoire, should find room in the decision-making process. Not as a separate 
phase, yet interacting with the other repertoires in the decision-making process, 
and in the further development of defining appropriate medicine use and 
reimbursement. 
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Implications for the evaluation of medicines 
Dutch government has responded on the quest for legitimacy with the collection of 
more scientific evidence and more transparency requirements. Completing the 
decision framework, however, as I argued, is not likely to increase its legitimacy. In 
spite of the above mentioned challenges, this quest for legitimacy is fed by a basic 
optimism about the role of scientific knowledge that remains embedded in western 
liberal democratic political systems (Sanderson 2006). The solution of complex 
social problems is believed to require “better evidence of ‘what works’ in terms of 
policy intervention, and more ‘rational’ policy-making processes in which such 
evidence can play a stronger role in policy decisions” (Sanderson 2006, p.124). 
There are at least two implications worth mentioning of this rational policy process 
model which can be distilled from this thesis. 
 
First, within this rational model, the focus is on improving the ‘instrumental’ use of 
research and evaluation (Sanderson 2006). Thus, the policy constructed at a 
distance of its execution not only provides legitimacy, but is expected to be 
executed in practice as well. However, currently, more and more health regulators 
feel the need to improve the dynamic nature of health regulation, of which 
conditional reimbursement regulations are good examples. At present, the way the 
benefit package management infrastructure is designed, does not allow for such 
transformation in steering appropriate drug use and reimbursement. The 
formulation of a benefit package with a positive list of medicines to be reimbursed 
requires ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decisions. The conditional reimbursement regulations already 
show a more dynamic nature of steering appropriate medicine use and 
reimbursement. However, in the end, they require a similar ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision. 
The steering mechanism based on regulatory objectivity, as shown in chapter four, 
indicates how appropriate medicine use and reimbursement can be stimulated and 
even somewhat controlled on a continual basis of reflection. A next step in further 
embracing these new forms of steering health care, I believe is worthwhile to 
experiment with, lies in making adjustments in the political system. For example, 
the ownership and thus financial responsibility of the databases, as discussed in 
chapter four, are heavily debated. The Ministry of Health’s financial support to 
stimulate the development of these databases is crucial. It allows for generating 
data that stimulates reflection about appropriate medicine use in clinical practice. 
Moreover, it stimulates clinical practice and policy to co-produce knowledge on 
appropriate medicine use and reimbursement. Although these new governing 
mechanisms and adjustments of the political system sound as drastic changes, 
they are mostly a continuation of the process of incremental changes in the health 
system and governing the collective funding of public goods. 
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Secondly, the rational process of decision-making consists of different phases in 
determining the policy problem, the appropriate measures and subsequently their 
implementation and sometimes also their evaluation. Moreover, this rational model 
of policy-making sees the different phases in decision-making as sequential and 
unequivocally separate (Bal 2006). This can be illustrated by the division of the 
drug reimbursement decision-making process in a technical assessment, followed 
by a societal appraisal phase. The inclusion of an appraisal committee, reflecting 
upon any societal considerations to trump or deviate from the preliminary decision 
in the technology assessment phase, bears witness of gained insight in the action 
of legitimate and effective decision-making. However, currently this appraisal 
committee is seen as a final hurdle in the process of formulating an advice to the 
Ministry of Health about the admission of a medical technology. Yet, in this final 
phase, it appears that much debate concerns the validity or even existence of 
evidence in the assessment phase (based on observations of ACP meetings). If 
the societal appraisal, or even other relevant repertoires, would be better integrated 
or valued in the decision-making process, its efficiency might be improved, as well 
as its legitimacy and effectiveness. 
 
A more dynamic and reflective regulation of drug reimbursement, might even be a 
logical continuation of already existing processes. In this dynamic and reflective 
regulation, the various repertoires gain importance, and infrastructures for 
stimulating appropriate medicine use and reimbursement are (further) constructed. 
The PHAROS database is exemplary for a new form of governing medicines based 
on the notion of regulatory objectivity. Making use of a knowledge infrastructure 
that requires continual reflection on the relevant knowledge for the decision-making 
process is the essential element. The evidence used exists, on the one hand, of 
objects, such as databases or RCT's and outcomes research. On the other hand, it 
consists of the interpretation and reflection, by medical professionals or other 
relevant repertoire owners, on this evidence. The type of data to be collected is 
discussed between policy and clinical practice. This discussion takes place, both in 
the process towards the data collection, and during the data collection period itself. 
The discussion and negotiation allows for the emergence of a new steering mode, 
contributing to the objectification and regulation of appropriate medicine use and 
reimbursement. Note, this does not take away the importance of a proper 
technology assessment and the need for a prioritization decision framework. On 
the contrary, both scientization and formalization have enormously contributed to 
constructing legitimacy in prioritization decision-making. However, further 
optimizing current decision-making infrastructure, I have demonstrated, should not 
be sought in the robustness of evidence or the formal procedure. Further 
optimizing prioritization decision-making should be sought in the process and the 
activity of decision-making. Whereas in 1998 Holm argued for the second phase of 
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priority setting activities, entailing the realization that simple solutions for priority 
setting are flawed and focusing on the priority setting process itself and its 
transparency, I argue for a third phase of priority setting activities (Holm et al. 
1998). In this third phase, prerequisites for a good evaluation of medicines are the 
incorporation of relevant repertoires, especially that of clinical practice, when 
uncertainty about a medicine’s appropriate use and reimbursement in practice 
arises, and (the stimulation of) the interaction between the different repertoires 
allowing for the co-production of new knowledge on appropriate medicine use and 
reimbursement. 
 
More general, this thesis demonstrates how social sciences can provide insight in 
the use of knowledge in decision-making infrastructures. Social scientific research 
and evaluation of decision-making in complex situations, develops knowledge 
about how and why policy measures do, or do not, ‘work’. It addresses questions 
such as: Is it possible to define a decision framework for the prioritization and 
allocation of scarce resources in such way it strikes the right balance between the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the policy decisions? Or, do the continuous 
legitimizing problems of policy-makers require another perspective on the creation 
and use of scientific evidence, objectivity and transparency? These questions entail 
the exploration of the prerequisites for legitimate and effective policy measures. 
Policy experiments can provide input for social scientific research, such as the 
exploration of the databases in the conditional reimbursement regulation. This type 
of research, as conducted in this thesis, does not focus on the management or 
organization of public service agencies, but focuses on the activity of making policy 
measures effective and legitimate. Similar research has proven fruitful in exploring 
the construction and use of prescription data, by pharmacists and GPs, as 
performance indicators in The Netherlands. In their study on performance 
measurement by local pharmaceutical consultation groups, De Bont & Grit (2012) 
opened up the black box of the performance indicator, by focusing on the active 
role of the measurements in governing rational drug use. Subsequently, they “were 
able to describe the advantages of a simple and general measurement to 
performance management in comparison to a more extensive set of performance 
indicators”. Exactly this understanding of the role of scientific evidence and other 
(socially robust) knowledges in decision-making, and the way the influence of these 
knowledges is prioritized, is highly relevant in current organization and 
management of the health care arena.  
Research reflections 
The combination of research material gained through both qualitative and 
quantitative methods has not only proved to be fruitful, yet included much and 
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complex work as well. It is exactly this aspect of my research I would like to reflect 
upon in the final pages of my thesis. Especially, since believing in the 
incompatibility of the quantitative and qualitative research paradigms and 
associated methods, is still much alive in the science practices informing health 
policy. The approach taken in this thesis is a qualitative one. The rigour of my 
analysis and findings is not based on systematically testing and empirically 
justifying a hypothesis. The quality of my research is safeguarded by strategies 
such as triangulation and member checking. However, throughout my research 
period, I was able to observe and actively participate in the two research cultures. 
The question how to collect and analyze data on the Dutch drug reimbursement 
decision-making process, to gain insight in legitimate and effective decision-
making, has resulted in interesting debates and research struggles. These 
struggles were not only fed by the different methodological approaches, but most 
often by the different perspectives on how, and in what way, social sciences should 
inform health policy decision-making. Like Lehoux (2006), who claims that in her 
research on ‘The problem of Health Technology’ she worked on border zones of 
various research domains (industrial design, public health, epistemology, sociology 
of science and technology, etc.), I have been looking for insights resulting from 
combining the border zones of health economics and STS. Working with and 
observing my colleagues from the disciplines of health economics and STS has 
taught me that holding on to, for example, the principle of ’multiple realities’; “the 
contradictory, but equally valid accounts of the same phenomenon”, is worthwhile 
but entails challenges in working together too (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004, 
p.16).  
 
It is not the associated methods with the research paradigms that caused debates 
in the teams I worked with, but much more the underlying principles on the position 
of science in (re)constructing reality to inform the public at large, fellow 
researchers, policy etc. From a quantitative research paradigm, in specific the 
health economics it is up to the decision-makers to decide upon the research’s 
value to the policy. Once research is conducted and its results and underlying 
principles presented, the work of the researchers is finished. From a qualitative 
research paradigm, in specific in STS, it is exactly the interaction between the 
researcher and policy-makers which attracts a lot of attention. Therefore, I claim it 
is not the incompatibility between the qualitative and quantitative research 
paradigm the discussion should focus on, but on the discussion how the combined 
efforts will likely contribute to informing health policy. 
 
For future mixed method research projects, I would advice to acknowledge these 
fundamental differences early in the research process and make them part of joint 
discussion. It is wise to try to establish a basic set of agreed principles, and 
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subsequently methodological strategies to allow for a better mix of combined 
research methods and paradigms. Integrating data and findings from both 
qualitative and quantitative research in one study has proven rather difficult. 
Discussing methodological strategies might aid in improving such integration. 
However, the underlying discussion on the principles and focus on the purpose and 
concept of science should not be forgotten. Nevertheless, in practice, mixed 
method research remains difficult; O’Cathain et al. (2008) show how many 
“researchers mainly ignore the mixed methods design and only describe the 
separate components of a study” (O'Cathain, Murphy & Nicholl 2008, p.92). 
Though the promise of mixed methods research, an opportunity for synthesis of 
research traditions and insights a mono approach would not achieve, is worthwhile 
to pursuit for, especially in complex research arenas such as health care. 
Final conclusion 
In this thesis, I have analyzed several solutions searched for by Dutch health 
policy-makers to complete the decision framework, as well as analyzed new 
approaches taken in drug reimbursement decision-making processes. In particular, 
I explored the –knowledge– practices in prioritization decision-making processes, 
to gain insight in the different aspects of the work needed to legitimize prioritization 
decisions. This exploration has led to three main findings. First, the benefit 
package management infrastructure struggles with the construction of two separate 
domains; policy and practice. The current infrastructure enacts an artificial 
separation that shuts out knowledge from (clinical) practice in policy; it excludes 
morality and politics from decision-making. Second, legitimacy of decision-making 
is not something one can simply construct, yet legitimizing prioritization decision-
making entails much work. Therefore, the legitimacy of prioritization decisions 
should be redefined towards the activity of legitimizing the decision-making. Last, 
such a redefinition entails that reimbursement decisions are not regarded as the 
end of the decision-making process, yet as merely one point in the process of 
governing appropriate medicine use and reimbursement. These findings 
demonstrated that the search for improving prioritization decision-making should 
make room for the insights of the social scientific discipline in the understanding of 
legitimizing decision-making. Further social scientific research on the infrastructure 
of benefit package management can contribute to insights in how current benefit 
package infrastructure can be organized in a way the interaction between the 
different repertoires becomes part of the evaluation of medicines. The incorporation 
of, amongst others, lay knowledge in the debate on the value of a medicine, I 
demonstrated, legitimizes the prioritization decision to be made. Therefore, an 
exploration of the possibility of a ‘co-production of knowledge’-model in Dutch 
benefit package management system, could be a next step in legitimizing the drug 
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reimbursement decision-making processes. A ‘co-production of knowledge’-model, 
for example, allows for the ad hoc inclusion of public debate on controversial health 
technology decisions (Moreira 2011). 
 
To end, this thesis demonstrated that working towards legitimacy entails a different 
approach to governing appropriate medicine use and reimbursement. In this 
approach, the drug reimbursement process is not the end, but merely the 
beginning of legitimating prioritization decisions. This requires an infrastructure of 
benefit package management that is (re)designed to stimulate a continual 
interaction between policy, science and (clinical) practice, to reflect upon 
appropriate medicine use. Acknowledging the diversity of forms of knowledge in 
legitimizing prioritization decision-making, is a fundamental step in establishing 
new governing mechanisms for appropriate medicine use and reimbursement. In 
the end, it is the process and the activity of decision-making that warrants the 
legitimacy of prioritization decisions and not the robustness of evidence or formal 
procedure followed alone. 
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The research in this thesis starts with the question how current infrastructure of 
benefit package management governs appropriate medicine use and 
reimbursement, and constructs legitimacy for prioritization decisions. In this thesis, 
the Dutch drug reimbursement decision-making and related policy instruments are 
studied. The sharp rise of both the costs of (innovative) medicines and the ageing 
population put pressure on the entire health system. Consequently, there is a need 
for priority-setting. Governments try to ensure that the scarce resources available 
to health care are put to optimal use. The priorities for the allocation of scarce 
resources, such as medicines, are set via principles, values and/or defining 
practices. Given what is at stake for patients affected by reimbursement decisions, 
governmental regulators are also expected to establish legitimacy of their decision-
making. Legitimacy of decision-making entails that the public considers the 
decision-making -framework, -process and -outcomes, to be just or socially robust. 
Currently, governmental decision-makers shape the legitimacy of decision-making 
via the scientization and formalization of the decision-making process. Accordingly, 
the decision-making infrastructure is expanded. Despite these expansions, the 
problem of legitimacy remains; e.g. the evidence based boundaries to the 
reimbursement of a drug are disputed by medical professionals and health 
insurers, and do not incline (clinical) practice to follow. Therefore, this thesis 
demonstrates, another perspective on the legitimacy of decision-making is needed 
in order to contribute to governing appropriate medicine use and reimbursement. A 
decision-making infrastructure is an evolving structure; i.e. it embodies processes 
of discussion, negotiation and compilation that facilitate the emergence of new 
governing mechanisms. These new governing mechanisms have the potential to 
substantially contribute to legitimizing decisions as they focus on the process, the 
activity of decision-making.  
 
In chapters one, two and three, current medicine regulations and decision 
framework are explored and evaluated, in order to understand how scientization 
and formalization stimulate appropriate medicine use and reimbursement. This 
evaluation demonstrates that the execution of health regulations in daily practice 
deviates substantially from the intended policy and its underlying principles. 
Current infrastructure of benefit package management pays little attention to the 
management of diverging rationalities about (the value of) medicines. Therefore, it 
does not come as a surprise that health regulators still experience difficulties 
explaining the basis for their drug reimbursement decisions. The expansions of the 
decision-making infrastructure do not seem to have solved the problem of 
legitimacy. At least, not in the sense of socially robust prioritization decisions. In 
chapters four and five, this thesis focuses on the (knowledge) practices and the 
Dutch benefit package management infrastructure, making use of a social scientific 
perspective. The analyses in these chapters show that policy and clinical practice 
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are working towards legitimacy in decision-making. Yet, not in the way decision-
makers had expected, through strict control and monitoring. But, by shifting focus 
towards the process of decision-making; by stimulating the interaction between 
policy, science and practice as well as acknowledging the different rationalities in 
prioritization decision-making. 
 
Chapter one depicts how Dutch government has tried to cope with the exponential 
growth of health care costs relating to inpatient pharmacotherapy in the late 
1990’s. Dutch government aimed to solve the cost problem in the inpatient 
pharmaceutical care sector, through regulating the (additional) financing of 
expensive inpatient medicines and transferring responsibility of access to care to 
health insurers and hospitals. Yet (clinical) practice depicts this policy as 
inadequate and potentially leading to legitimacy problems regarding the equal 
distribution of care. Thus, despite the efforts of health regulators, the expensive 
medicines regulation did not have the desired effects. Next, this chapter points at 
the call by both policy makers and medical professionals for the development of 
more evidence based policy and evidence based mechanisms in order to gain 
legitimacy for decision-making. Making evidence based prioritization choices is 
thought to stimulate appropriate medicine use and reimbursement in practice. 
 
In chapter two the evaluation of the conditional reimbursement of outpatient 
medicines as a policy tool, shows that evidence based decision-making does not 
automatically lead to appropriate medicine use and reimbursement in clinical 
practice. The Health Care Insurance Board, an independent agency within arm’s 
length of Dutch government, responsible for the benefit package management, 
focuses on defining and stimulating appropriate medicine use and reimbursement. 
In order to promote effective and efficient use of certain pharmaceuticals, the 
reimbursement of a medicine is made conditional to specific criteria or rules (e.g. 
specific patient groups and health providers). Mostly, conditions apply to those 
drugs that are considered expensive and/or have a risk of inappropriate use. 
Conditions are defined to limit off-label drug use and promote drug use for 
indications where effectiveness has been established. This evidence based 
character of the conditions should warrant the policy tool’s legitimacy. Additionally, 
the Health Care Insurance Board expects that the scientization of the decision-
making inclines the practice of prescribing (medical professionals) and reimbursing 
(health insurers) to follow. However, health insurers and pharmaceutical industry 
contest the legitimacy of the conditional reimbursement policy tool. They refer to 
the lack of transparency of the decision process and the lack of consistency in the 
use of decision criteria. In practice, it appears, the evidence based conditions for 
appropriate medicine use and reimbursement are crossed more often than 
anticipated. Instead, the cases that include knowledge from policy executing 
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stakeholders, such as medical professionals, to formulate the reimbursement 
conditions, are regarded as examples of legitimate decision-making. These cases 
also prove rather influential on clinical practice’s medicine prescription. This 
chapter therefore shows that the amount of effect of the policy measure is not 
attributed to its evidence based character, yet to the way the conditions for 
reimbursement are developed and executed. The latter involves a changed relation 
between policy and practice.  
 
Not only was the legitimacy of prioritization decisions sought in evidence based 
decision making, the decision framework was also made more precise by adding 
new criteria. Chapter three therefore focused on completing the decision 
framework, by exploring the possibility of making the budget impact criterion 
explicit by providing for a rationale. Whereas the current Dutch decision framework 
explicitly entails the criteria of effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and severity of 
illness, the role of budget impact remains less obvious. Explicating budget impact 
as a rationing criterion, assumes that this explication contributes to the 
transparency of the decision process and therefore the accountability of the 
decision-makers. This chapter identifies four rationales for considering budget 
impact in reimbursement decision-making: opportunity costs, loss aversion, 
decision uncertainty and equal opportunity. Especially equal opportunity might offer 
some ethical foundation. Equal opportunity reflects that people may strive for 
resource allocation fairness by some form of procedural justice that ensures 
availability of treatment for all. Yet, this particular rationale for budget impact calls 
into question if it is fair to allocate resources on the basis of a utilitarian principle 
alone –the ethical foundation for the cost-effectiveness criterion. Implications for 
the decision framework will then go beyond the need to facilitate application of 
cost-effectiveness, and require rethinking of the basis for resource allocation 
decisions. Provided that legitimate decision-making consists of the use of explicit 
criteria and a complete decision framework, the acknowledgement of budget 
impact as an explicit rationing criterion has important consequences for the 
efficiency and complexity of the decision process. It might even decrease the 
legitimacy of priority setting decision-making. Thus, despite the expansions of the 
decision-making infrastructure, the problem of legitimacy remains. 
 
Chapter four demonstrates how the activity of legitimate decision-making is found 
on a governmental level, and simultaneously is embodied in its policy tools, such 
as the databases. The exploration of the Growth Hormone database and PHAROS 
registry shows whether and how the efforts to accumulate and organize clinical 
data and the increasing use of databases in clinical, research and policy practices 
have transformed the regulation of clinical practices. We demonstrate how 
databases have become a coordination regime. The databases facilitate both, the 
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interaction between policy and clinical practice, and the interaction between 
collective forms of expertise. The latter entails the combining of people (clinicians, 
researchers, administrators, patients, etc.) and objects (entities, instruments, tools, 
techniques, etc). These interactions allow for the emergence of new forms of 
objectivity and regulation, such as regulatory objectivity. Subsequently, the 
relationship between clinical and policy practice is reconfigured. Although the 
databases do not allow for real time monitoring as expected by the health 
regulators, the dynamic process of continual data collection and reflexivity by 
medical professionals and researchers does fulfil the health regulators’ goal of 
stimulating appropriate medicine use and reimbursement in clinical practice. By 
adapting new governing mechanisms, such as databases, in current decision-
making infrastructure, it becomes possible to stimulate appropriate medicine use 
and reimbursement in clinical practice and concurrently facilitate working towards 
legitimate decision-making.  
 
Chapter five combines and explores the three case studies within this thesis: a) 
the conditional reimbursement of medicines in the outpatient setting, b) the 
conditional reimbursement of medicines in the inpatient setting, and c) the possible 
addition of a new rationing criterion to the decision-framework for benefit package 
management; ‘budget impact’. The cases are explored and analysed with respect 
to the dynamics of legitimate decision-making from a situational approach to 
regulatory behaviour. The sociology of situated judgement provides insight in the 
process and the different ways actors legitimate their action of decision–making, 
and has contributed to the definition of a framework of different ‘repertoires of 
justification’. Each repertoire has its own characteristics and dynamics, providing 
actors with symbols, stories, world views, material and organizational 
arrangements from which they can select different elements to justify their action. 
The conception of the repertoires is used to identify four different repertoires of 
evaluation in Dutch drug reimbursement decision processes: the science, clinical 
practice, equity, and process repertoire. Each repertoire entails different forms of 
knowledge (such as tacit, clinical, methodological, health economic knowledge) 
which in turn attribute value to a pharmaceutical (decision). Based on the 
identification of these repertoires, this chapter demonstrates that legitimacy in 
practice is closely related to the interaction between the repertoires and the context 
influencing what (combination of) repertoires can produce legitimacy at a certain 
point in the decision process.  Therefore, the (lack of) impact of some prioritization 
decisions can be understood by the (insufficient) incorporation and interaction of 
the different repertoires in the decision process. Finally, we argue for a decision 
process that sufficiently takes into account its environment when uncertainties 
arise; seeking dialogue with or consultation of the network, integrate related 
routines and regulation. 
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In the discussion and conclusion this thesis reflects upon the question how 
current benefit package management infrastructure governs appropriate medicine 
use and reimbursement and constructs legitimacy for prioritization decisions. The 
evaluation and exploration of the different policy tools have led to three main 
findings. First, the benefit package management infrastructure struggles with the 
construction of two separate domains; policy and practice. The current 
infrastructure enacts an artificial separation that shuts out knowledge from (clinical) 
practice in policy; it excludes morality and politics from decision-making. The use of 
evidence in decision-making, and transparent decision-making procedures, have 
contributed to the perceived authority of health decision-makers, and therefore the 
acceptance and validity of their argumentation. Yet, little attention is paid to the 
management of diverging rationalities about (the value of) medicines. Second, 
legitimacy of decision-making is not something one can simply construct, but 
entails much work. Legitimizing decision-making is related to the acceptance and 
validity of the activity of decision-making. Last, such a redefinition entails that 
reimbursement decisions are not regarded as the end of the decision-making 
process, yet as merely one, albeit important, point in the process of governing 
appropriate medicine use and reimbursement. The inclusion, or exclusion, of a 
medicine in a formulary by the Ministry of Health is the beginning of the stimulation 
of appropriate medicine use and reimbursement.  
 
To end, this thesis demonstrates that working towards legitimacy entails a different 
approach to governing appropriate medicine use and reimbursement. In this 
approach, the drug reimbursement process is not the end, but merely the 
beginning of legitimating prioritization decisions. This requires an infrastructure of 
benefit package management that is (re)designed to stimulate a continual 
interaction between policy, science and (clinical) practice, to reflect upon 
appropriate medicine use. Acknowledging the diversity of forms of knowledge in 
legitimizing prioritization decision-making, is a fundamental step in establishing 
new governing mechanisms for appropriate medicine use and reimbursement. In 
the end, it is the process and the activity of decision-making that warrants the 
legitimacy of prioritization decisions and not the robustness of evidence or formal 
procedure followed alone. 
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Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift start met de vraag hoe de huidige infrastructuur 
van pakketbeheer het gepast gebruik en vergoeden van geneesmiddelen stuurt, en 
legitimiteit van prioriteringsbeslissingen construeert. Dit proefschrift bestudeert de 
besluitvorming van geneesmiddelenvergoedingen en gerelateerde 
beleidsinstrumenten. Zowel de sterke stijging in de kosten van (innovatieve) 
geneesmiddelen en de vergrijzende populatie drukken op het gehele 
gezondheidszorgstelsel. Hierdoor is er een noodzaak tot prioritering. Overheden 
proberen te waarborgen dat de schaarse middelen die beschikbaar zijn binnen de 
gezondheidzorg ook optimaal worden ingezet. De prioritering van de allocatie van 
deze schaarse middelen, zoals geneesmiddelen, wordt vastgesteld aan de hand 
van principes, waarden en/of het definiëren van praktijken. Aangezien er voor die 
patiënten die geraakt worden door de vergoedingenbeslissingen heel wat op het 
spel staat, moeten beleidsmakers zich ook verantwoorden voor de legitimiteit van 
de genomen beslissingen. Legitimiteit van besluitvorming houdt in dat de 
beslissingscriteria, het proces en de uitkomsten van de besluitvorming door het 
publiek gezien worden als rechtvaardig of sociaal robuust. Op dit moment wordt de 
legitimiteit van besluitvorming vormgegeven door de verwetenschappelijking en 
formalisering van het besluitvormingsproces. Zodoende wordt de 
besluitvormingsinfrastructuur volgens deze structuur uitgebreid. Ondanks deze 
uitbreidingen, blijft het legitimiteitprobleem bestaan; bv. de evidence based 
condities voor geneesmiddelenvergoedingen worden door medische professionals 
en zorgverzekeraars betwist en dragen niet bij aan het volgen van de regelgeving 
in de (klinische) praktijk. Daarom laat dit proefschrift zien dat een ander perspectief 
op legitimiteit van besluitvorming nodig is om bij te dragen aan het sturen van het 
gepast gebruik en vergoeden van geneesmiddelen. Een 
besluitvormingsinfrastructuur is een evoluerende structuur; i.e. het belichaamt 
processen van discussie, onderhandeling en compilatie die de opkomst van 
nieuwe sturingsmechanismen vergemakkelijken. Deze nieuwe 
sturingsmechanismen hebben de potentie substantieel bij te dragen aan het 
legitimeren van beslissingen, omdat deze focussen op het proces, de activiteit 
besluitvorming. 
 
In de hoofdstukken een, twee en drie, zijn hedendaagse 
geneesmiddelenregulering en beoordelingskader onderzocht en geëvalueerd, met 
als doel inzicht te krijgen in hoe verwetenschappelijking en formalisering van 
besluitvorming bijdragen aan de stimulering van gepast gebruik en vergoeden van 
geneesmiddelen. De evaluatie laat zien dat de uitvoering van 
gezondheidsregulering in de dagelijkse praktijk substantieel blijkt af te wijken van 
het beoogde beleid en haar onderliggende principes. De huidige infrastructuur van 
pakketbeheer schenkt weinig aandacht aan het beheer van de uiteenlopende 
rationaliteit ten aanzien van (de waarde van) geneesmiddelen. Daarom is het 
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weinig verrassend dat beleidsmakers nog altijd moeilijkheden ervaren in het 
uitleggen van de grondslagen van de geneesmiddelenvergoedingen besluiten. De 
uitbreidingen van de besluitvormingsinfrastructuur hebben niet voldoende 
bijgedragen aan het oplossen van het legitimiteitprobleem. Althans, geen 
legitimiteit in de zin van sociaal robuuste prioriteringsbesluitvorming. Vervolgens 
focust dit proefschrift, in de hoofdstukken vier en vijf, specifiek op de (kennis) 
praktijk en (de ontwikkeling van) de infrastructuur van het Nederlands 
pakketbeheer, gebruik makend van een sociaalwetenschappelijk perspectief. De 
analyses laten zien dat beleid en klinische praktijk werken naar legitimiteit in 
besluitvorming. Echter, niet op de wijze zoals verwacht door de beleidsmakers, 
strikte controle en monitoren. Maar, door de focus te verleggen naar het proces 
van besluitvorming; door de interactie tussen beleid, wetenschap en praktijk te 
stimuleren, en de verschillende rationaliteiten in de prioriteringsbesluitvorming te 
erkennen. 
 
Hoofdstuk één laat zien hoe de Nederlandse overheid heeft geprobeerd om te 
gaan met de exponentiële groei in gezondheidszorgkosten gerelateerd aan de 
ziekenhuisgeneesmiddelen eind jaren negentig vorige eeuw. De Nederlandse 
overheid beoogde het kostenprobleem op te lossen in de farmaceutische 
ziekenhuiszorg sector door middel van de regulering van (additionele) financiering 
van dure ziekenhuisgeneesmiddelen en het overhevelen van de 
verantwoordelijkheid van de toegang tot zorg naar de zorgverzekeraars en 
ziekenhuizen. Echter, de (klinische) praktijk beschrijft dit beleid als inadequaat en 
mogelijk leidend tot legitimiteitproblemen ten aanzien van de gelijkwaardige 
verdeling van zorg. Ondanks de inspanningen van de beleidsmakers had de dure 
geneesmiddelen regulering niet het gewenste effect. Vervolgens, duidt dit 
hoofdstuk de roep van zowel beleidsmakers and medische professionals om de 
ontwikkeling van meer evidence based beleid en evidence based mechanismen 
om de legitimiteit van besluitvorming te vergroten. Door evidence based 
prioriteringsbeslissingen te maken zou het gepast gebruik en vergoeden van 
geneesmiddelen in de praktijk worden gestimuleerd. 
 
In hoofdstuk twee laat de evaluatie van het conditioneel vergoeden van 
extramurale geneesmiddelen als beleidsinstrument zien dat evidence based 
besluitvorming niet automatisch leidt tot gepast gebruik en vergoeden van 
geneesmiddelen in de (klinische) praktijk. Het College voor zorgverzekeringen, een 
onafhankelijke overheidsorganisatie verantwoordelijk voor het pakketbeheer in 
Nederland, focust op het definiëren en stimuleren van gepast gebruik en 
vergoeden van geneesmiddelen. Om het effectieve en efficiënt gebruik van 
bepaalde geneesmiddelen te promoten, zijn aan de vergoeding van deze 
medicijnen voorwaarden verbonden (bv. specifieke patiëntengroepen en 
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zorgverleners). Veelal zijn voorwaarden verbonden aan de vergoeding van die 
geneesmiddelen die gezien worden als duur en/of een risico op oneigenlijk gebruik 
hebben. De voorwaarden worden gesteld om zo het off-label medicijngebruik te 
beperken en het gebruik voor indicaties waarvan de effectiviteit is vastgesteld te 
promoten. Het evidence based karakter van de condities zou de legitimiteit van het 
beleidsinstrument moeten waarborgen. Daarbij verwacht het College voor 
zorgverzekeringen dat, door de verwetenschappelijking van de besluitvorming, 
voorschrijvers en zorgverzekeraars het beleid zullen volgen. Echter, 
zorgverzekeraars en farmaceutische industrie betwisten de legitimiteit van de 
conditionele geneesmiddelenvergoeding. Zij refereren hierbij naar het gebrek aan 
transparantie van het besluitvormingsproces en het gebrek in consistentie in het 
gebruik van de beoordelingscriteria. In de praktijk, zo blijkt, worden de evidence 
based condities voor gepast gebruik en vergoeden van geneesmiddelen vaker 
overschreden dan verwacht. De cases waarbij kennis vanuit beleidsuitvoerders 
(zoals medische professionals) wordt gebruikt in het formuleren van de 
vergoedingsvoorwaarden, worden vaker gezien als voorbeelden van legitieme 
besluitvorming. Deze cases blijken bovendien ook meer invloed te hebben op de 
voorschrijfpraktijk. Dit hoofdstuk laat dientengevolge zien dat de mate van effect 
van een beleidsmaatregel niet is verbonden aan het evidence based karakter van, 
maar aan de wijze waarop vergoedingsvoorwaarden zijn ontwikkeld en uitgevoerd. 
Het laatste houdt in dat de relatie tussen beleid en praktijk verandert. 
 
Niet alleen werd de legitimiteit van prioriteringsbeslissingen gezocht in evidence 
based besluitvorming, het beoordelingskader werd ook verfijnd door nieuwe criteria 
toe te voegen. Hoofdstuk drie focust daarom op het complementeren van het 
beoordelingskader. Het exploreert de mogelijkheid om van budget impact een 
expliciet criterium te maken door deze van een onderbouwing te voorzien. Het 
huidige beoordelingskader omvat de criteria effectiviteit, kosteneffectiviteit en 
ziektelast. De rol van budget impact in dit kader is minder duidelijk. Met het 
expliciteren van budget impact als beoordelingscriterium wordt verondersteld dat 
explicitering bijdraagt aan de transparantie van het besluitvormingsproces en 
daarmee de verantwoording van de beleidsmakers. Dit hoofdstuk identificeert vier 
grondgedachten voor de inachtneming van budget impact in vergoedingen 
besluitvorming: opportuniteitskosten, het vermijden van verlies, onzekerheid in 
besluitvorming en gelijke gelegenheid. Vooral de grondgedachte van gelijke 
gelegenheid kan een ethische grondslag bieden voor het opnemen van budget 
impact als beoordelingscriterium in de besluitvorming. Gelijke gelegenheid houdt in 
dat mensen streven naar een rechtvaardige allocatie van middelen op basis van 
een procedurele rechtmatigheid dat een beschikbaarheid van behandeling voor 
allen waarborgt. Echter, deze specifieke grondgedachte voor budget impact 
betwijfelt ook of het rechtvaardig is om middelen te verdelen op basis van een 
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utilistisch principe alleen (de ethische grondslag voor het 
kosteneffectiviteitcriterium). Indien de legitimiteit van besluitvorming bestaat uit het 
gebruik van expliciete beoordelingscriteria en een compleet beoordelingskader, 
heeft de inclusie van budget impact als expliciet criterium belangrijke 
consequenties voor de efficiëntie en complexiteit van het besluitvormingsproces. 
De inclusie zou zelfs de legitimiteit van prioriteringsbesluitvorming mogelijk doen 
afnemen. Dus, ondanks de uitbreiding van de besluitvormingsinfrastructuur, blijft 
het legitimiteitprobleem bestaan. 
 
Hoofdstuk vier laat zien hoe de activiteit van legitieme besluitvorming zichtbaar is 
bij de overheid, en tevens is ingebed in beleidsinstrumenten als geneesmiddelen 
databases in de praktijk. De exploratie van de Groeihormoon database en 
PHAROS register demonstreert, of en hoe de inspanningen om klinische data te 
verzamelen en organiseren, én het toegenomen gebruik van databases in 
klinische-, onderzoek- en beleidspraktijken, de regulering van klinische praktijken 
heeft getransformeerd. We demonstreren hoe databases een coördinatie regime 
zijn geworden. De databases faciliteren zowel de interactie tussen beleid en 
klinische praktijk, als de interactie tussen collectieve vormen van expertise. Het 
laatste houdt in het combineren van mensen (clinici, onderzoekers, beheerders, 
patiënten, etc.) en objecten (entiteiten, instrumenten, hulpmiddelen technieken, 
etc.). Deze interacties maken het mogelijk dat nieuwe vormen van objectiviteit en 
regulering, zoals gereguleerde objectiviteit, ontstaan. Daardoor verandert de relatie 
tussen beleid en klinische praktijk. Hoewel de databases dus niet het onvertraagde 
en continue monitoren mogelijk maakte, zoals verwacht door de beleidsmakers, 
heeft het dynamische proces van continue dataverzameling en reflectie, door 
medische professionals en onderzoekers, wel het doel van de beleidsmakers 
bereikt. Namelijk, het stimuleren van gepast gebruik en vergoeden van 
geneesmiddelen in de klinische praktijk. Door nieuwe vormen van 
sturingsmechanismen aan te nemen in de huidige besluitvormingsinfrastructuur, 
zoals databases, wordt het mogelijk het gepast gebruik en vergoeden van 
geneesmiddelen in de (klinische) praktijk te stimuleren, en tegelijkertijd het werken 
naar legitieme besluitvorming te bevorderen. 
 
Hoofdstuk vijf combineert en exploreert de drie case studies van dit proefschrift: 
a) de conditionele vergoeding van extramurale geneesmiddelen, b) de conditionele 
vergoeding van intramurale geneesmiddelen, en c) the mogelijke toevoeging van 
budget impact als criterium in het beoordelingskader van het pakketbeheer. De 
cases zijn verkend en geanalyseerd wat betreft de dynamiek van legitieme 
besluitvorming vanuit een situationele benadering van regulerend gedrag. De 
sociologie van gesitueerde beoordeling geeft inzicht in het dynamische proces en 
de verschillende wijzen waarop actoren hun acties of besluitvorming legitimeren op 
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basis van de definiëring van een kader van verschillende “repertoires van 
rechtvaardiging”. Elk repertoire heeft zijn eigen karakteristieken en dynamiek, en 
voorziet actoren van symbolen, verhalen, wereldbeelden en materiële en 
organisatorische arrangementen, waaruit zij verschillende elementen kunnen 
selecteren waarmee hun acties worden gerechtvaardigd. De conceptie van 
repertoires is gebruikt om vier verschillende “repertoires van evaluatie” in de 
Nederlandse geneesmiddelenvergoedingen besluitvorming te identificeren: de 
repertoires van wetenschap, klinische praktijk, billijkheid, en proces. Elk repertoire 
omhelst verschillende vormen van kennis (bv impliciete, klinische, 
methodologische, gezondheidseconomische kennis), die achtereenvolgens waarde 
toekennen aan geneesmiddelen (beslissingen). Op basis van de identificatie van 
deze repertoires, laat dit hoofdstuk zien dat legitimiteit in de praktijk nauw verwant 
is aan de interactie tussen de verschillende repertoires, en aan de invloed van 
context op (de combinatie van) repertoires die legitimiteit produceren op een 
bepaald moment in het besluitvormingsproces. Het (gebrek aan) effect van 
sommige prioriteringsbeslissingen kan hierdoor begrepen worden als de 
(ontoereikende) incorporatie en interactie van de verschillende repertoires in het 
besluitvormingsproces. Ten slotte, pleit dit hoofdstuk voor een 
besluitvormingsproces dat voldoende rekenschap geeft van zijn omgeving zodra 
onzekerheden zich aandienen; het zoeken naar de dialoog met of consultatie van 
het netwerk, en het integreren van gerelateerde routines en regulering. 
 
De discussie en conclusie van dit proefschrift reflecteert op de vraag hoe de 
huidige infrastructuur van het pakketbeheer het gepast gebruik en vergoeden van 
geneesmiddelen stimuleert, en legitimiteit voor prioriteringsbeslissingen 
construeert. De evaluatie en exploratie van de verschillende beleidsinstrumenten 
heeft geleid tot drie hoofdbevindingen. Ten eerste, de huidige infrastructuur 
worstelt met de constructie van twee aparte domeinen: beleid en praktijk. De 
huidige infrastructuur verordent een artificiële scheiding, die de kennis vanuit de 
(klinische) praktijk buitensluit van beleid; het laat moraliteit en politiek in de 
besluitvorming niet toe. Het gebruik van bewijs in besluitvorming en transparante 
procedures hebben bijgedragen aan de vermeende autoriteit van 
gezondheidsbeleidsmakers, en daarmee de acceptatie en validiteit van hun 
argumentatie. Echter, er wordt weinig aandacht besteed aan de verschillende 
rationaliteiten ten aanzien van (de waarde van) geneesmiddelen. Ten tweede kan 
legitimiteit van besluitvorming niet simpel worden geconstrueerd, maar bestaat dit 
uit veel werk. Het legitimeren van besluitvorming is gerelateerd aan de acceptatie 
en validiteit van de activiteit ‘besluitvorming’. Ten laatste, een dusdanige 
herdefiniëring houdt in dat vergoedingsbesluiten niet gezien moeten worden als het 
einde van het besluitvormingsproces, maar als slechts een enkel doch belangrijk 
punt in het proces van sturen van gepast gebruik en vergoeden van 
Samenvatting 
177 
geneesmiddelen. De opname, of verwijdering, van een geneesmiddel in het 
basispakket of in een regeling door het Ministerie van VWS staat daarmee aan het 
begin van de stimulering van het gepast gebruiken en vergoeden van 
geneesmiddelen. 
 
Tot besluit, het werken naar legitimiteit van besluitvorming vereist een andere 
benadering van het sturen van het gepast gebruik en vergoeden van 
geneesmiddelen, zo laat dit proefschrift zien. In deze benadering staat het proces 
van geneesmiddelenvergoedingen niet aan het einde, maar aan het begin van het 
legitimeren van prioriteringsbeslissingen. De infrastructuur van het Nederlandse 
pakketbeheer zal dan zo moeten worden (her)ontworpen, dat deze de continue 
interactie tussen beleid, wetenschap en praktijk stimuleert en daarmee ook reflectie 
op het gepast gebruik van geneesmiddelen. Het (h)erkennen van de 
verscheidenheid aan kennisvormen die prioriteringsbeslissingen legitimeren, is een 
fundamentele stap in het vestigen van nieuwe sturingsmechanismen voor het 
gepast gebruik en vergoeden van geneesmiddelen. Uiteindelijk is het het proces 
en de activiteit van besluitvorming dat de legitimiteit van prioriteringsbeslissingen 
waarborgt, en niet de robuustheid van bewijs of de formele procedure alleen. 
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Op deze plek wil ik iedereen bedanken, die in de afgelopen jaren samen met mij 
‘het promotiepad’ heeft bewandeld. Sommigen hebben zij aan zij met mij 
gewandeld. Anderen trokken juist even de kar of gaven mij een duw de goede kant 
op. Dan zijn er ook nog wandelaars, die er zich niet eens bewust van zijn dat ik hen 
dank schuldig ben.  
 
Allereerst mijn (co)promotoren Roland Bal, Elly Stolk en Antoinette de Bont. Waar 
ik eerst met eenieder apart ben gaan rondstruinen, zijn we geëindigd in een 
gezamenlijke verkenning van het weelderige woud van 
geneesmiddelenbesluitvorming. Jullie visie en inzichten waren inspirerend en 
maakten dat ik dit woud vanuit vele invalshoeken heb mogen verkennen. Dat dit 
soms botsingen van ideeën met zich meebracht, heeft er toe geleid dat ik een 
uitdagend maar ook mooi pad heb bewandeld; hoewel misschien niet volgens de 
kortste route. Roland, zeker in de laatste twee jaren van mijn promotietraject is 
jouw begeleiding op het STS-pad van grote waarde geweest. Door mee te zoeken 
naar passende analytische begrippen om de grote hoeveelheid empirisch 
materiaal te ordenen en door mij aan te sporen tot (meer) conceptueel denken, is 
mijn expeditie vele malen mooier geworden. Elly, jouw vertrouwen in mij als 
sociaalwetenschappelijk onderzoeker binnen de gezondheidseconomische wereld 
was zo groot, dat je het lef had mij drie maanden voor mijn zwangerschapsverlof 
aan te nemen op het ‘Third Man-project’. Dat vertrouwen zal in de loop der tijd af 
en toe wel deuken hebben opgelopen, toch hoop ik dat je nu met trots kunt 
zeggen: “dat is mijn promovenda”. Antoinette, jij weet als geen ander wanneer 
richting te geven, zij aan zij te wandelen, of juist op gepaste afstand toe te kijken 
hoe iemand zijn eigen weg zoekt en vindt. Die gave maakt van jou een unieke en 
prettige begeleider op het promotiepad. Ik ben dan ook zeer dankbaar dat ik jou 
heb mogen ontmoeten. 
 
Eén reden die deze wandeling langer maakte, is het werken in multidisciplinaire 
onderzoeksteams. Herman Stoevelaar, Arthur Eyck, Louis Niessen, Antoinette de 
Bont, Elly Stolk, Jan van Busschbach en Joshua Cohen, ik heb veel plezier gehad 
tijdens onze samenwerking. Herman, dankzij jou heb ik mijn eerste stappen gezet 
in de onderzoekswereld: ze smaakten naar meer! Arthur, jij nam me letterlijk en 
figuurlijk mee op excursie door de wondere wereld van de gezondheidszorg. Onze 
inspirerende gesprekken rondom interviews of bij jou thuis zullen mij zeker bij 
blijven. Joshua, het bezoek aan Boston was onvergetelijk; omdat jij het mogelijk 
maakte een gedeelte van de summer course bij Norman Daniëls aan Harvard 
School of Public Health te volgen. Maar minstens zo dankbaar ben ik je vanwege 
ons bezoek aan mijn eerste NBA-wedstrijd ooit! 
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Mijn respondenten bedank ik voor de interessante en informatieve gesprekken en 
de tijd die ze daarvoor hebben genomen. Speciaal wil ik de medewerkers van het 
College voor zorgverzekeringen en het Ministerie van VWS bedanken. Sommigen 
heb ik meermaals gesproken en steeds was ik welkom. Ook Carin Uyl en Adri 
Steenhoek wil ik bedanken, omdat zij altijd bereid waren mijn vragen te bespreken 
over het onderzoek naar dure geneesmiddelen. ZonMW en MagMW bedank ik 
voor het financieren van de verschillende projecten, waardoor een langdurig verblijf 
in het woud van de geneesmiddelenbesluitvorming mogelijk was. 
 
In mijn tijd bij het iBMG, waarvan de laatste jaren bij de sectie Health Care 
Governance, heb ik vele mensen mogen ontmoeten die eenzelfde pad aan het 
bewandelen waren, bewandeld hebben, hier juist mee stopten, of op andere wijze 
betrokken waren bij mijn promotietraject. Graag wil ik daarom mijn (ex)collega’s bij 
het iBMG hartelijk danken voor de gezellige en inspirerende lunches, discussies en 
congresbezoeken. Vooral ook dank aan alle kamergenoten die ik in de loop der 
jaren heb versleten: Addy, Femke, Floor, Hester, Jolanda, Joyce, Lonneke, 
Maarten, Marit, Marjan en Zarah. Jolanda, voor jou een speciaal woord van dank, 
omdat jij bereidt bent om het laatste uur van mijn tocht letterlijk aan mijn zijde te 
staan als paranimf. Maar vooral ook, omdat jouw bemoedigende woorden mij op 
cruciale momenten overeind hebben gehouden. Onze gesprekken over het 
combineren en balanceren van werk en gezin, met alle mooie en minder 
aangename aspecten daarvan, maakte het promotiepad ook op persoonlijk vlak 
zeer waardevol. Hester, jouw humor en sarcasme zijn verfrissend en maakten het 
werken bij iBMG tot een plezierige tijd. Sonja, je bent een mooi en warm mens. Ik 
heb genoten van onze samenwerking bij het vak Health Care Governance. Met 
veel vertrouwen heb ik het coördinatorschap aan jou overgedragen. Samantha, 
zonder jouw kritische opmerkingen en stijlverbeteringen was ik nu nog aan het 
schrijven geweest. Ik dank je voor jouw steun, maar vooral ook voor je vertrouwen 
in mij: dat ik het echt zelf kon, Thanks! 
 
Inmiddels werk ik met veel plezier bij Tranzo, een inspirerende werkomgeving, 
waar ik met hernieuwde energie mijn proefschrift heb kunnen en willen afschrijven. 
Hoewel ik Tranzo vaak omschrijf als een duiventil waar iedereen te pas en te 
onpas in- en uitvliegt, is het ook een warm nest. Leonieke, onze koffiemomenten 
koester ik en ik hoop dan ook dat ze zullen blijven tot het einde van jóuw 
promotietraject. Henk, wat was ik de eerste keer verbaasd dat jij persoonlijk alle 
‘Tranzuelen’ kwam uitnodigen voor de lunch en nog meer toen dat de volgende 
dag weer gebeurde. Het staat symbool voor de warmte van het Tranzo-nest. 
Jolanda, wat is het heerlijk dat jij mij de gelegenheid biedt om mijn geleerde kennis 
nu in de praktijk te brengen en daarmee uit te breiden. 
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Dan zijn er nog de mensen die, zonder dat ze het weten, heel belangrijk zijn 
geworden voor het bereiken van het einde van deze wandeling. Lieve Charlotte, 
Merla en Maike, jullie zijn er altijd voor mij, ook als ik weer eens tijden niets van me 
heb laten horen. Onze etentjes, gesprekken en vakanties zijn soms therapeutisch, 
maar vooral gezellig. Charlotte, samen met jou op en buiten het basketbalveld, 
maakt van het leven een feest. En ondanks dat je geen idee had wat het inhield 
om mijn paranimf te zijn, heb je volmondig ja gezegd. Die onvoorwaardelijke steun 
betekent veel voor mij. Merla, elke keer dat we weer een etentje plannen, kijk ik 
daar enorm naar uit. Niets is prettiger dan samen met jou over onze kinderen, 
familie, werk, wensen en dromen te praten. Maike, al vanaf het Hertog Jan delen 
we onze levenspaden, de ene keer lopen ze wat dichter bij elkaar dan de andere, 
maar ik weet dat jij er altijd bent en hoop dat jij mij blijft vinden. 
 
Dan het finale stuk van het promotiepad. Hier komen de mensen aan bod aan wie 
ik misschien wel de meeste dank verschuldigd ben. Lieve pa Ben en mam, soms 
zullen jullie je afvragen waar jullie drie promoverende dochters aan te danken 
hebben (in goede en slechte zin). Ik denk, pap, omdat jij laat zien dat leren niet iets 
is van school alleen, maar als je aan het leven en je werk hecht, een continu 
proces van verrijking is. En mam, ik herken mij in jouw doorzettingsvermogen en 
interesse in het welzijn van anderen. Eén ding staat buiten kijf, zonder jullie steun 
zou dit pad voor mij en mijn gezin niet te bewandelen geweest zijn! Renske en 
Jonne, lieve zussen, dank voor jullie oprechte interesse in mijn proefschrift, het 
kritisch bekijken van de (op één na) laatste versie en de fijne gesprekken buiten 
het promoveren om. Mijn schoonouders, Jan en Kitty, bedankt voor jullie steun en 
het vele oppassen. Ook Jacqueline, Dirk, Robert en Ramon, bedankt voor jullie 
gezonde (des)interesse in mijn proefschrift.  
Lieve Maurice, samen met jou het levenspad bewandelen is mooi. De afgelopen 
jaren zijn uitdagend geweest met vele mooie hoogtepunten. Jouw humor, warmte 
en vertrouwen, maakte dat mijn promotiepad goed begaanbaar bleef. Samen wil ik 
over een tijdje wel weer een nieuw avontuur aangaan, maar voor nu mogen we 
even rustig doorwandelen en genieten van wat we samen hebben bereikt. Mirte, 
Silke en Pim, tijdens mijn promotietraject hebben jullie me altijd weer op het rechte 
pad gekregen, daar waar het in de wereld echt om draait. Dat ik jullie mag 
begeleiden en mag toekijken hoe jullie je ontwikkelen en steeds meer je eigen weg 
kiezen, is een voorrecht waar ik nog lang van hoop te genieten. 
 
Maartje Niezen  
April 2012 
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